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The Journal of Philosophy

Small Worlds with Cosmic Powers

William M. Simpson

Published Jan 1, 2023• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian dispositions’, and Simpson’s theory of ‘Cosmic Hylomorphism’, in which the particle configuration comprises a hylomorphic substance which has an intrinsic power. I argue that Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only a small number of particles, but that this problem is avoided by Cosmic Hylomorphism, in which the cosmic power manifests a teleological process.

DOI
10.5840/jphil2023120824

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The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian dispositions’, and Simpson’s theory of ‘Cosmic Hylomorphism’, in which the particle configuration comprises a hylomorphic substance which has an intrinsic power. I argue that Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only a small number of particles, but that this problem is avoided by Cosmic Hylomorphism, in which the cosmic power manifests a teleological process.
Abstract The primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics seeks to account for quantum phenomena in terms of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime) and a law of nature that describes its temporal development. This approach to explaining quantum phenomena is compatible with either a Humean or powerist account of laws. In this paper, I offer a powerist ontology in which the law is specified by Bohmian mechanics for a global configuration of particles. Unlike in other powerist ontologies, however, this law is not grounded in a structural power that is instantiated by the global configuration. Instead, I combine the primitive ontology approach with Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism to create a new metaphysical model, in which the cosmos is a hylomorphic substance with an intrinsic power to choreograph the trajectories of the particles.
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.
Bohmian Mechanics (as presented in Dürr et al. 1992) is being regarded more and more as an attractive quantum theory because it provides a clear ontology, consisting of particles and one universal wave-function (Dürr et al 1992, Dürr et al. 1995). However, this is true only prima facie because the status of the wave-function remains controversial for several reasons (Belot 2012, Esfeld et al. 2014). In my talk I will show how the debate on the wave-function is leading to a completely new way of understanding not only the ontology of Bohmian Mechanics, but also the fundamental building blocks of any physical theory (the so called ‘primitive ontology’). In particular, I will discuss the dispositional approach, which regards the wave-function as a nomological entity grounded in one dispositional property instantiated by some ‘primitive stuff’ (Esfeld et al. 2014, Esfeld et al. 2015). In my conclusion I will point out the challenges and the problems that this approach has to face, and I will suggest that it cannot be regarded as a definitive and final solution to the question of the status of the wave-function.
The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion
Abstract The neo-Aristotelian programme in natural philosophy comprises a family of theoretical frameworks that offer alternatives to quantum fundamentalism , i.e., to the metaphysical thesis that all the fundamental entities and all natural properties are represented explicitly in some model of quantum theory (whether or not supplemented by microphysical hidden variables or microphysically driven collapse mechanisms). I develop a taxonomy of possible Aristotelian interpretations of QM by considering seven choice points for quantum hylomorphism. I consider George Ellis and Barbara Drossel’s Contextual Wave Function Collapse theory, Alexander Pruss’s Traveling Forms model (Pruss 2018, 2023), and William Simpson’s Contextual Bohmian Mechanics, and locate them on this taxonomy. Finally, I take a stand (tentatively) on each of the seven choice points and suggest directions for further research.
Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not explicitly invoke any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts.