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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument in spacetime and in what sense quantum mechanics is fundamentally incomplete

Petkov, Vesselin

Published Dec 14, 2025• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Two problems with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument originate from the difficult-to-explain continual dismissal of Minkowski’s demonstration that the concept of spacetime represents a real four-dimensional world and is not just a mathematical space. The uncritical employment of the traditional three-dimensional language to the description of this argument leads (e.g., in its Bohm's version) to those problems: (1) due to the collapse of the common wavefunction of the constituents 1 and 2 of a disintegrated system, caused by the measurement of 1's spin (event $E_{1}$), and due the conservation of the total spin, 2's spin is \textit{instantaneously} determined (event $E_{2}$), which in three-dimensional language inescapably means that $E_{2}$ is \textit{caused} by $E_{1}$ (using merely a different word -- `correlation' -- does not explain anything in three-dimensional language); (2) events $E_{1}$ and $E_{2}$ are simultaneous \textit{only} for an observer $A$, who was at rest with respect to the disintegrated system, and therefore the total spin is not conserved for arbitrarily large periods of time for all observers in relative motion with respect to $A$ and there exists a class of observers $B$ for whom event $E_{2}$ occurs \textit{before} $E_{1}$, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the fundamental implicit assumption that the physical world is three-dimensional. When the reality of spacetime is explicitly recognized, (1) the paradoxes of the non-conservation of the total spin and that $E_{2}$ happens before $E_{1}$ for observers $B$ do not arise (because there is no `before' and `after' in spacetime) and the statement that there is a correlation between $E_{1}$ and $E_{2}$ makes a perfect sense, and (2) a spacetime model of the quantum object can then be considered (by also taking into account the non-fully-realized experimental fact that the quantum object \textit{actually} exists everywhere where its wavefunction is different from zero) in order to address the fundamental incompleteness of quantum mechanics -- that it deals not with the quantum object itself, but only with its states. The paper ends with a discussion of a prediction by the proposed spacetime model of the electron that can be tested experimentally probably by the quadratic Stark effect.

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In Newtonian mechanics there exists a continuous x i.e. for a conservative force: .5mv(x)v(x) + V(x) = E with x taking any value. This is associated with the idea of dx→0. As a result one may choose an x and x+dx with dx→0 and v(x) and v(x+dx) become arbitrarily close in value. It is almost as if their identities merge. In (1) entropy and average energy are calculated using the Maxwell-Boltzmann MB factor exp(-e/T) and a continuous energy. The results E= NT (k=1) and S = -ln(T/To) with To being an integration constant show that one must have T>To because T→0 does not lead to S→0. Thus there is a problem if one uses continuous energy. In other words continuous energy is rejected.. (1) then considers an equally spaced energy i.e. e=bn, n=0,1,2,3 … and calculates energy and entropy again. In this case S→0 as T→0. Thus (1) concludes that it is entropy which leads to the discretization of energy In this note we try to argue that discretization of energy is already implied by the MB factor. The MB factor exp(-energy/T) where T is a math parameter called temperature represents a probability. In other words, different energies have different probabilities i.e. one must distinguish between them. Having two energy values merge is a problem now because one has a second parameter T which may also go to zero i.e. e2-e1→0 and T→0 leads to trouble because exp(-e2/T) does not tend to zero as it should if e1=0. We argue that the underlying reason for e1 and e2 being discretely different is that one cannot use the probability/T formalism i.e. MB factor unless interactions occur. We argue that such two body interactions cannot ultimately transfer or remove a de→0 and keep e1 and e2 distinct. In other words the interaction/collision is ultimately linked to a finite energy transfer even though T→0. As a result energy should be discretized in an equilibrium scenario. This argument does not make use of entropy explicitly although implicitly having exp(-e2/T)-->0 as T→0 (say for a 2 level system) means that the particle is in state e1 which may be associated with an entropy of 0 if one ignores internal features of this state. We also note that the continuous energy result E=NT, and not just the entropy, leads to trouble because as T becomes extremely tiny E which is an average of say e1 and e2 with e1=0 as an example approaches T in magnitude. The smaller T becomes the smaller e2 becomes which e2 and e1 no longer have separate identities, but in such a case one does not have an equilibrium scenario either. In other words exp(-e/T) implies interactions between distinguishable states with respect to energy.

