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Lecture notes in computer science

Efficient Maliciously Secure Multiparty Computation for RAM

Marcel Keller, Avishay Yanai

Published Jan 1, 2018• 37 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_4

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A crucial issue, that mostly affects the performance of actively secure computation of RAM programs, is the task of reading/writing from/to memory in a private and authenticated manner. Previous works in the active security and multiparty settings are based purely on the SPDZ (reactive) protocol, hence, memory accesses are treated just like any input to the computation. However, a garbled-circuit-based construction (such as BMR), which benefits from a lower round complexity, must resolve the issue of converting memory data bits to their corresponding wire keys and vice versa.

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Secure 2-party computation (2PC) is becoming practical for some applications. However, most ap-proaches are limited by the fact that the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In response, random-access machines (RAM programs) have recently been investigated as a promising alternative representation. In this work, we present the first practical protocols for evaluating RAM programs with security against malicious adversaries. A useful efficiency measure is to divide the cost of malicious-secure evalu-ation of f by the cost of semi-honest-secure evaluation of f. Our RAM protocols achieve ratios matching the state of the art for circuit-based 2PC. For statistical security 2−s, our protocol without preprocessing achieves a ratio of s; our online-offline protocol has a pre-processing phase and achieves online ratio ∼ 2s / log T, where T is the total execution time of the RAM program. To summarize, our solutions show that the “extra overhead ” of obtaining malicious security for RAM programs (beyond what is needed for circuits) is minimal and does not grow with the running time of the program. 1

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A crucial issue, that mostly affects the performance of actively secure computation of RAM programs, is the task of reading/writing from/to memory in a private and authenticated manner. Previous works in the active security and multiparty settings are based purely on the SPDZ (reactive) protocol, hence, memory accesses are treated just like any input to the computation. However, a garbled-circuit-based construction (such as BMR), which benefits from a lower round complexity, must resolve the issue of converting memory data bits to their corresponding wire keys and vice versa.
Secure 2-party computation (2PC) is becoming practical for some applications. However, most ap-proaches are limited by the fact that the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In response, random-access machines (RAM programs) have recently been investigated as a promising alternative representation. In this work, we present the first practical protocols for evaluating RAM programs with security against malicious adversaries. A useful efficiency measure is to divide the cost of malicious-secure evalu-ation of f by the cost of semi-honest-secure evaluation of f. Our RAM protocols achieve ratios matching the state of the art for circuit-based 2PC. For statistical security 2−s, our protocol without preprocessing achieves a ratio of s; our online-offline protocol has a pre-processing phase and achieves online ratio ∼ 2s / log T, where T is the total execution time of the RAM program. To summarize, our solutions show that the “extra overhead ” of obtaining malicious security for RAM programs (beyond what is needed for circuits) is minimal and does not grow with the running time of the program. 1