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ETRI Journal

Post‐quantum identity‐based authenticated multiple key agreement protocol

Yang Yang, Hongji Yuan, Linbo Yan, Yinglan Ruan

Published Jun 27, 2023• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Authenticated multiple key agreement (AMKA) protocols provide participants with multiple session keys after one round of authentication. Many schemes use Diffie–Hellman or authenticated key agreement schemes that rely on hard integer factorizations that are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Lattice cryptography provides quantum resistance to authenticated key agreement protocols, but the certificate always incurs excessive public key infrastructure management overhead. Thus, a lightweight lattice‐based secure system is needed that removes this overhead. To answer this need, we provide a two‐party lattice‐ and identity‐based AMKA scheme based on bilateral short integer or computational bilateral inhomogeneous small integer solutions, and we provide a security proof based on the random oracle model. Compared with existing AMKA protocols, our new protocol has higher efficiency and stronger security.

DOI
10.4218/etrij.2022-0320

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Concurrency and Computation Practice and Experience•Jun 1, 2026•0 citations
Abstract Authenticated multiple key agreement (AMKA) protocols provide participants with multiple session keys after one round of authentication. Many schemes use Diffie–Hellman or authenticated key agreement schemes that rely on hard integer factorizations that are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Lattice cryptography provides quantum resistance to authenticated key agreement protocols, but the certificate always incurs excessive public key infrastructure management overhead. Thus, a lightweight lattice‐based secure system is needed that removes this overhead. To answer this need, we provide a two‐party lattice‐ and identity‐based AMKA scheme based on bilateral short integer or computational bilateral inhomogeneous small integer solutions, and we provide a security proof based on the random oracle model. Compared with existing AMKA protocols, our new protocol has higher efficiency and stronger security.
Summary Through the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), the manufacturing enterprises have significantly enhanced the production efficiency. The transmission of data in IIoT over public channels has brought about information leakage issues. Therefore, it is crucial to agree on a session key among the participants. In recent years, numerous authenticated key exchange (AKE) schemes have been designed. However, those AKE schemes which adopt the certificateless approach to tackle certificate management and key escrow may remain vulnerable to quantum attacks, and other AKE schemes which are based on lattice hard problem so as to achieve the post quantum security may incur key management issues. To simultaneously address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a lightweight certificateless lattice‐based authenticated key exchange (C2LAKE) scheme. Upon the hardness assumptions of the inhomogeneous small integer solution (ISIS) and computational bilateral inhomogeneous small integer solution (CBi‐ISIS) problems, the C2LAKE scheme has been demonstrated to be secure in the eCK model and the random oracle model (ROM). Better trade‐off among security and functionality features, and communication and computation costs make the C2LAKE scheme suitable and applicable in the IIoT environment.
Summary Successful and efficient key management plays a critical role toward secured computing and communication systems. Many authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed to meet the great challenges of information security. The two‐party key agreement protocol can be classified into two categories: implicit and explicit key authentications. This paper investigates the issue on authenticated two‐party key agreement protocol over an insecure public network and extends the existing implicit authenticated key agreement protocol into the explicit one by introducing the authenticators. The advantage of this explicit protocol is that it does not need any fixed public key infrastructure. Furthermore, this explicit protocol is provably secure in the random oracle under the Computation Gap Diffie‐Hellman assumption. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2013.© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Summary Key exchange protocols play an important role in securing the network communication over an insecure channel. In literature, a large number of key exchange schemes exist. The security of most of them is based on the Diffie‐Hellman (DH) problems over a group. But these types of DH problems are solvable in the presence of quantum computers. Thus, we require a non‐DH type key exchange scheme that resists to the quantum computers and new modern technologies. In this paper, 2 novel lattice‐based authenticated key exchange (LB‐AKE) protocols, (1) using a signature‐based authenticator and (2) using a signcryption‐based authenticator, are devised in Canetti‐Krawczyk proof model. The security of proposed protocols depends on the hardness of small integer solutions on the lattice. An extensive proof of security to our claim is given. The proposed AKEs characterize faster computation speed and resistance to the modern complex computers.
