This paper considers the issue on authenticated two-party key agreement protocol over an insecure public network. Many authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed to meet the challenges. Based on bilinear pairing, Zhou et al. proposed a two-party key agreement with implicit key authentication in 2011. Implicit key authentication can be easily achieved by encrypting the later communications using the session key. However, we can not ensure how participants using the session key protocol. This paper will transform the Zhou's implicit authenticated key agreement protocol into the explicit one with key confirmation by introducing the authenticators, and show the proposed protocol is provably secure under the random-oracle model.
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.
This paper studies two-party authenticated agreement protocol in the certificateless public setting.Most of existing schemes either are proved insecure or have computation burden.Basesd on twin Diffie-Hellman problem introduced by Cash,Kiltz and Shoup,an efficient certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement protocol using bilinear pair is proposed.To construct an effective decision oracle for twin Diffie-Hellman problem,generic method of extracting partial private key is proposed.the method,with one master key and two hash functions.is applied to the design of protocol.When compared with other schemes with provable security,the proposed scheme,with the same message bandwidth,achieve efficiency in computational cost.The security of the proposed scheme has been proven in the random oracle model without Gap assumption.
Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
In this paper, we present a new efficient authenticated key agreement protocol. Compared with other cross-domain protocols which are all in the same cryptosystem, our protocol is innovatively designed to shift between the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the Identity-based Cryptosystem (IBC). This protocol combined with heterogeneous signcryption method is proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability on the basis of the assumptions of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) in the authentication phases, and it simultaneously guarantees the ciphertext anonymity. In addition, it can efficiently resist kinds of active attacks such as known-session key attack, key forge attack, and known-temporary secret key attack. Compared with other two-party authenticated key agreement protocols, the newly proposed key agreement protocol has better security, practicability and efficiency.