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BRILL eBooks

Quantum Field Theory: A Case for Event Ontologies?

Andreas Bartels

Published Jan 1, 2000• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The recent work of P. Teller and S. Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities of that theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only forbid classical, i.e. spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have suggested competing ersatz-ontologies which could account for the ‘loss of the particles’: Field quanta vs. Field events. However, both ontologies suffer from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence from basis-representations, events – if understood as concrete measurement events – are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type ‘Quantum system S is in quantum state Ψ’. The latter are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e. they can be identified by their location inside the causal net of the world.

DOI
10.1163/9789004457812_015

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The recent work of P. Teller and S. Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities of that theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only forbid classical, i.e. spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have suggested competing ersatz-ontologies which could account for the ‘loss of the particles’: Field quanta vs. Field events. However, both ontologies suffer from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence from basis-representations, events – if understood as concrete measurement events – are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type ‘Quantum system S is in quantum state Ψ’. The latter are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e. they can be identified by their location inside the causal net of the world.
The recent work of Paul Teller and Sunny Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities in this theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only exclude classical, i.e., spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have proposed competing ersatz-ontologies to account for the ‘loss of particles’: field quanta vs. field events. Both ontologies, however, suffer from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence of basis-representations, events—if understood as concrete measurement events—are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type ‘Quantum system, S, is in quantum state, Ψ‘. These are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e., they can be identified by their location within thecausalnet of the world.
Approaches to Ontology: Candidate General Ontologies for Situating Quantum Field (P Simons) 'Quanta', Tropes, or Processes: Ontologies for QFT Beyond the Myth of Substance (J Seibt) Analytical Ontologists in Action: A Comment on Seibt and Simons (M Kuhlmann) How Do Field Theories Refer to Entities in a Field? (S Y Auyang) Field Ontologies for QFT: A Naive View of the Quantum Field (A Wayne) Comments on Paul Teller's Book, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (G Fleming) So What Is the Quantum Field? (P Teller) Relativity, Measurement and Renormalization: On the Nature of Measurement Records in Relativistic Quantum Field (J A Barrett) No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories? (H Halvorson & R Clifton) Events and Covariance in the Interpretation of Quantum Field (D Dieks) Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields? (B Falkenburg) Renormalization and the Disunity of Science (N Huggett) Gauge Symmetries and the Vacuum: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Redhead) Comment on Redhead: The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetry (M Drieschner et al.) Is the Zero-Point Energy Real? (S Saunders) Two Comments on the Vacuum in Algebraic Quantum Field (M Redei).
In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).
Quantum field theory (QFT) can be analyzed in terms of its mathematical structure, its conceptual system for physical descriptions, or its basic ontology. The analysis can be done logically or historically. In this chapter, only the genesis of the conceptual foundations of QFT relevant to its basic ontology will be treated; no discussion of its mathematical structures or its epistemological underpinnings will be given. Some conceptual problems, such as those related to probability and measurement, will be discussed, but only because of their relevance to the basic ontology of QFT, rather than their intrinsic philosophical interest. Here, by basic ontology I mean the irreducible entities that QFT is invented to describe. The often mentioned candidates for the basic ontology of QFT, in fact of the physical world, are the discrete particle and the continuous field. Another possible candidate (the spacetime point) has also been suggested recently (Redhead, 1983). Since the aim of this chapter is to analyze the historical process in which the conceptual foundations of QFT were laid down, rather than the logical structure of QFT which philosophers of the present day treat, no discussion of the last possibility will be given. The content of this chapter involves the formation and interpretation, in a roughly chronological order, of the concepts of the wave function, quantization, quantization of the field, the vacuum, interactions between fields, and renormalization. The first two topics will be discussed in relation to the quantization of the field, with their role being taken as the starting point of the conceptual development of QFT.
An important way in which quantum field theory (QFT) differs from non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that in QFT systems generically possess an infinite number of degrees of freedom. This chapter examines the proposals for non-fundamental roles that the particle concept plays in particle physics. The fields which feature in the QFT formalism are mathematical expressions; work needs to be done to determine the ontological properties of the entities that are represented by the mathematical field formalism. One difficulty for the quanta interpretation of QFT is that the analysis in terms of quanta offered in the preceding paragraphs is restricted to free systems. The no-go results for interacting systems inspire a different approach to regarding particles as non-fundamental entities. The fields which feature in the QFT formalism are mathematical expressions; work needs to be done to determine the ontological properties of the entities that are represented by the mathematical field formalism.
According to classical physics, particles are basic constituents of the physical world. Quantum theory is much less friendly to particles; in particular, relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) creates serious obstacles for the idea that particles are fundamental. Apparently, when moving from the domain of RQFT to that of classical mechanics (CM), particles have to emerge at some stage. It is standard to assume that this emergence has been completed at the level of quantum mechanics, halfway between RQFT and CM, even though particles of the same kind in many-particle quantum mechanics have the curious feature of being ‘entities without identity’. Against this ‘Received View’ about the nature of quantum particles we outline and defend an Alternative View (AV), in which the emergent character of particles is emphasized. According to this AV, the step to a particle theory has not yet been made in quantum mechanics: conditions have still to be satisfied in order to make the particle concept applicable. If these conditions are met, the quantum particles that emerge are distinguishable individuals possessing physically defined identities, in stark contrast to what the Received View asserts. We will compare and contrast the two Views, both from a physical and a logical/conceptual point of view. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.