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Axioms

Research on Repeated Quantum Games with Public Goods under Strong Reciprocity

Simo Sun, Yadong Shu, Jinxiu Pi, Die Zhou

Published Nov 10, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We developed a repeated quantum game of public goods by using quantum entanglement and strong reciprocity mechanisms. Utilizing the framework of quantum game analysis, a comparative investigation incorporating both entangled and non-entangled states reveals that the player will choose a fully cooperative strategy when the expected cooperation strategy of the competitor exceeds a certain threshold. When the entanglement of states is not considered, the prisoner’s dilemma still exists, and the cooperating party must bear the cost of defactoring the quantum strategy themselves; when considering the entanglement of states, the benefits of both parties in the game are closely related, forming a community of benefits. By signing a strong reciprocity contract, the degree of cooperation between the game parties can be considered using the strong reciprocity entanglement contract mechanism. The party striving to cooperate does not have to bear the risk of the other party’s defector, and to some extent, it can solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Finally, taking the public goods green planting industry project as an example, by jointly entrusting a third party to determine and sign a strong reciprocity entanglement contract, both parties can ensure a complete quantum strategy to maximize cooperation and achieve Pareto optimality, ultimately enabling the long-term and stable development of the public goods industry project.

DOI
10.3390/axioms12111044

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We developed a repeated quantum game of public goods by using quantum entanglement and strong reciprocity mechanisms. Utilizing the framework of quantum game analysis, a comparative investigation incorporating both entangled and non-entangled states reveals that the player will choose a fully cooperative strategy when the expected cooperation strategy of the competitor exceeds a certain threshold. When the entanglement of states is not considered, the prisoner’s dilemma still exists, and the cooperating party must bear the cost of defactoring the quantum strategy themselves; when considering the entanglement of states, the benefits of both parties in the game are closely related, forming a community of benefits. By signing a strong reciprocity contract, the degree of cooperation between the game parties can be considered using the strong reciprocity entanglement contract mechanism. The party striving to cooperate does not have to bear the risk of the other party’s defector, and to some extent, it can solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Finally, taking the public goods green planting industry project as an example, by jointly entrusting a third party to determine and sign a strong reciprocity entanglement contract, both parties can ensure a complete quantum strategy to maximize cooperation and achieve Pareto optimality, ultimately enabling the long-term and stable development of the public goods industry project.
Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, only single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been studied, therefore nothing is known for infinitely repeated quantum game. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games does not much differ from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma and repeated classical prisoner's dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma.
It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner's dilemma game.The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options.Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state.The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized.On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair.We show that quantum prisoner's dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions.Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.
A well-known model in game theory, the Volunteer's Dilemma describes a group of nnn players who decide whether to volunteer for a collective benefit at a personal cost, or to abstain and risk forfeiting the benefit altogether. A quantum version of this dilemma, developed within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework, allows each player to manipulate one qubit of a shared entangled state, leading to symmetric Nash equilibria with higher expected payoffs than in the classical game. Existing analyses, however, assume maximal entanglement, which is experimentally demanding for hardware-constrained quantum systems. Within the same framework, we introduce a generalized Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma with a tunable entanglement parameter γγγ and study the extent to which equilibrium behavior depends on the level of entanglement. We derive explicit conditions relating γγγ, the number of players, and the players' strategies under which symmetric Nash equilibria exist, focusing on two canonical strategy profiles: one for 2≤n≤92\leq n\leq 92≤n≤9, and one for even nnn. We find that maximal entanglement is not required to sustain symmetric equilibria. Instead, equilibrium behavior persists above a threshold value, which we compute analytically in both cases. We also demonstrate that the threshold value directly depends on system size.
In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of biological systems and human society. In this work, we propose a generalized prisoner's dilemma quantum game and study the game on Watts-Strogatz small-world network (WS model) with different values of entanglement. Here entanglement is used as a metaphor to study relationship between players. In a single step, each player has three strategies to choose: cooperation, defection and adopting a special quantum strategy first introduced by Eisert (denoted by Q). The person who chooses the quantum strategy Q can be regarded as a super cooperator. In prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation is very hard to emerge on relatively homogeneous networks, such as random graphs and WS model. Our experimental results show that in generalized prisoners dilemma quantum game, entanglement can guarantee emergence of super cooperators and greatly increase the payoff of the whole network. Even on homogeneous networks with very large inducement value(b is close to 2), the frequency of cooperators can still exceeds 70%. This work provides a new insight into understanding cooperation when considering the role of relationship between cooperators.