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World Scientific series in 20th century physics

BERTLMANN'S SOCKS AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

James S. Bell

Published Sep 1, 1995• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situations just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.

DOI
10.1142/9789812795854_0085

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BERTLMANN'S SOCKS AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

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Les corrélations d'Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen, sont assez semblables à beaucoup de phénomènes banals de la vie quotidienne. Il est donc un peu difficile pour le profane de comprendre au premier abord pourquoi un tel flot de paroles a coulé à ce sujet. Il faut rappeler que les grands théoriciens de la mécanique quantique étaient convaincus qu'il fallait abandonner l'idée d'une réalité objective sur le plan microphysique. Les corrélations en question, vues dans l'optique de l'hypothèse de causalité locale (absence d'action à distance), étaient un argument de taille pour une telle réalitié. Les physiciens quantiques ont développé des contre-arguments (ni très clairs ni très convaincants à mon avis) et les opposants sont restés sur leurs positions. Depuis il a été possible de pousser l'analyse un peu plus loin, en considérant surtout des situations voisines de celles envisagées par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen. On trouve des corrélations qui ne sont pas du tout banales. Ce n'est plus aisé de croire, avec Einstein, que les prévisions de la mécanique quantique sont réconciliables avec la causalité locale et la réalité objective du monde microphysique. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situation just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.

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•Dec 14, 2025•0 citations
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situations just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.
Les corrélations d'Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen, sont assez semblables à beaucoup de phénomènes banals de la vie quotidienne. Il est donc un peu difficile pour le profane de comprendre au premier abord pourquoi un tel flot de paroles a coulé à ce sujet. Il faut rappeler que les grands théoriciens de la mécanique quantique étaient convaincus qu'il fallait abandonner l'idée d'une réalité objective sur le plan microphysique. Les corrélations en question, vues dans l'optique de l'hypothèse de causalité locale (absence d'action à distance), étaient un argument de taille pour une telle réalitié. Les physiciens quantiques ont développé des contre-arguments (ni très clairs ni très convaincants à mon avis) et les opposants sont restés sur leurs positions. Depuis il a été possible de pousser l'analyse un peu plus loin, en considérant surtout des situations voisines de celles envisagées par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen. On trouve des corrélations qui ne sont pas du tout banales. Ce n'est plus aisé de croire, avec Einstein, que les prévisions de la mécanique quantique sont réconciliables avec la causalité locale et la réalité objective du monde microphysique. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situation just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.
Les corrélations d'Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen, sont assez semblables à beaucoup de phénomènes banals de la vie quotidienne. Il est donc un peu difficile pour le profane de comprendre au premier abord pourquoi un tel flot de paroles a coulé à ce sujet. Il faut rappeler que les grands théoriciens de la mécanique quantique étaient convaincus qu'il fallait abandonner l'idée d'une réalité objective sur le plan microphysique. Les corrélations en question, vues dans l'optique de l'hypothèse de causalité locale (absence d'action à distance), étaient un argument de taille pour une telle réalité. Les physiciens quantiques ont développé des contre-arguments (ni très clairs ni très convaincants à mon avis) et les opposants sont restés sur leurs positions. Depuis il a été possible de pousser l'analyse un peu plus loin, en considérant surtout des situations voisines de celles envisagées par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen. On trouve des corrélations qui ne sont pas du tout banales. Ce n'est plus aisé de croire, avec Einstein, que les prévisions de la mécanique quantique sont réconciliables avec la causalité locale et la réalité objective du monde microphysique.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics (or, for that matter, of any physical theory) consists in answering the question: How can the world be for the theory to be true? That question is especially pressing in the case of the long-distance correlations predicted by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and rather convincingly established during the past decades in various laboratories. I will review four different approaches to the understanding of long-distance quantum correlations: (i) the Copenhagen interpretation and some of its modern variants; (ii) Bohmian mechanics of spin-carrying particles; (iii) Cramer's transactional interpretation; and (iv) the Hess-Philipp analysis of extended parameter spaces.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
Two problems with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument originate from the difficult-to-explain continual dismissal of Minkowski’s demonstration that the concept of spacetime represents a real four-dimensional world and is not just a mathematical space. The uncritical employment of the traditional three-dimensional language to the description of this argument leads (e.g., in its Bohm's version) to those problems: (1) due to the collapse of the common wavefunction of the constituents 1 and 2 of a disintegrated system, caused by the measurement of 1's spin (event E1E_{1}E1​), and due the conservation of the total spin, 2's spin is \textit{instantaneously} determined (event E2E_{2}E2​), which in three-dimensional language inescapably means that E2E_{2}E2​ is \textit{caused} by E1E_{1}E1​ (using merely a different word -- `correlation' -- does not explain anything in three-dimensional language); (2) events E1E_{1}E1​ and E2E_{2}E2​ are simultaneous \textit{only} for an observer AAA, who was at rest with respect to the disintegrated system, and therefore the total spin is not conserved for arbitrarily large periods of time for all observers in relative motion with respect to AAA and there exists a class of observers BBB for whom event E2E_{2}E2​ occurs \textit{before} E1E_{1}E1​, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the fundamental implicit assumption that the physical world is three-dimensional. When the reality of spacetime is explicitly recognized, (1) the paradoxes of the non-conservation of the total spin and that E2E_{2}E2​ happens before E1E_{1}E1​ for observers BBB do not arise (because there is no `before' and `after' in spacetime) and the statement that there is a correlation between E1E_{1}E1​ and E2E_{2}E2​ makes a perfect sense, and (2) a spacetime model of the quantum object can then be considered (by also taking into account the non-fully-realized experimental fact that the quantum object \textit{actually} exists everywhere where its wavefunction is different from zero) in order to address the fundamental incompleteness of quantum mechanics -- that it deals not with the quantum object itself, but only with its states. The paper ends with a discussion of a prediction by the proposed spacetime model of the electron that can be tested experimentally probably by the quadratic Stark effect.