The increasing demand in data rates and new emerging applications require that the future generation of satellite networks will be designed at sub-THz frequencies with ultra-broad bandwidth. Such next generation communication network owing to its own complexity will be prone to cyberattacks. In this study, we design a physical layer security for the next generation LEO satellite link. We consider a scenario where Eve is placed at a certain distance from the legitimate ground station (Bob) while communicating with low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Alice). By taking advantage of the uniqueness of THz atmospheric channel, we derive a closed form expression of the optimum power spectral density (PSD) of the transmitted signal so as to maximize the channel capacity. By leveraging the higher losses due to atmospheric channel and optimum PSD, we improve the physical layer security of the satellite link in the considered scenario. The simulation results show that we can enhance the normalized secrecy capacity beyond a small coverage area near the legitimate receiver Bob.
The increasing demand in data rates and new emerging applications require that the future generation of satellite networks will be designed at sub-THz frequencies with ultra-broad bandwidth. Such next generation communication network owing to its own complexity will be prone to cyberattacks. In this study, we design a physical layer security for the next generation LEO satellite link. We consider a scenario where Eve is placed at a certain distance from the legitimate ground station (Bob) while communicating with low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Alice). By taking advantage of the uniqueness of THz atmospheric channel, we derive a closed form expression of the optimum power spectral density (PSD) of the transmitted signal so as to maximize the channel capacity. By leveraging the higher losses due to atmospheric channel and optimum PSD, we improve the physical layer security of the satellite link in the considered scenario. The simulation results show that we can enhance the normalized secrecy capacity beyond a small coverage area near the legitimate receiver Bob.
With the rapid advancement of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, ensuring the security of satellite-to-ground communication has become a critical concern. Traditional cryptographic techniques, while effective against classical attacks, face increasing threats from quantum computing. This paper proposes a quantum key secure transmission method tailored for LEO satellite-ground communication scenarios. The method integrates quantum key distribution (QKD) with dynamic channel estimation and orbital mobility prediction to support secure and low-latency key handshakes between satellites and ground stations. A hybrid encryption strategy is introduced, where QKD-generated keys are used to refresh symmetric session keys in real time, significantly enhancing resistance to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method ensures stable key distribution under Doppler-shifted and intermittent link conditions, achieving improved secrecy capacity and resilience against quantum-level adversaries. This work provides a viable and scalable quantum-safe communication solution for future secure satellite networks.
Physical layer security uses the inherent characteristics of the channel to protect data transmission, reducing reliance on encryption mechanisms at higher layers. This chapter explores key generation protocols that utilize unique channel fading patterns, such as shadowing, multipath propagation, and Doppler shifts, to generate cryptographically secure shared keys between satellites and ground stations. This ensures synchronization amid channel variations. Physical-layer authentication uses distinctive signal fingerprints, such as the channel impulse response, carrier frequency offset, and signal modulation imperfections, to verify the identity of communicating terminals and prevent spoofing attacks. Encryption techniques such as directional modulation focus transmitted signals spatially towards legitimate receivers via beamforming, thereby minimizing signal leakage to eavesdroppers. While these methods boast low computational overhead, making them suitable for resource-constrained satellite systems, they face challenges from rapidly changing channel conditions, including atmospheric turbulence and variations induced by orbital motion. Case studies, such as security enhancements in satellite-IoT links and inter-satellite communication, demonstrate the practical applications of these methods and highlight their critical role in strengthening the security of satellite communications at the physical layer.
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communications are vulnerable to eavesdropping due to open wireless links. To address this issue, a simplified artificial noise (AN)-aided physical layer security scheme is proposed. A practical system model including a multi-antenna LEO satellite, a single-antenna ground user, and multiple eavesdroppers is established, considering shadowed Rician fading and imperfect channel state information (CSI). The AN is projected into the null space of the legitimate user’s channel to avoid interference, while suppressing eavesdroppers. A fixed power allocation strategy is adopted for easy implementation. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms traditional methods in secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability (SOP) with low computational complexity, making it suitable for resource-constrained LEO satellite systems.
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communications are vulnerable to eavesdropping over open wireless links. This paper proposes a simplified artificial noise (AN)-aided physical layer security scheme. A system model with a multi-antenna LEO satellite, a single-antenna ground user, and multiple eavesdroppers is built under shadowed-Rician fading and imperfect channel state information. AN is projected into the null space of the legitimate channel to avoid interference, and fixed power allocation is adopted for low complexity. Simulations show the scheme achieves better secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability than traditional methods, suitable for resource-constrained LEO satellite systems.
In this paper, we consider a low earth orbit satellite communication system with a legitimate user and an eavesdropper and investigate its secrecy performance. Considering the beam coverage of the satellites, we propose a system where a friendly jammer satellite transmits artificial noise signals only to eavesdroppers. We obtain the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios taking into account the Nakagami-𝑚 fading and the positions of ground users and satellites. The CDFs are used to derive the analytical forms of the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, secrecy capacity outage probability, and average secrecy capacity. In addition, for tractability and insight, asymptotic forms are also investigated at a high-power regime. Finally, we present the numerical results to validate the obtained expressions and show the diversity order of the secrecy capacity.
To cope with the scarcity of radio frequency (RF) counterparts, free-space optics (FSO) based on satellite communications technologies have recently gained a lot of interest. Firstly, this investigates the security of space-to-ground intensity modulation/direct detection FSO satellite communications in various effects from the physical world, such as propagation loss, beam misalignment, cloud attenuation, and fading caused by atmospheric turbulence. Next, A wiretap channel composed of a genuine broadcaster Alice (i.e., the satellite), a legitimate user Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve is considered over turbulent channels characterized by the Fisher-Snedecor F distribution. In addition, the closed-form expressions of the secrecy performance metrics, including average secrecy capacity, secrecy outage probability, and strictly positive secrecy capacity, are derived in our study. Finally, the numerical findings indicate that the satellite altitude of 600 km should be used to achieve a secrecy outage of roughly 50% for the whole turbulence regime. In addition, high levels of cloud liquid water content (CLWC) could improve the secrecy performance as it is shown that, the average secrecy capacity increases by about 12% when the CLWC increases from 1mg/m3 to 2mg/m3.