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IEEE Internet of Things Journal

LPQ-HBSS: A Lightweight Post-Quantum Hash-Based Signature Scheme for Fog-Enabled Internet of Things Systems

Efat Fathalla, Raveendra Babu Ponnuru, Mohamed Azab

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The emergence of quantum computing threatens the security assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems across modern digital infrastructures. This challenge has accelerated the development of post-quantum cryptographic primitives capable of resisting quantum-capable adversaries. Among these, hash-based signature schemes are widely recognized as strong post-quantum candidates because their security relies solely on cryptographic hash functions. However, existing multi-time hash-based signature schemes, such as XMSS, rely on Merkle-tree structures to manage one-time signature keys, resulting in additional computational, communication, and verification overhead due to authentication-path construction and traversal.

DOI
10.1109/jiot.2026.3736052

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The emergence of quantum computing threatens the security assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems across modern digital infrastructures. This challenge has accelerated the development of post-quantum cryptographic primitives capable of resisting quantum-capable adversaries. Among these, hash-based signature schemes are widely recognized as strong post-quantum candidates because their security relies solely on cryptographic hash functions. However, existing multi-time hash-based signature schemes, such as XMSS, rely on Merkle-tree structures to manage one-time signature keys, resulting in additional computational, communication, and verification overhead due to authentication-path construction and traversal.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a serious threat to classical digital signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA, which rely on mathematical problems vulnerable to quantum attacks. Hash-based digital signatures offer a strong post-quantum alternative due to their reliance on cryptographic hash functions and their resistance to both classical and quantum adversaries. This study evaluates the feasibility of hash-based signatures in lightweight and resource-constrained environments by implementing three representative schemes: Lamport One-Time Signatures (OTS), Winternitz One-Time Signatures (WOTS), and Merkle-WOTS. The analysis focuses on key performance factors relevant to constrained devices, including key size, signature size, signing time, and verification speed. Experimental results show that while Lamport OTS provides conceptual simplicity and WOTS offers improved efficiency, the Merkle-WOTS scheme delivers the most practical balance. It supports multiple signatures under a compact public key while maintaining moderate signature sizes and competitive performance. These findings indicate that Merkle-WOTS is a strong candidate for post-quantum authentication in IoT and other lightweight embedded systems.
Quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of IoT networks, as traditional cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC become vulnerable to quantum attacks. While research into post-quantum cryptography is ongoing, many proposed solutions remain resource-intensive. Merkle tree-based one-time signature (OTS) schemes, commonly used for key management, impose substantial computational and communication burdens, particularly when generating signature verification paths. This paper proposes a lightweight post-quantum key man-agement scheme called the hashblock signature scheme (HBSS). By utilizing an N-dimensional matrix structure, HBSS reduces communication, storage, and computational demands, making it a scalable and efficient solution for IoT digital signatures, thereby enhancing security while minimizing resource usage.
Group signatures, due to their inherent advantages in anonymous authentication, have been widely adopted in privacy-preserving multi-device authentication and related scenarios, establishing themselves as a fundamental cryptographic building block for securing communications in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems. However, existing post-quantum group signature schemes suffer from excessively large signature sizes, lack of strong non-frameability, and insufficient privilege separation, making them difficult to meet the efficiency and security requirements of IIoT. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a hash-based post-quantum group signature scheme (HPGS) for IIoT, which employs the SPHINCS+variant CEDRUS and MPC-in-the-Head zero-knowledge proofs. Specifically, we optimize the zero-knowledge proof circuit and Merkle tree parameters, and introduce an epoch-based Merkle tree accumulator to constrain the signature size to the kilobyte scale while supporting dynamic enrollment and revocation. Next, we design a member self-key-generation mechanism, where each member independently generates the signing key and only registers a public commitment, guaranteeing strong non-frameability. Furthermore, we distribute credential issuance and signature opening to two independent entities, enforcing protocol-level privilege separation. Experimental results show that, under NIST Level 1 post-quantum security, the scheme achieves a signature size of 47.07 KB, an online signing time of 104 μs, and a verification time of 1.4 ms, outperforming existing schemes in signing speed, verification efficiency, and functional completeness.
