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arXiv:1406.1371

The ontology of Bohmian mechanics

Michaël Esfeld, Dustin Lazarovici, Mario Hubert, Detlef Dürr

Published Jun 5, 2014• 1 citation
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Abstract

The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1406.1371

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The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion

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This contribution aims to show the complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the kinematics and dynamics of the particles within the guidance view of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In particular, it deals with two formulations of the theory. The former, which goes under the name of Bohmian mechanics, puts the particles in a Galilean space-time and considers the wave-function as a nomological entity; the latter, which is normally known as the pilot-wave theory, puts the particles in an Aristotelian space-time and regards the wave-function as a physical field. On one hand, I will show that the difference of the ontological status of the wave-function is due to a difference in how the theory is formulated. On the other hand, I will show that in both cases the dynamics and kinematics of the particles are determined by a prior ontological commitment concerning the wave-function. My talk will open with a brief summary of Bohmian Mechanics and its nomological view in connection with the dispositional view. After that, I will claim that, given the Galilean space-time and the law of motion for the particles, the natural choice is to attribute a nomological status to the wave-function. I will argue, however, that this is true only if we adopt a certain argument according to which we derive the dynamics from the kinematics. I will also point out that the nomological status of the wave-function was already presupposed before building the guiding law of motion. My last consideration will be that, given the nomological status of the wave-function, the kinematics of the theory becomes ambiguous. In particular, we need a clarification of the meaning of ‘natural state’, otherwise we have two possible natural motions for Bohmian Mechanics, which are either uniform velocity or the velocity given by the wave-function through the law of motion. This last inertial motion, however, would on one hand endorse a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function, on the other hand, it would imply the abandonment of perhaps Galilean space-time and certainly Newtonian mechanics. In the second part of my talk, I will investigate the ontological status of the wave-function in the Pilot-wave theory. I will show that on one hand the realist interpretation of the wave-function is a necessary commitment once we hold true the dynamics and the kinematics of the particles, and in particular once we hold true that we derive the kinematics from the dynamics. I will however point out that this derivation is straightforward if and only if we first assume that the wave-function represents a physical field. I will draw a two-fold conclusion, which is useful for any theory. On one hand it is methodologically wrong to decide on the ontological status of the wave-function regardless of the structure of the theory. On the other hand, it is sometimes naïve to say that we should not read off the ontology from the formalism, since the formalism may be determined by a certain ontological choice.

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This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n

•Jan 1, 2017•1 citation
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.
The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion
It is argued that in Bohmian mechanics the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe does not encode the influences of other par-ticles on the subsystem. This suggests that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics does not consist only in Bohmian particles and their posi-tions. It is nonetheless pointed out that since the wave function in configuration space may represent the state of ergodic motion of non-Bohmian particles in three-dimensional space, the ontology of Bohmian mechanics may still consist only in particles. Bohmian mechanics, which is also called the de Broglie-Bohm theory, is a realistic alternative to standard quantum mechanics initially proposed by de Broglie (1928) and later developed by Bohm (1952). According to the theory, a complete realistic description of a quantum system is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of its particles together with its wave function. It has been a hot topic of debate how to interpret the wave function in the theory. Recently Esfeld et al (2013) further developed the nomological interpretation of the wave function, as suggested by Dürr, Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (1997), Goldstein and Teufel (2001) and Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2012). They argued that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics consists only in Bohmian particles and their positions, and in particular, the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe encodes the influences of other particles in the universe on the subsystem. In this note, we will argue that this interesting view may be problematic. The Bohmian law of motion is expressed by two equations, a guiding equation for the configuration of particles in three-dimensional space and the Schrödinger equation, describing the time evolution of the wave function, which enters the guiding equation. The law can be formulated as follows: dQ(t) dt = vΨ(t)(Q(t)). (1)
The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive guide to the metaphysics of Bohmian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles following trajectories that are determined by the quantum wave-function. The key question that the theory has to face relates to the ontological interpretation of the quantum wave-function. The main debate has mostly centered around two opposing views, wave-function realism on the one hand, and the nomological view on the other hand. The supporters of the former believe that the wave-function is a physical field living in a high-dimensional space; the supporters of the latter regard the wave-function as just an entity that appears in the laws of nature and lacks physical status. This monograph discusses both views open-mindedly, illuminating their tacit problems and providing new insight into how they can be overcome. Moreover, it discusses the structuralist view, which is often neglected and which can be regarded as a reconciliation of the two main opposing camps.
This contribution aims to show the complex interplay between the ontological status of the wave-function and the kinematics and dynamics of the particles within the guidance view of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In particular, it deals with two formulations of the theory. The former, which goes under the name of Bohmian mechanics, puts the particles in a Galilean space-time and considers the wave-function as a nomological entity; the latter, which is normally known as the pilot-wave theory, puts the particles in an Aristotelian space-time and regards the wave-function as a physical field. On one hand, I will show that the difference of the ontological status of the wave-function is due to a difference in how the theory is formulated. On the other hand, I will show that in both cases the dynamics and kinematics of the particles are determined by a prior ontological commitment concerning the wave-function. My talk will open with a brief summary of Bohmian Mechanics and its nomological view in connection with the dispositional view. After that, I will claim that, given the Galilean space-time and the law of motion for the particles, the natural choice is to attribute a nomological status to the wave-function. I will argue, however, that this is true only if we adopt a certain argument according to which we derive the dynamics from the kinematics. I will also point out that the nomological status of the wave-function was already presupposed before building the guiding law of motion. My last consideration will be that, given the nomological status of the wave-function, the kinematics of the theory becomes ambiguous. In particular, we need a clarification of the meaning of ‘natural state’, otherwise we have two possible natural motions for Bohmian Mechanics, which are either uniform velocity or the velocity given by the wave-function through the law of motion. This last inertial motion, however, would on one hand endorse a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function, on the other hand, it would imply the abandonment of perhaps Galilean space-time and certainly Newtonian mechanics. In the second part of my talk, I will investigate the ontological status of the wave-function in the Pilot-wave theory. I will show that on one hand the realist interpretation of the wave-function is a necessary commitment once we hold true the dynamics and the kinematics of the particles, and in particular once we hold true that we derive the kinematics from the dynamics. I will however point out that this derivation is straightforward if and only if we first assume that the wave-function represents a physical field. I will draw a two-fold conclusion, which is useful for any theory. On one hand it is methodologically wrong to decide on the ontological status of the wave-function regardless of the structure of the theory. On the other hand, it is sometimes naïve to say that we should not read off the ontology from the formalism, since the formalism may be determined by a certain ontological choice.
Bohmian Mechanics (as presented in Dürr et al. 1992) is being regarded more and more as an attractive quantum theory because it provides a clear ontology, consisting of particles and one universal wave-function (Dürr et al 1992, Dürr et al. 1995). However, this is true only prima facie because the status of the wave-function remains controversial for several reasons (Belot 2012, Esfeld et al. 2014). In my talk I will show how the debate on the wave-function is leading to a completely new way of understanding not only the ontology of Bohmian Mechanics, but also the fundamental building blocks of any physical theory (the so called ‘primitive ontology’). In particular, I will discuss the dispositional approach, which regards the wave-function as a nomological entity grounded in one dispositional property instantiated by some ‘primitive stuff’ (Esfeld et al. 2014, Esfeld et al. 2015). In my conclusion I will point out the challenges and the problems that this approach has to face, and I will suggest that it cannot be regarded as a definitive and final solution to the question of the status of the wave-function.
This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n