In emerging environments such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT), secure authentication and key negotiation play a crucial role in protecting data transmitted over public networks. However, many existing authentication protocols are still designed based on classical public-key cryptography primitives, and quantum computing may threaten their security. To address this challenge, we propose a post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol that uses the lattice-based Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Our proposed protocol integrates cryptographic authentication, smart card protection, and post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, enabling mutual authentication between users and servers and securely establishing session keys. The security of the protocol is formally analyzed in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model under the random oracle assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying KEM scheme. Furthermore, through informal security analysis, we have further demonstrated that the protocol possesses important security properties, including anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward confidentiality, and resistance to known attacks. In addition, the computational cost and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with several representative authentication protocols. The results show that the proposed protocol can provide strong security while maintaining low computational cost and communication overhead.
ABSTRACT A three‐party post‐quantum key agreement protocol involves server with two communicating parties securely agreeing on a shared secret key in a way that is resistant to quantum attacks. Once the shared secret key is shared using authenticated key agreement protocol, then user (A), and user (B) can use it for securing communication channel using symmetric‐key encryption AES‐256 algorithm. Although there are few third‐party post‐quantum authenticated and key agreement schemes exist, but the recent studies in this paper illustrates that they are not satisfying properties like unlinkability, anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and signal leakage attacks. Therefore, the proposed protocol ensures anonymity, unlinkablity, perfect forward secrecy, and resistant against signal leakage attacks. The proposed protocol uses different random numbers for each of sessions and ensures freshness of the session key to maintain forward secrecy. In this protocol, the user (A) only communicates with server, and establish an authenticated session key with user (B) which avoids server overheads. The use of ring learning with errors (RLWE) instead of the simpler learning with errors (LWE) is primarily motivated by the need for efficiency, compactness, and scalability in cryptographic applications. A comparative study, including both performance and security assessments, demonstrates that the proposed design is more secure and efficient.
ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a mounting and concrete threat to the cryptographi protocols underpinning mobile communication systems, where both security and computational efficiency are critical constraints. Existing three‐party authenticated key agreement (3PAKA) schemes either rely on classically hard problems broken by Shor's algorithm or, among postquantum proposals, fail to simultaneously achieve user anonymity, unlinkability, and perfect forward secrecy at acceptable cost for resource‐constrained mobile devices. We first conduct a rigorous cryptanalysis of the recent lattice‐based scheme of Singh et al. and uncover four concrete vulnerabilities: an identity recovery vulnerability and scalability failure arising from XOR masking with a static server key, which forces an exhaustive identity search and opens a denial‐of‐service vector; blind acceptance by the responder , as User forwards the initiator's message without verifying the sender's identity; authentication blindness at the initiator , since the response received by User carries no cryptographic proof of User 's identity; and server‐side incomplete verification caused by a missing session parameter , which the server requires but never receives. To remedy these deficiencies, we propose a Three‐Party Post‐Quantum Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement (MAKA) scheme for mobile devices, built on the Ideal‐Lattice Ring Learning With Errors (Ring‐LWE) assumption with parameters and Gaussian width . The proposed four‐message protocol employs biometric‐bound fuzzy extractors, dynamic masked identities , and fresh per‐session Ring‐LWE samples to achieve mutual authentication, user anonymity, unlinkability, and perfect forward secrecy. Security is formally analyzed in the Bellare–Rogaway (BR) model under the Random Oracle Model (ROM), yielding a tight reduction to the Decision‐RLWE assumption. Our message structure yields a total communication cost of bits, representing approximately improvement over Singh et al. It also demonstrates a favourable communicationcost relative to those of Islam and Basu, Rewal et al., Kumar et al., Dabra et al., and Park et al. across both metrics.