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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

Candidate General Ontologies for Situating Quantum Field Theory

PETER M. SIMONS

Published Nov 1, 2002• 22 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Ontology is traditionally an a priori discipline purveying its categories and principles independently of mere facts, but this arrogance of philosophers has led them into latent or patent incompatibility with good science and has landed them with philosophical aporiai such as the mind-body problem and the universals dispute. So while maintaining the abstractness and systematic universality of ontology it pays to craft one's categories with an eye to the best empirical science, while not necessarily trying to read the ontology off that science. I present desiderata for a systematic ontology and give several reasons why one cannot use physical theory alone as the source of one's a posteriori ontology. With this in mind I survey six ontological theories as possible frameworks for QFT, four briefly, two at greater length. The first is the traditional substanceattribute metaphysic, which is clearly obsolete, and on which I expend little time. The second is its modern logico-linguistic replacement, the ontology of individuals and sets touted as semantic values in logical semantics. This too falls by the wayside for several reasons. A third is the closely related ontology or ontologies of facts, against which I argue on general grounds. A fourth is Whiteheadian process ontology, which is an improvement over the previous three but still leaves several questions unsatisfactorily answered. The most flexible and promising to date is the ontology of tropes and trope bundles, which I have discussed in several places. After expounding this I reject it not because it is false but because it is neither broad nor deep enough. As a final, sixth alternative, I present an ontology of invariant factors inspired in part by Whitehead and in part by remarks of Max Planck, and offer it as a promising future abstract framework within which to situate the physics of QFT.

DOI
10.1142/9789812776440_0002

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Approaches to Ontology: Candidate General Ontologies for Situating Quantum Field (P Simons) 'Quanta', Tropes, or Processes: Ontologies for QFT Beyond the Myth of Substance (J Seibt) Analytical Ontologists in Action: A Comment on Seibt and Simons (M Kuhlmann) How Do Field Theories Refer to Entities in a Field? (S Y Auyang) Field Ontologies for QFT: A Naive View of the Quantum Field (A Wayne) Comments on Paul Teller's Book, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (G Fleming) So What Is the Quantum Field? (P Teller) Relativity, Measurement and Renormalization: On the Nature of Measurement Records in Relativistic Quantum Field (J A Barrett) No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories? (H Halvorson & R Clifton) Events and Covariance in the Interpretation of Quantum Field (D Dieks) Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields? (B Falkenburg) Renormalization and the Disunity of Science (N Huggett) Gauge Symmetries and the Vacuum: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Redhead) Comment on Redhead: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Drieschner et al.) Is the Zero-Point Energy Real? (S Saunders) Two Comments on the Vacuum in Algebraic Quantum Field (M Redei).

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Nov 1, 2002•114 citations
Ontology is traditionally an a priori discipline purveying its categories and principles independently of mere facts, but this arrogance of philosophers has led them into latent or patent incompatibility with good science and has landed them with philosophical aporiai such as the mind-body problem and the universals dispute. So while maintaining the abstractness and systematic universality of ontology it pays to craft one's categories with an eye to the best empirical science, while not necessarily trying to read the ontology off that science. I present desiderata for a systematic ontology and give several reasons why one cannot use physical theory alone as the source of one's a posteriori ontology. With this in mind I survey six ontological theories as possible frameworks for QFT, four briefly, two at greater length. The first is the traditional substanceattribute metaphysic, which is clearly obsolete, and on which I expend little time. The second is its modern logico-linguistic replacement, the ontology of individuals and sets touted as semantic values in logical semantics. This too falls by the wayside for several reasons. A third is the closely related ontology or ontologies of facts, against which I argue on general grounds. A fourth is Whiteheadian process ontology, which is an improvement over the previous three but still leaves several questions unsatisfactorily answered. The most flexible and promising to date is the ontology of tropes and trope bundles, which I have discussed in several places. After expounding this I reject it not because it is false but because it is neither broad nor deep enough. As a final, sixth alternative, I present an ontology of invariant factors inspired in part by Whitehead and in part by remarks of Max Planck, and offer it as a promising future abstract framework within which to situate the physics of QFT.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Quantum field theory (QFT) can be analyzed in terms of its mathematical structure, its conceptual system for physical descriptions, or its basic ontology. The analysis can be done logically or historically. In this chapter, only the genesis of the conceptual foundations of QFT relevant to its basic ontology will be treated; no discussion of its mathematical structures or its epistemological underpinnings will be given. Some conceptual problems, such as those related to probability and measurement, will be discussed, but only because of their relevance to the basic ontology of QFT, rather than their intrinsic philosophical interest. Here, by basic ontology I mean the irreducible entities that QFT is invented to describe. The often mentioned candidates for the basic ontology of QFT, in fact of the physical world, are the discrete particle and the continuous field. Another possible candidate (the spacetime point) has also been suggested recently (Redhead, 1983). Since the aim of this chapter is to analyze the historical process in which the conceptual foundations of QFT were laid down, rather than the logical structure of QFT which philosophers of the present day treat, no discussion of the last possibility will be given. The content of this chapter involves the formation and interpretation, in a roughly chronological order, of the concepts of the wave function, quantization, quantization of the field, the vacuum, interactions between fields, and renormalization. The first two topics will be discussed in relation to the quantization of the field, with their role being taken as the starting point of the conceptual development of QFT.
The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and individuality are primitive may be preferred. In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by current science - I deal with the question regarding whether and how the ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that constitute the basic 'building blocks' of reality are identified with the state-independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to do with quantum statistics are accounted for. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.
Approaches to Ontology: Candidate General Ontologies for Situating Quantum Field (P Simons) 'Quanta', Tropes, or Processes: Ontologies for QFT Beyond the Myth of Substance (J Seibt) Analytical Ontologists in Action: A Comment on Seibt and Simons (M Kuhlmann) How Do Field Theories Refer to Entities in a Field? (S Y Auyang) Field Ontologies for QFT: A Naive View of the Quantum Field (A Wayne) Comments on Paul Teller's Book, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (G Fleming) So What Is the Quantum Field? (P Teller) Relativity, Measurement and Renormalization: On the Nature of Measurement Records in Relativistic Quantum Field (J A Barrett) No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories? (H Halvorson & R Clifton) Events and Covariance in the Interpretation of Quantum Field (D Dieks) Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields? (B Falkenburg) Renormalization and the Disunity of Science (N Huggett) Gauge Symmetries and the Vacuum: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Redhead) Comment on Redhead: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Drieschner et al.) Is the Zero-Point Energy Real? (S Saunders) Two Comments on the Vacuum in Algebraic Quantum Field (M Redei).