Physical layer security uses the inherent characteristics of the channel to protect data transmission, reducing reliance on encryption mechanisms at higher layers. This chapter explores key generation protocols that utilize unique channel fading patterns, such as shadowing, multipath propagation, and Doppler shifts, to generate cryptographically secure shared keys between satellites and ground stations. This ensures synchronization amid channel variations. Physical-layer authentication uses distinctive signal fingerprints, such as the channel impulse response, carrier frequency offset, and signal modulation imperfections, to verify the identity of communicating terminals and prevent spoofing attacks. Encryption techniques such as directional modulation focus transmitted signals spatially towards legitimate receivers via beamforming, thereby minimizing signal leakage to eavesdroppers. While these methods boast low computational overhead, making them suitable for resource-constrained satellite systems, they face challenges from rapidly changing channel conditions, including atmospheric turbulence and variations induced by orbital motion. Case studies, such as security enhancements in satellite-IoT links and inter-satellite communication, demonstrate the practical applications of these methods and highlight their critical role in strengthening the security of satellite communications at the physical layer.
Physical layer security uses the inherent characteristics of the channel to protect data transmission, reducing reliance on encryption mechanisms at higher layers. This chapter explores key generation protocols that utilize unique channel fading patterns, such as shadowing, multipath propagation, and Doppler shifts, to generate cryptographically secure shared keys between satellites and ground stations. This ensures synchronization amid channel variations. Physical-layer authentication uses distinctive signal fingerprints, such as the channel impulse response, carrier frequency offset, and signal modulation imperfections, to verify the identity of communicating terminals and prevent spoofing attacks. Encryption techniques such as directional modulation focus transmitted signals spatially towards legitimate receivers via beamforming, thereby minimizing signal leakage to eavesdroppers. While these methods boast low computational overhead, making them suitable for resource-constrained satellite systems, they face challenges from rapidly changing channel conditions, including atmospheric turbulence and variations induced by orbital motion. Case studies, such as security enhancements in satellite-IoT links and inter-satellite communication, demonstrate the practical applications of these methods and highlight their critical role in strengthening the security of satellite communications at the physical layer.
Abstract Satellite communications have emerged as a promising extension of terrestrial networks in future 6G network research due to their extensive coverage in remote areas and their ability to support the increasing traffic rate and heterogeneous networks. Like other wireless communication technologies, satellite signals are transmitted in a shared medium, making them vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping, jamming, and spoofing. A good candidate to overcome these issues is physical layer security (PLS), which utilizes physical layer characteristics to provide security, mainly due to its suitability for resource‐limited devices such as satellites and IoT devices. This paper provides a comprehensive and up‐to‐date review of PLS solutions to secure satellite communication. Main satellite applications are classified into five domains: satellite‐terrestrial, satellite‐based IoT, satellite navigation systems, FSO‐based, and inter‐satellite. In each domain, how PLS can improve the overall security of the system, preserve desirable security properties, and resist widespread attacks are discussed and investigated. Finally, some gaps in the related literature are highlight and open research problems, including uplink secrecy techniques, smart threat models, authentication and integrity techniques, PLS for inter‐satellite links, and machine learning‐based PLS, are discussed.
With the rapid advancement of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, ensuring the security of satellite-to-ground communication has become a critical concern. Traditional cryptographic techniques, while effective against classical attacks, face increasing threats from quantum computing. This paper proposes a quantum key secure transmission method tailored for LEO satellite-ground communication scenarios. The method integrates quantum key distribution (QKD) with dynamic channel estimation and orbital mobility prediction to support secure and low-latency key handshakes between satellites and ground stations. A hybrid encryption strategy is introduced, where QKD-generated keys are used to refresh symmetric session keys in real time, significantly enhancing resistance to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method ensures stable key distribution under Doppler-shifted and intermittent link conditions, achieving improved secrecy capacity and resilience against quantum-level adversaries. This work provides a viable and scalable quantum-safe communication solution for future secure satellite networks.
The increasing demand in data rates and new emerging applications require that the future generation of satellite networks will be designed at sub-THz frequencies with ultra-broad bandwidth. Such next generation communication network owing to its own complexity will be prone to cyberattacks. In this study, we design a physical layer security for the next generation LEO satellite link. We consider a scenario where Eve is placed at a certain distance from the legitimate ground station (Bob) while communicating with low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Alice). By taking advantage of the uniqueness of THz atmospheric channel, we derive a closed form expression of the optimum power spectral density (PSD) of the transmitted signal so as to maximize the channel capacity. By leveraging the higher losses due to atmospheric channel and optimum PSD, we improve the physical layer security of the satellite link in the considered scenario. The simulation results show that we can enhance the normalized secrecy capacity beyond a small coverage area near the legitimate receiver Bob.
