This paper proposes a new post-quantum signature scheme, Syrga2, based on hash functions. As known, existing post-quantum algorithms are classified based on their structures. The proposed Syrga2 scheme belongs to the class of multi-use signatures with state retention. A distinctive feature of state-retaining signatures is achieving a compromise between performance and signature size. This scheme enables the creation of a secure signature for r messages using a single pair of secret and public keys. The strength of signature algorithms based on hash functions depends on the properties of the hash function used in their structure. Additionally, for such algorithms, it is possible to specify the security level precisely. In the proposed scheme, the HBC-256 algorithm developed at the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies (IICT) is used as the hash function. The security of the HBC-256 algorithm has been thoroughly studied in other works by the authors. In contrast to the Syrga1 scheme presented in previous works by the authors, the Syrga2 scheme provides for the definition of different security levels determined by the parameter τ. This paper experimentally demonstrates the impossibility of breaking the proposed scheme using a chosen-plaintext attack. Additionally, the scheme’s performance is evaluated for signature creation, signing, and message verification.
This paper proposes a new post-quantum signature scheme, Syrga2, based on hash functions. As known, existing post-quantum algorithms are classified based on their structures. The proposed Syrga2 scheme belongs to the class of multi-use signatures with state retention. A distinctive feature of state-retaining signatures is achieving a compromise between performance and signature size. This scheme enables the creation of a secure signature for r messages using a single pair of secret and public keys. The strength of signature algorithms based on hash functions depends on the properties of the hash function used in their structure. Additionally, for such algorithms, it is possible to specify the security level precisely. In the proposed scheme, the HBC-256 algorithm developed at the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies (IICT) is used as the hash function. The security of the HBC-256 algorithm has been thoroughly studied in other works by the authors. In contrast to the Syrga1 scheme presented in previous works by the authors, the Syrga2 scheme provides for the definition of different security levels determined by the parameter τ. This paper experimentally demonstrates the impossibility of breaking the proposed scheme using a chosen-plaintext attack. Additionally, the scheme’s performance is evaluated for signature creation, signing, and message verification.
With the rapid development of quantum technologies, quantum-safe cryptography has found significant attention. Hash-based signature schemes have been in particular of interest because of (i) the importance of digital signature as the main source of trust on the Internet, (ii) the fact that the security of these signatures relies on existence of one-way functions, which is the minimal assumption for signature schemes, and (iii) they can be efficiently implemented. Basic hash-based signatures are for a single message, but have been extended for signing multiple messages. In this paper we design a Multi-message Signature Scheme (MSS) based on an existing One-Time Signature (OTS) that we refer to as KSN-OTS. KSN uses SWIFFT, an additive homomorphic lattice-based hash function family with provable one-wayness property, as the one-way-function and achieves a short signature. We prove security of our proposed signature scheme in a new strengthened security model (multi-target multi-function) of MSS, determine the system parameters for 512 bit classical (256 bit quantum) security, and compare parameter sizes of our scheme against XMSS, a widely studied hash based MSS that has been a candidate for NIST standardization of post-quantum signature scheme. We give an efficient implementation of our scheme using Intel SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) instruction set. For this, we first implement SWIFFT computation using a SIMD parallelization of Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) of elements of the ring Zp[X]/(Xn+1), that can support different levels of parallelization. We compare efficiency of this implementation with a comparable (security level) implementation of XMSS and show its superior performance on a number of efficiency parameters.