•Nov 12, 2022•0 citations
Two problems with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument originate from the difficult-to-explain continual dismissal of Minkowski’s demonstration that the concept of spacetime represents a real four-dimensional world and is not just a mathematical space. The uncritical employment of the traditional three-dimensional language to the description of this argument leads (e.g., in its Bohm's version) to those problems: (1) due to the collapse of the common wavefunction of the constituents 1 and 2 of a disintegrated system, caused by the measurement of 1's spin (event E1E_{1}E1​), and due the conservation of the total spin, 2's spin is \textit{instantaneously} determined (event E2E_{2}E2​), which in three-dimensional language inescapably means that E2E_{2}E2​ is \textit{caused} by E1E_{1}E1​ (using merely a different word -- correlation' -- does not explain anything in three-dimensional language); (2) events $E_{1}$ and $E_{2}$ are simultaneous \textit{only} for an observer $A$, who was at rest with respect to the disintegrated system, and therefore the total spin is not conserved for arbitrarily large periods of time for all observers in relative motion with respect to $A$ and there exists a class of observers $B$ for whom event $E_{2}$ occurs \textit{before} $E_{1}$, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the fundamental implicit assumption that the physical world is three-dimensional. When the reality of spacetime is explicitly recognized, (1) the paradoxes of the non-conservation of the total spin and that $E_{2}$ happens before $E_{1}$ for observers $B$ do not arise (because there is no before' and `after' in spacetime) and the statement that there is a correlation between E1E_{1}E1​ and E2E_{2}E2​ makes a perfect sense, and (2) a spacetime model of the quantum object can then be considered (by also taking into account the non-fully-realized experimental fact that the quantum object \textit{actually} exists everywhere where its wavefunction is different from zero) in order to address the fundamental incompleteness of quantum mechanics -- that it deals not with the quantum object itself, but only with its states. The paper ends with a discussion of a prediction by the proposed spacetime model of the electron that can be tested experimentally probably by the quadratic Stark effect.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper [17] in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics.There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics.There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality.Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities).The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities.And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades.The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers.It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions: (a) that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by: (b) that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible. In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid. The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.
In Newtonian mechanics there exists a continuous x i.e. for a conservative force: .5mv(x)v(x) + V(x) = E with x taking any value. This is associated with the idea of dx→0. As a result one may choose an x and x+dx with dx→0 and v(x) and v(x+dx) become arbitrarily close in value. It is almost as if their identities merge. In (1) entropy and average energy are calculated using the Maxwell-Boltzmann MB factor exp(-e/T) and a continuous energy. The results E= NT (k=1) and S = -ln(T/To) with To being an integration constant show that one must have T>To because T→0 does not lead to S→0. Thus there is a problem if one uses continuous energy. In other words continuous energy is rejected.. (1) then considers an equally spaced energy i.e. e=bn, n=0,1,2,3 … and calculates energy and entropy again. In this case S→0 as T→0. Thus (1) concludes that it is entropy which leads to the discretization of energy In this note we try to argue that discretization of energy is already implied by the MB factor. The MB factor exp(-energy/T) where T is a math parameter called temperature represents a probability. In other words, different energies have different probabilities i.e. one must distinguish between them. Having two energy values merge is a problem now because one has a second parameter T which may also go to zero i.e. e2-e1→0 and T→0 leads to trouble because exp(-e2/T) does not tend to zero as it should if e1=0. We argue that the underlying reason for e1 and e2 being discretely different is that one cannot use the probability/T formalism i.e. MB factor unless interactions occur. We argue that such two body interactions cannot ultimately transfer or remove a de→0 and keep e1 and e2 distinct. In other words the interaction/collision is ultimately linked to a finite energy transfer even though T→0. As a result energy should be discretized in an equilibrium scenario. This argument does not make use of entropy explicitly although implicitly having exp(-e2/T)-->0 as T→0 (say for a 2 level system) means that the particle is in state e1 which may be associated with an entropy of 0 if one ignores internal features of this state. We also note that the continuous energy result E=NT, and not just the entropy, leads to trouble because as T becomes extremely tiny E which is an average of say e1 and e2 with e1=0 as an example approaches T in magnitude. The smaller T becomes the smaller e2 becomes which e2 and e1 no longer have separate identities, but in such a case one does not have an equilibrium scenario either. In other words exp(-e/T) implies interactions between distinguishable states with respect to energy.