The paper presents applications of homomorphic cryptographic schemes in process control. Homomorphic encryption is a particular type of encryption that allows performing mathematical operations over encrypted data. Therefore the user can use third-party services as controllers without revealing any vulnerable information, like process data. Homomorphic properties make it possible to perform data aggregation or evaluate control actions without having any knowledge about the process data. Our paper explores two fully homomorphic cryptographic schemes, namely Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) cryptosystems. Each scheme is briefly described with its advantages and drawbacks, conditions, and applications. We present a case study involving linear-quadratic (LQ) control strategy implemented in an encrypted setup. This serves for comparison and a step-by-step guide for implementing encrypted process control.
The paper presents applications of homomorphic cryptographic schemes in process control. Homomorphic encryption is a particular type of encryption that allows performing mathematical operations over encrypted data. Therefore the user can use third-party services as controllers without revealing any vulnerable information, like process data. Homomorphic properties make it possible to perform data aggregation or evaluate control actions without having any knowledge about the process data. Our paper explores two fully homomorphic cryptographic schemes, namely Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) cryptosystems. Each scheme is briefly described with its advantages and drawbacks, conditions, and applications. We present a case study involving linear-quadratic (LQ) control strategy implemented in an encrypted setup. This serves for comparison and a step-by-step guide for implementing encrypted process control.
The paper presents applications of homomorphic cryptographic schemes in process control. Homomorphic encryption is a particular type of encryption that allows performing mathematical operations over encrypted data. Therefore the user can use third-party services as controllers without revealing any vulnerable information, like process data. Homomorphic properties make it possible to perform data aggregation or evaluate control actions without having any knowledge about the process data. Our paper explores two fully homomorphic cryptographic schemes, namely Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) cryptosystems. Each scheme is briefly described with its advantages and drawbacks, conditions, and applications. We present a case study involving hl linear-quadratic (LQ) control strategy implemented in an encrypted setup. This serves for comparison and a step-by-step guide for implementing encrypted process control.
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we investigate schemes for secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
In actual operation, there are security risks to the data of the network control system, mainly in the form of possible eavesdropping of signals in the transmission channel and parameters in the controller leading to data leakage. In this paper, we propose a scheme for encrypting linear controllers using fully homomorphic encryption, which effectively removes these security risks and substantially improves the security of networked control systems. Meanwhile, this paper uses precomputation to handle data encryption, which eliminates the encryption time and solves the drawback of fully homomorphic encryption that it is difficult to apply due to the efficiency problem. Compared to previous schemes with precomputation, for the first time, we propose two methods to mitigate the problem of the slight security degradation caused by precomputation, which makes our scheme more secure. Finally, we provide numerical simulation results to support our scheme, and the data show that the encrypted controller achieves normal control and improves safety and efficiency.
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we demonstrate that multi-party computation enables secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
This thesis presents a comprehensive analysis of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), a transformative advancement in contemporary cryptography. The exponential growth in digital data, coupled with the escalating demand for remote data processing, has elevated the importance of robust information security and privacy mechanisms. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes facilitate the outsourcing of computations to untrusted third parties without exposing the underlying sensitive information, significantly enhancing data privacy assurances. Traditional encryption methods effectively protect data at rest and in transit; however, they inherently lack the capability to perform operations directly on encrypted data. FHE addresses this fundamental shortcoming by enabling intricate computations to be conducted on encrypted data without the necessity of decryption. The thesis begins by outlining the historical development of encryption systems and fundamental cryptographic concepts. It details the progression from the "privacy homomorphism" concept introduced by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos in 1978 to Craig Gentry's seminal work in 2009, which presented the first practical FHE scheme. The key milestones in the evolution of FHE and major contributions in the literature are presented from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Subsequently, the mathematical structures and concepts underlying FHE are discussed in depth. Topics such as lattices, rings and fields, polynomials, number fields, canonical embedding, and ideal structures are examined as the foundational building blocks ensuring the security of FHE. In particular, challenging problems provided by Lattice-Based Cryptography, such as Learning with Errors (LWE), serve as the mathematical basis for FHE's resistance to attacks. The thesis also analyzes the structure, functioning, and differences between modern FHE schemes (such as Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan (BGV), Fan and Vercauteren (BFV), and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS)). The practical applications, advantages, limitations, and recent optimization techniques of these schemes are thoroughly examined. Special attention is given to the opportunities FHE offers in sectors where data privacy is paramount, including healthcare, finance, and cloud computing. Key practical challenges such as high computational costs, large key and ciphertext sizes, and noise management are highlighted. Innovations to address these challenges, including hardware accelerators, software optimizations, and open-source libraries (like HELib and SEAL), are explored in detail. The thesis also covers contemporary research areas such as multi-key FHE, privacy-preserving computation in artificial intelligence, and post-quantum cryptography. In conclusion, this thesis presents a broad perspective on FHE, covering its mathematical foundations and practical application potential, while evaluating current developments, limitations, and future research directions. The wider and more efficient xxv adoption of FHE will open new possibilities for information security and privacy. In this context, the thesis aims to serve as a comprehensive resource for both academic and industrial communities. Keywords: Bootstrapping, Relinearization, Ring Learning with Errors, BGV, BFV, CKKS.
The design of encrypted controllers, which perform control operation directly over encrypted signals via homomorphic cryptosystems, should consider both security of the control data and performance of the controller. Considering the use of Learning With Errors (LWE) based cryptosystem, in this paper, we present a design procedure for encrypted linear dynamic controllers. Providing a guideline for choosing the parameters of the cryptosystem as well as quantization, the procedure guarantees both the desired level of security and performance. Receiving the encrypted signals of the plant input as well as the output, the proposed controller is able to perform the dynamic operation over encrypted data for infinite time horizon, without the use of decryption or reset of the state. Thanks to additively and multiplicatively homomorphic property of the LWE-based cryptosystem, information of both control signals and gain matrices is protected by encryption.