The paper offers a novel digital signature scheme that integrates ElGamal cryptographic principles with the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem, specifically designed to ensure post-quantum security. As quantum computers advance and present significant risks to traditional cryptographic systems, this scheme offers an interesting alternative for securing digital signatures against potential quantum threats. The scheme uses only basic secure principles. The offered approach offers key generation, where parameters and random matrices are selected, and signature generation, which involves creating signatures based on hashed messages and matrix computations. Verification ensures the authenticity and integrity of signatures. We provide experimental evaluations detailing key generation, signature creation, and verification times across different matrix dimensions and message sizes. Key generation takes between 2.5–10.2 seconds, while signature generation ranges from 0.20 to 9.30 milliseconds and verification from 0.18 to 8.90 milliseconds, depending on message size and matrix dimension. The scheme maintains a consistent signature size of 1.7 KB, independent of message length due to a hash-and-sign strategy. These results demonstrate that the scheme balances post-quantum security with practical performance, especially in high-security contexts. A comparison with traditional ElGamal encryption reveals the trade-offs between security and efficiency. While the SIS-based scheme delivers enhanced protection against quantum threats, it also entails increased computational complexity and larger signature sizes compared to conventional schemes. Overall, our proposed digital signature scheme stands as an excellent option for safe communications in a post-quantum world, representing a crucial step in protecting the authenticity and integrity of digital exchanges against changing technological risks. We believe that as quantum computing continues to develop, research into robust cryptographic alternatives will become increasingly important for safeguarding sensitive information across various sectors.
We are surrounded by many smart applications that make human life efficient. The general concept of IoT applications involves communication between devices. To make our smart environment secure, authentication is the most important requirement to be achieved to avoid unwanted attacks. Cryptographic schemes used currently in such IoT devices are public-key cryptographic primitives that are vulnerable to future quantum attacks. Quantum approaches derived by Shor and Grover will break the public-key primitives with square root and cube root speedups. Hence, there is a need to develop a successful and efficient signature scheme to authenticate such devices. Post-quantum cryptographic approaches are based on hard mathematical problems which are difficult to break by future attacks. Amongst all these post-quantum signature approaches, hash-based post-quantum signatures incorporate existing hash algorithms to achieve the required security level. This paper summarises stateful hash-based post-quantum signature schemes that can be implemented on constrained devices for IoT applications.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a serious threat to classical digital signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA, which rely on mathematical problems vulnerable to quantum attacks. Hash-based digital signatures offer a strong post-quantum alternative due to their reliance on cryptographic hash functions and their resistance to both classical and quantum adversaries. This study evaluates the feasibility of hash-based signatures in lightweight and resource-constrained environments by implementing three representative schemes: Lamport One-Time Signatures (OTS), Winternitz One-Time Signatures (WOTS), and Merkle-WOTS. The analysis focuses on key performance factors relevant to constrained devices, including key size, signature size, signing time, and verification speed. Experimental results show that while Lamport OTS provides conceptual simplicity and WOTS offers improved efficiency, the Merkle-WOTS scheme delivers the most practical balance. It supports multiple signatures under a compact public key while maintaining moderate signature sizes and competitive performance. These findings indicate that Merkle-WOTS is a strong candidate for post-quantum authentication in IoT and other lightweight embedded systems.
The rapid development of quantum computing poses a threat to traditional public-key systems. The existing Internet security framework relies heavily on public-key cryptography and hash functions, with classical algorithms such as RSA and ECC widely used for digital signatures and identity authentication. Meanwhile, quantum algorithms, represented by Shor’s algorithm and Grover’s algorithm, which can solve the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time or significantly accelerate brute-force attacks on symmetric ciphers, posing a fundamental threat to traditional public-key cryptographic systems. To address the security threats posed by quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography has emerged. Transition schemes, such as the NIST post-quantum standards, have been proposed; however, new post-quantum algorithms require significantly more computational time for verification than traditional algorithms, and their migration into practical network protocols and blockchain systems presents considerable challenges. Among these, post-quantum digital signature technology is a key branch. This paper systematically reviews research progress in post-quantum digital signatures, summarizes NIST-standardized algorithms and cutting-edge non-standard schemes, and compares the performance of typical algorithms.
The emergence of quantum computing threatens the security assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems across modern digital infrastructures. This challenge has accelerated the development of post-quantum cryptographic primitives capable of resisting quantum-capable adversaries. Among these, hash-based signature schemes are widely recognized as strong post-quantum candidates because their security relies solely on cryptographic hash functions. However, existing multi-time hash-based signature schemes, such as XMSS, rely on Merkle-tree structures to manage one-time signature keys, resulting in additional computational, communication, and verification overhead due to authentication-path construction and traversal.