Modern public-key cryptography relies on the hardness of mathematical problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. However, the development of quantum computing poses an imminent threat to these assumptions. Shor’s algorithm, in particular, can factor large semiprimes exponentially faster than classical algorithms, compromising systems like RSA, DSA, and ECC. This paper explores the mathematical foundations of pre-quantum cryptography, discusses the limitations of classical security models when confronted with quantum capabilities, and then pays attention to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a field dedicated to developing cryptographic schemes resilient against both classical and quantum attacks. Among the proposed families, this paper focuses specifically on hash function–based cryptography for its simplicity and minimal reliance on algebraic structure. This study focuses in particular on SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based digital signature scheme currently under consideration by NIST. Through detailed mathematical explanation and a visual example, we analyze its construction using Winternitz One-Time Signatures and Merkle trees. The results highlight SPHINCS+ as a robust candidate for post-quantum security due to its reliance on well-understood hash primitives and its resistance to known quantum algorithms such as Grover’s. Finally, this paper discusses ongoing challenges such as performance trade-offs, standardization, and real-world deployment. This research underscores the urgency of adopting quantum-resistant cryptographic systems before large-scale quantum computers become a reality.
Satellite communication networks play a critical role in providing connectivity to remote regions and areas with limited infrastructure. However, their inherently open nature and physical exposure make them particularly susceptible to security threats, including replay, impersonation, and man-in- the-middle attacks. The emergence of quantum computing further undermines the robustness of conventional cryptographic schemes that rely on number-theoretic assumptions. To mitigate these challenges, this article proposesHBQS, a lightweight post-quantum authentication framework designed for satellite platforms with limited resources.HBQSintegrates Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) with hash-based cryptography, leveraging SPHINCS+ digital signatures and SHA-3 hashing to provide secure mutual authentication and session key establishment. The protocolHBQSwas implemented and evaluated on embedded hardware platforms, including Raspberry Pi 4.0, PYNQ-Z2 FPGA, and a Dell ground control station. The experimental results demonstrate thatHBQSachieves mutual authentication in 0.88 ms, offering an approximately 67% reduction in execution time compared to representative baselines from the prior literature. Entropy analysis confirms that the proposed protocol maintains a high entropy across critical components, withHBQSachieving a signature entropy of 164.63 bits and PUF response entropy of 172.58 bits, indicating strong resistance to statistical and modeling attacks. A formal security analysis conducted within the Random Oracle Model demonstrates semantic security against both classical and quantum adversaries. The protocolHBQSshows a significant improvement over existing methods, achieving approximately 67% reduction in computational execution time, approximately 11.5% faster user-side handshake time, approximately 0.6% improvement on the satellite side and full security coverage across all evaluated security features with only a 21.4% increase in static memory usage as the trade-off. These findings positionHBQSas an efficient, secure, and scalable authentication solution for next-generation satellite communication systems operating in the post-quantum era.
As quantum computing advances, classical public-key cryptosystems face escalating risks, driving global standardization efforts by NIST, ETSI, and ISO. This paper provides a comprehensive review of recent developments in post-quantum cryptography (PQC), focusing on lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate approaches. We examine their security foundations, implementation challenges, and applicability across domains such as finance, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT). A core contribution is the proposed Hybrid Cryptographic Framework (HCF), which combines classical and quantum-resistant primitives to enable a secure and interoperable migration path. The framework integrates hybrid key exchange, dual-signature schemes, and PQC-compatible Merkle trees, and is supported by a discrete multi-objective optimization model for selecting algorithms under real-world constraints. The paper also discusses deployment challenges, including hardware acceleration, side-channel resistance, and legacy compatibility. Real-world case studies illustrate how leading institutions are piloting PQC integration in practice. Finally, we propose a strategic roadmap for PQC adoption, incorporating adaptive triggers based on quantum capabilities and evolving threat models. By aligning cryptographic design with international standards and practical system requirements, this work offers guidance for building resilient, quantum-safe infrastructures.