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arXiv:2103.16335 · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

Multi-party computation enables secure polynomial control based solely on secret-sharing

Sebastian Schlor, Michael Hertneck, Stefan Wildhagen, Frank Allgöwer

Published Dec 14, 2021• 18 citations
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Abstract

Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we demonstrate that multi-party computation enables secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.

DOI
10.1109/cdc45484.2021.9683026

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Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we investigate schemes for secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel $n$-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.

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IEEE Access•Jan 1, 2021•12 citations
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we demonstrate that multi-party computation enables secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we investigate schemes for secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel nnn-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
Summary Encrypted control enables confidential controller evaluations in cloud‐based or networked control systems. Roughly speaking, an encrypted controller is a modified control algorithms that is capable of computing encrypted control actions based on encrypted system states. Encrypted control has been realized using different tools from cryptography such as homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and multiparty computation. However, the vast majority of existing encrypted controllers is linear or makes intensive use of encrypted linear operations. In this article, we present a novel and flexible method for the encrypted implementation of arbitrary polynomial controllers. Technically, our approach builds on tailored two‐party computation combined with secret sharing and additively homomorphic encryption.
Secure computation methods include methods that use homomorphic encryption (HE) and those that use secret sharing (SS). Secure computation based on HE can be realized using one server, and the computation process can be made public if the encryption key is kept secure. However, HE generally requires a substantial computation cost. In contrast, SS has the advantage of low computation cost, allowing for high-speed processing; however, all servers must be managed independently. And the process of k or more servers cannot be disclosed. In particular, secret input will be leaked when the same organization manages multiple servers to implement SS. Therefore, a complex model where each server is independently managed is required. Iwamura et al. proposed a secure computation that is information-theoretic secure in n≥k instead of n≥2k−1 by assuming a trusted third party (TTP). In this paper, by making more effective use of a TTP, we demonstrate that secure computation based on SS is possible with only one computing server. Moreover, we show that the entire computation process can be disclosed if the key is managed safely. We realize a method that solves the disadvantages of conventional approaches with a faster computation than those methods.
In this paper, we propose a secure two-party computation protocol for dynamic controllers using a secret sharing scheme. The proposed protocol realizes outsourcing of controller computation to two servers, while controller parameters, states, inputs, and outputs are kept secret against the servers. Unlike previous encrypted controls in a single-server setting, the proposed method can operate a dynamic controller for an infinite time horizon without controller state decryption or input re-encryption. We show that the control performance achievable by the proposed protocol can be made arbitrarily close to that attained by the unencrypted controller. Furthermore, system-theoretic and cryptographic modifications of the protocol are presented to improve the communication complexity. The feasibility of the protocol is demonstrated through numerical examples of PID and observer-based controls.
The significant advantage of the quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is to ensure the perfect security of quantum private data. In this paper, a novel secure multiparty quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is proposed, which can complete arbitrary quantum computation on the private data of multiple clients without decryption by an almost dishonest server. Firstly, each client obtains a secure encryption key through the measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol and encrypts the private data by using the encryption operator and key. Secondly, with the help of the almost dishonest server, the non-maximally entangled states are pre-shared between the client and the server to correct errors in the homomorphic evaluation of T gates, so as to realize universal quantum circuit evaluation on encrypted data. Thirdly, from the perspective of the application scenario of secure multi-party computation, this work is based on the probabilistic quantum homomorphic encryption scheme, allowing multiple parties to delegate the server to perform the secure homomorphic evaluation. The operation and the permission to access the data performed by the client and the server are clearly pointed out. Finally, a concrete security analysis shows that the proposed multiparty quantum homomorphic encryption scheme can securely resist outside and inside attacks.
Two-party computation allows two clients to jointly compute an arbitrary function of their inputs without revealing these inputs to each other. In this study, we adopt a server-aided model, in which a set of computing servers performs computation using the inputs of two clients. In the (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, input s is divided into n shares and can be recovered from k shares, where k is a threshold. Typically, the multiplication of shares increases the polynomial's degree from (k-1) to (2k-2), thus increasing the number of shares required from k to 2k-1. Because each server typically holds only one share, the number of servers required also increases to 2k-1. Therefore, a set of n servers can compute multiplication securely only if the adversary corrupts at most k-1 <; n/2 servers. In this study, we differentiate N, which is the number of required servers, and n, which is the parameter of the (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. We propose a method of multiplication by using only N ≥ k servers. This is implemented by sending two shares of the same input to each server. In a “normal” method, sending multiple shares to one server violates security because k shares can be leaked from k-1 servers. We overcome this by implementing a different functionality, where each share is first encrypted with a different random number (encrypted share) before being sent to a server. Instead of the “normal shares” of ab, our protocol computes the encrypted shares of ab using the encrypted shares of a and b. We show that the proposed method is secure against a non-colluding semi-honest adversary. Moreover, we implement our method in MATLAB and show its efficiency.