Actually, the NIST post-quantum cryptosystem standardization competition reached its third round with seven finalist candidates. And NIST invites the cryptographic community to analyzing the selected candidates. In this context, we contribute by creating a new blind digital signature protocol over our release of NTRU post-quantum cryptosystem. Our protocol can be a variant of FALCON digital signature scheme, which is among of those finalist candidates. Because of our NTRU release is additively homomorphic, we successfully blind and unblind the digital signature by adding a random message. We obtained good results; the speed performance of our protocol outperforms FALCON by a factor up to 27, with a stronger security level, and perfect correctness.
Actually, the NIST post-quantum cryptosystem standardization competition reached its third round with seven finalist candidates. And NIST invites the cryptographic community to analyzing the selected candidates. In this context, we contribute by creating a new blind digital signature protocol over our release of NTRU post-quantum cryptosystem. Our protocol can be a variant of FALCON digital signature scheme, which is among of those finalist candidates. Because of our NTRU release is additively homomorphic, we successfully blind and unblind the digital signature by adding a random message. We obtained good results; the speed performance of our protocol outperforms FALCON by a factor up to 27, with a stronger security level, and perfect correctness.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows the issuance, management, and validation of digital certificates to establish trust between entities in networked systems. The security of PKI relies on cryptography and the underlying hardness problems. Recent advances in quantum computing pose significant threats to the cryptographic algorithms currently used in digital networking, including PKI. NIST launched the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project and standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON). To diversify the PQC portfolio, NIST is now evaluating 14 additional digital signature candidates. In this work, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of these 14 additional signature candidates, evaluating their integration and operational overhead within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Our empirical results show that several additional candidates perform competitively with standardized schemes in PKI operations. Eight of the fourteen Round 2 candidates outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with schemes such as HAWK and CROSS achieving performance levels that approach those of ML-DSA and FALCON. These findings identify which of the candidate schemes are practical alternatives for securing PKI against quantum threats.
Recent advancements in quantum computing threaten the cryptographic foundations of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized three post-quantum digital signature algorithms, namely ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FALCON, fourteen additional candidates are currently under evaluation, to diversify the collection of available post-quantum signature schemes. This work presents a comprehensive performance analysis of the fourteen ‘Round 2’ digital signature candidates within a functional X. 509 PKI environment. Unlike prior studies focused on isolated benchmarking, we evaluate the complete PKI life cycle, key generation, CSR creation, as well as certificate signing and verification. Our empirical results indicate that several candidates perform competitively with current standards; notably, eight schemes outperform SLH-DSA in signing efficiency, with HAWK and CROSS approaching the performance levels of ML-DSA and FALCON. However, memory analysis reveals critical trade-offs. While HAWK and CROSS maintain high efficiency, multivariate schemes like UOV and FAEST incur significantly higher memory overheads. These observed performance characteristics provide a stronger basis for selecting suitable post-quantum signatures in practical PKI environments.
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
Lattices lead to promising practical post-quantum digital signatures, combining asymptotic efficiency with strong theoretical security guarantees. However, tuning their parameters into practical instantiations is a delicate task. On the one hand, NIST round~2 candidates based on Lyubashevsky's design (such as dilithium and qtesla) allow several tradeoffs between security and efficiency, but at the expense of a large bandwidth consumption. On the other hand, the hash-and-sign falcon signature is much more compact and is still very efficient, but it allows only two security levels, with large compactness and security gaps between them. We introduce a new family of signature schemes based on the falcon design, which relies on module lattices. Our concrete instantiation enjoys the compactness and efficiency of falcon, and allows an intermediate security level. It leads to the most compact lattice-based signature achieving a quantum security above 128 bits.
Conventional public-key cryptographic systems are increasingly threatened by advances in quantum computing, accelerating the need for robust post-quantum cryptographic solutions. Among these, Falcon, a compact lattice-based digital signature scheme, has emerged as a leading candidate in the NIST post-quantum standardization process due to its efficiency and theoretical security grounded in hard lattice problems. This work introduces Falcon-M, a modified version of the Falcon algorithm that significantly reduces implementation complexity. It does so by replacing Falcon’s intricate trapdoor-based key-generation mechanism with a simplified approach that utilizes randomized polynomial Gaussian sampling and fast Fourier transform (FFT) operations. Falcon-M incorporates SHA-512 hashing and discrete Gaussian sampling to preserve cryptographic soundness and statistical randomness while maintaining the core structure of Falcon’s signing and verification processes. We formally specify the Falcon-M algorithm, provide an updated pseudocode, and offer a comparative analysis with the original Falcon in terms of algorithmic complexity, security assumptions, and implementation overhead. Additionally, we present formal lemmas and theorems to ensure correctness and define theoretical bounds on forgery resistance. Although Falcon-M does not rely on a formal cryptographic trapdoor, we demonstrate that it achieves strong practical security based on assumptions related to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. Falcon-M is thus well-suited for lightweight post-quantum applications, particularly in resource-constrained environments, such as embedded systems and Internet-of-Things (IoT) platforms.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of two lattice-based post-quantum digital signature schemes: FALCON and SOLMAE. FALCON which was finallty selected by NIST for PQC standardization, represents an efficient realization of the GPV framework over NTRU lattices. SOLMAE, inspired by FALCON, Mitaka, and Antrag, aims to improve implementation simplicity and performance while preserving strong security guarantees. Adopting a pedagogical approach, we provide algorithmic insights into both schemes and conduct practical evaluations using their Python implementations, focusing on key generation, signing, and verification procedures. Performance comparisons at two NIST security levels (512 and 1024 bits) highlight SOLMAE’s potential advantages in simplicity and execution time, suggesting its suitability for deployment in resource-constrained environments.