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A SKG Security Challenge: Indoor SKG Under an On-The-Shoulder Eavesdropping Attack

Amitha Mayya, Miroslav Mitev, Arsenia Chorti, Gerhard Paul Fettweis

Published Oct 16, 2023• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Physical layer security (PLS) is seen as the means to enhance physical layer trustworthiness in 6G. This work provides a proof-of-concept for one of the most mature PLS technologies, i.e., secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients during the channel’s coherence time. As opposed to other works, where only specific parts of the protocol are typically investigated, here, we implement the full SKG chain in four indoor experimental campaigns. In detail, we consider two legitimate nodes, who use the wireless channel to extract secret keys and a malicious node placed in the immediate vicinity of one of them, who acts as a passive eavesdropper. To estimate the final SKG rate we evaluate the conditional min-entropy by taking into account all information available at the eavesdropper. Finally, we use this paper to announce the first ever physical layer security challenge, mirroring practices in cryptography. We call the community to scrutinize the presented results and try to “break” our SKG implementation. To this end, we provide, i) the full dataset observed by the eavesdroppers, ii) 20 blocks of 16−byte long ciphertexts, encrypted using one-time pad with 20 distilled secret keys, and, iii) all codes and software used in our SKG implementation. An attack will be considered successful if any part(s) of the plaintext are successfully retrieved.

