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Lecture notes in computer science

Maliciously Secure Massively Parallel Computation for All-but-One Corruptions

Rex Fernando, Yuval Gelles, Ilan Komargodski, Elaine Shi

Published Jan 1, 2022• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-15802-5_24

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Cryptographic protocols with adaptive security ensure that security holds against an adver-sary who can dynamically determine which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses—or even after the protocol is finished. In the setting where all parties may potentially be corrupted, and secure erasure is not assumed, it has been a long-standing open question to design secure-computation protocols with adaptive security running in constant rounds. Here, we show a constant-round, universally composable protocol for computing any functionality, tolerating a malicious, adaptive adversary corrupting any number of parties. Interest-ingly, our protocol can compute all functionalities, not just adaptively well-formed ones.

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One of the most fundamental results of secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any n-party functionality can be computed with perfect security, in the private channels model. When the adversary is semi-honest this holds as long as t < n/2 parties are corrupted, and when the adversary is malicious this holds as long as t < n/3 parties are corrupted. In this chapter, we present a full description of the BGW protocol for the semi-honest and malicious settings, along with detailed explanations and intuition regarding the security of the protocols; full proofs can be found in [1].
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) provides provable security guarantees for many privacy critical applications. The semi-honest MPC protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries who can only observe the protocol execution, while the maliciously secure MPC protocols are secure against malicious adversaries who can deviate from the protocol description arbitrarily. Many security sensitive applications tend to use semi-honest MPC protocols because malicious security comes with huge communication and/or computation costs. In this work, we show how to efficiently transform generic semi-honest two-party protocols into maliciously secure multi-party protocol in the server-aided setting. We further propose an optimized constant-round server-aided MPC protocol. The proposed protocols are secure when all but one parties are maliciously corrupted, while the remaining party and the server are corrupted by semi-honest and non-colluding adversaries. We implement and evaluate our constant-round protocol. For the 2-party case, our protocol is only 1.11× slower than thesemi-honestYao's Garbled Circuits protocol, and it is 9.16× faster than the maliciously secure authenticated garbling protocol and 4.96× faster than the state-of-the-art maliciously secure server-aided protocol of Wuet al.For the 8-party case, our protocol is 103.29× faster than the authenticated garbling protocol and 17.03× faster than the protocol of Wuet al.
Cryptographic protocols with adaptive security ensure that security holds against an adver-sary who can dynamically determine which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses—or even after the protocol is finished. In the setting where all parties may potentially be corrupted, and secure erasure is not assumed, it has been a long-standing open question to design secure-computation protocols with adaptive security running in constant rounds. Here, we show a constant-round, universally composable protocol for computing any functionality, tolerating a malicious, adaptive adversary corrupting any number of parties. Interest-ingly, our protocol can compute all functionalities, not just adaptively well-formed ones.