Low earth orbit (LEO) satellite signals cover extensive areas with high intensity, rendering them vulnerable to interception. However, the rapid movement of LEO satellites leads to severe Doppler frequency shift, making it extremely challenging to generate a consistent key using traditional physical key generation techniques. In response to these issues, we have fully utilized Orthogonal Time Frequency Space (OTFS) in dynamic environments and propose a physical layer key generation (PLKG) scheme based on delay- Doppler (DD) domain signal processing. In the preprocessing stage, we propose a Linearly Weighted Moving Average Coding (LW-MAC) algorithm that dynamically adjusts weights with varying channel response intensities, significantly reducing the inconsistency in channel estimation. Subsequently, to address the reduction in key security caused by insufficient key length, we propose a Maximum of Real and Imaginary parts of channel response Assisted Amplitude Quantization (MRIAAQ) algorithm, which increases the key length and enhances the key entropy value. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed PLKG scheme has substantial advantages over bidirectional difference quantization (BDQ) and equal probability quantization schemes in terms of key disagreement rate (KDR). Moreover, our PLKG scheme significantly reduces the bit error rate (BER) by approximately 71.37%on average compared to artificial noise-aided physical layer security scheme, thereby greatly enhancing the security of dynamic satellite-to-ground communication.
Modern networking technologies involve the interconnection of smart and intelligent physical objects to provide advanced services. These physical objects may be part of various network technologies like WLAN, wireless sensor network (WSN), Internet of Things (IoT), etc., and share data in wireless mode, which should be secured from threats. These physical devices possess many constraints like power, computational complexity and storage, and are required to have lightweight security algorithms. Traditionally, security is achieved by the higher layers of the communication model, which has high computational complexity and consumes more power. In this chapter, a secure-key-generation scheme from physical layer characteristics is introduced as a possible lightweight security alternative to traditional upper-layer security approaches. The proposed scheme is based on the wiretap-channel model and security is achieved by generating keys at both communicating ends independently, based on inherent common-channel characteristics like randomness. It is mainly based on the principle of spatial decorrelation and channel reciprocity for identical carrier frequency. There is no provision for sharing keys as in public-key cryptography, so physical-layer key generation is not vulnerable to threats like key leakage. The generated key at the transmitter encrypts plain text; the generated cipher is transmitted on the common channel and is decrypted at the receiver end using the key generated by the receiver. Key generation consists of fundamental blocks like channel probing and quantization followed by information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The physical-layer key generation is already a power-efficient security solution; this chapter aims to enhance this capacity further. This is done by introducing low-end signal conditioning in the channel-probing step using moving-window averaging. This solution not only improves system performance but also makes it suitable for limited- power applications. The performance of the key-generation system is characterised in terms of the bit-disagreement rate between the generated key sequences of communicating parties and the key randomness by means of the NIST statistical test suite.
Physical-layer key generation (PLKG) is a technique that produces symmetric encryption keys by exploiting the inherent characteristics of wireless channels. It offers advantages including high physical-layer security, elimination of pre-shared keys, dynamic upgradability, and resistance to quantum attacks, making PLKG a promising security solution for next-generation (6G) networks. However, satellite communication channels exhibit high dynamics and long propagation delays. Characteristics such as large Doppler shifts, short coherence times, and orbital predictability pose severe challenges to PLKG, including reciprocity degradation, low key generation rate (KGR), and susceptibility to channel-prediction attacks. This work proposes a delay-Doppler domain time-hopping key generation scheme (KE-DD-TH) based on Orthogonal Time Frequency Space (OTFS) modulation for high-speed links between Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)/Medium-Earth-Orbit (MEO) satellites and ground terminals in Ka/Ku bands. The scheme performs non-uniform sampling on the DD domain grid of OTFS symbols using an ephemeris-driven pseudo-random time-hopping sequence generated by cascaded linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and a nonlinear matrix transformation. Both legitimate parties estimate the channel only at time-hopping instants and multiply two adjacent estimates to construct an "equivalent channel" matrix, yielding a random source with high entropy, high reciprocity, and low predictability. The eavesdropper's key disagreement rate (KDR) remains close to 0.5 under all signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions, corresponding to the ideal random-guessing baseline. This indicates that Eve obtains negligible mutual information, i.e., I(KA;KE)≈0. By contrast, the conventional KE-DD scheme allows Eve's KDR to degrade to 0.014 at 30 dB SNR, indicating near-complete key recovery. The generated keys pass all 12 randomness tests of the NIST SP 800-22 statistical test suite.