DOI
10.36227/techrxiv.24298372.v1

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Physical layer security (PLS) is seen as the means to enhance physical layer trustworthiness in 6G. This work provides a proof-of-concept for one of the most mature PLS technologies, i.e., secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients during the channel’s coherence time. As opposed to other works, where only specific parts of the protocol are typically investigated, here, we implement the full SKG chain in four indoor experimental campaigns. In detail, we consider two legitimate nodes, who use the wireless channel to extract secret keys and a malicious node placed in the immediate vicinity of one of them, who acts as a passive eavesdropper. To estimate the final SKG rate we evaluate the conditional min-entropy by taking into account all information available at the eavesdropper. Finally, we use this paper to announce the first ever physical layer security challenge, mirroring practices in cryptography. We call the community to scrutinize the presented results and try to “break” our SKG implementation. To this end, we provide, i) the full dataset observed by the eavesdroppers, ii) 20 blocks of 16−byte long ciphertexts, encrypted using one-time pad with 20 distilled secret keys, and, iii) all codes and software used in our SKG implementation. An attack will be considered successful if any part(s) of the plaintext are successfully retrieved.
Physical layer security (PLS) is seen as the means to enhance physical layer trustworthiness in 6G. This work provides a proof-of-concept for one of the most mature PLS technologies, i.e., secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients during the channel’s coherence time. As opposed to other works, where only specific parts of the protocol are typically investigated, here, we implement the full SKG chain in four indoor experimental campaigns. In detail, we consider two legitimate nodes, who use the wireless channel to extract secret keys and a malicious node placed in the immediate vicinity of one of them, who acts as a passive eavesdropper. To estimate the final SKG rate we evaluate the conditional min-entropy by taking into account all information available at the eavesdropper. Finally, we use this paper to announce the first ever physical layer security challenge, mirroring practices in cryptography. We call the community to scrutinize the presented results and try to “break” our SKG implementation. To this end, we provide, i) the full dataset observed by the eavesdroppers, ii) 20 blocks of 16−byte long ciphertexts, encrypted using one-time pad with 20 distilled secret keys, and, iii) all codes and software used in our SKG implementation. An attack will be considered successful if any part(s) of the plaintext are successfully retrieved.
Physical layer security (PLS) is seen as the means to enhance physical layer trustworthiness in 6G. This work provides a proof-of-concept for one of the most mature PLS technologies, i.e., secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients during the channel's coherence time. As opposed to other works, where only specific parts of the protocol are typically investigated, here, we implement the full SKG chain in four indoor experimental campaigns. In detail, we consider two legitimate nodes, who use the wireless channel to extract secret keys and a malicious node placed in the immediate vicinity of one of them, who acts as a passive eavesdropper. To estimate the final SKG rate we evaluate the conditional min-entropy by taking into account all information available at the eavesdropper. Finally, we use this paper to announce the first ever physical layer security challenge, mirroring practices in cryptography. We call the community to scrutinize the presented results and try to “break” our SKG implementation. To this end, we provide, i) the full dataset observed by the eavesdroppers, ii) 20 blocks of 16 - byte long ciphertexts, encrypted using one-time pad with 20 distilled secret keys, and, iii) all codes and software used in our SKG implementation. An attack will be considered successful if any part(s) of the plaintext are successfully retrieved.
Physical layer security (PLS) is seen as the means to enhance physical layer trustworthiness in 6G. This work provides a proof-of-concept for one of the most mature PLS technologies, i.e., secret key generation (SKG) from wireless fading coefficients during the channel's coherence time. As opposed to other works, where only specific parts of the protocol are typically investigated, here, we implement the full SKG chain in four indoor experimental campaigns. In detail, we consider two legitimate nodes, who use the wireless channel to extract secret keys and a malicious node placed in the immediate vicinity of one of them, who acts as a passive eavesdropper. To estimate the final SKG rate we evaluate the conditional min-entropy by taking into account all information available at the eavesdropper. Finally, we use this paper to announce the first ever physical layer security challenge, mirroring practices in cryptography. We call the community to scrutinize the presented results and try to ``break'' our SKG implementation. To this end, we provide, i) the full dataset observed by the eavesdroppers, ii) 202020 blocks of 16−16-16−byte long ciphertexts, encrypted using one-time pad with 202020 distilled secret keys, and, iii) all codes and software used in our SKG implementation. An attack will be considered successful if any part(s) of the plaintext are successfully retrieved.
Physical Layer Security (PLS) is emerging as an innovative solution to enhance the security of wireless communications. This work analyzes the impact of a realistic indoor radio propagation on Secrecy Key Generation (SKG) in a Wi-Fi application scenario. This PLS technique is based on the extraction of raw cryptographic keys, taking advantage of the radio propagation phenomena as a source of entropy. In detail, we considered two legitimate nodes, i.e., Alice and Bob, which use the SKG to extract keys from the channel, and a malicious node, i.e., Eve, which acts as a passive eavesdropper and tries to discover the key. The reported results show that legitimate nodes key mismatch is strongly influenced by noise contribution, and the eavesdropper attack performs better with a higher Line-of-Sight (LoS) contribution. Conversely, when the power is evenly spread over all the multipath components, the eavesdropped key mismatch is maintained in the range of 30 – 50 %.
The heterogeneous nature of the Sixth-Generation (6G) communication systems, jointly with the rapid expansion of sensitive applications, bring several challenges to systems security.The Secrecy Key Generation (SKG) is a Physical Layer Security (PLS) technique in which two legitimate nodes negotiate a session key, taking advantage of the physical layer phenomena as a source of entropy.In this contribution, we investigate the impact of Uniform Linear Array (ULA) dipole spacing on the SKG performance considering an indoor application environment.We considered two legitimate nodes, i.e., Alice and Bob, that adopt the SKG protocol to negotiate their session key.A malicious node, i.e., Eve, tries to eavesdrop on the communication to obtain the key by performing the on-the-shoulder attack.Results demonstrate that smaller dipole spacings, i.e., d ≤ 0.5λ result in lower channel and key correlations between Eve and the legitimate nodes, enhancing security.Larger spacings, however, create periodic zones of moderate correlation, potentially aiding Eve under certain angular positions.
Data security on Long Range (LoRa) wireless networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping threats, necessitating a Physical Layer Security (PLS) approach based on Secret Key Generation (SKG). This study implements an SKG scheme utilizing Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) values extracted in an indoor environment. The key generation process includes signal filtering using Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) to extract slow fading profiles, 2-bit Modified Multibit (MMB) quantization, and Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) information reconciliation. Based on the evaluation of an indoor test scenario (Lab 04.14) with 560 aligned data samples, the BCH mechanism functionally overcame channel noise, reducing the raw Bit Error Rate (BER) to 0.0000 and generating perfectly identical secret key bits between legitimate nodes. Furthermore, spatial vulnerability evaluations demonstrated the system’s effectiveness against passive eavesdropping. Although the eavesdropper (Eve) was placed in close physical proximity to the Relay node (2.5 meters), the signal correlation at Eve remained very low post-DCT filtering correlation coefficient ranging from 0.115 to 0.146. This proves a successful spatial decorrelation, wherein the eavesdropper’s multipath fading profile was entirely random and unrepresentative of the legitimate channel. Consequently, unauthorized parties completely failed to duplicate the secret keys, proving the system’s robust reliability and security for relay-based LoRa networks in indoor environments.