Secure computation methods include methods that use homomorphic encryption (HE) and those that use secret sharing (SS). Secure computation based on HE can be realized using one server, and the computation process can be made public if the encryption key is kept secure. However, HE generally requires a substantial computation cost. In contrast, SS has the advantage of low computation cost, allowing for high-speed processing; however, all servers must be managed independently. And the process of k or more servers cannot be disclosed. In particular, secret input will be leaked when the same organization manages multiple servers to implement SS. Therefore, a complex model where each server is independently managed is required. Iwamura et al. proposed a secure computation that is information-theoretic secure in n≥k instead of n≥2k−1 by assuming a trusted third party (TTP). In this paper, by making more effective use of a TTP, we demonstrate that secure computation based on SS is possible with only one computing server. Moreover, we show that the entire computation process can be disclosed if the key is managed safely. We realize a method that solves the disadvantages of conventional approaches with a faster computation than those methods.
Secure computation methods include methods that use homomorphic encryption (HE) and those that use secret sharing (SS). Secure computation based on HE can be realized using one server, and the computation process can be made public if the encryption key is kept secure. However, HE generally requires a substantial computation cost. In contrast, SS has the advantage of low computation cost, allowing for high-speed processing; however, all servers must be managed independently. And the process of k or more servers cannot be disclosed. In particular, secret input will be leaked when the same organization manages multiple servers to implement SS. Therefore, a complex model where each server is independently managed is required. Iwamura et al. proposed a secure computation that is information-theoretic secure in n≥k instead of n≥2k−1 by assuming a trusted third party (TTP). In this paper, by making more effective use of a TTP, we demonstrate that secure computation based on SS is possible with only one computing server. Moreover, we show that the entire computation process can be disclosed if the key is managed safely. We realize a method that solves the disadvantages of conventional approaches with a faster computation than those methods.
Advancements in Internet of Things devices allow for the collection and analysis of big data. Moreover, cloud computing has emerged as an ideal platform for big data analysis because it quickly provides computing resources for analysis at scale. However, concerns exist regarding the privacy and security of this information. Secure computation is a technology that enables computation while maintaining data encryption. In this study, we present a new secure computation based on a client-server model, in which a set of servers perform computations using the inputs of multiple clients. We adopt the(k,n)threshold secret sharing approach, where an inputsis divided intonshares and can be recovered from shares with a thresholdk. However, conventional secure computation using(k,n)threshold secret sharing generally requires the conditionn≥2k−1and communication among multiple servers for each multiplication. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has solved this problem completely. We demonstrate that processes that require communication can be concentrated in the preprocessing phase and propose a secure computation using(k,n)threshold secret sharing that does not require communication during the secure computation phase, even when multiplication is performed. Moreover, we show that the number of communications does not depend on the number of multiplications, unlike in conventional methods. As communication often requires more processing time than the actual secure computation, our method makes it possible to realize faster overall processing than conventional methods. We also present an extensive security analysis and experimental simulation of the proposed method. Our proposed method achieves information-theoretic security against semi-honest adversaries under certain conditions withn<2k−1.
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we investigate schemes for secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
Two-party computation allows two clients to jointly compute an arbitrary function of their inputs without revealing these inputs to each other. In this study, we adopt a server-aided model, in which a set of computing servers performs computation using the inputs of two clients. In the (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, input s is divided into n shares and can be recovered from k shares, where k is a threshold. Typically, the multiplication of shares increases the polynomial's degree from (k-1) to (2k-2), thus increasing the number of shares required from k to 2k-1. Because each server typically holds only one share, the number of servers required also increases to 2k-1. Therefore, a set of n servers can compute multiplication securely only if the adversary corrupts at most k-1 <; n/2 servers. In this study, we differentiate N, which is the number of required servers, and n, which is the parameter of the (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. We propose a method of multiplication by using only N ≥ k servers. This is implemented by sending two shares of the same input to each server. In a “normal” method, sending multiple shares to one server violates security because k shares can be leaked from k-1 servers. We overcome this by implementing a different functionality, where each share is first encrypted with a different random number (encrypted share) before being sent to a server. Instead of the “normal shares” of ab, our protocol computes the encrypted shares of ab using the encrypted shares of a and b. We show that the proposed method is secure against a non-colluding semi-honest adversary. Moreover, we implement our method in MATLAB and show its efficiency.
It seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that you should never trust a computer and that you should trust the person operating the computer even less. This in particular becomes a problem when the party that you do not trust is one which is separated from you and is one on which you depend, e.g. because that party is the holder of some data or some capability that you need in order to operate correctly. How do you perform a given task involving interaction with other parties while allowing these parties a minimal influence on you and, if privacy is an issue, allowing them to learn as little about you as possible. This is the general problem of secure multiparty computation. The usual way of formalizing the problem is to say that a number of parties who do not trust each other wish to compute some function of their local inputs, while keeping their inputs as secret as possible and guaranteeing the correctness of the output. Both goals should be obtained even if some parties stop participating or some malevolent coalition of the parties start deviating arbitrarily from the agreed protocol. The task is further complicated by the fact that besides their mutual distrust, nor do the parties trust the channels by which they communicate. A general solution to the secure multiparty computation problem is a compiler which given any feasible function describes an efficient protocol which allows the parties to compute the function securely on their local inputs over an open network. Over the past twenty years the secure multiparty computation problem has been the subject of a large body of research, both research into the models of multiparty computation and research aimed at realizing general secure multiparty computation. The main approach to realizing secure multiparty computation has been based on verifiable secret sharing as computation, where each party holds a secret share of each input and during the execution computes secret shares of all intermediate values. This approach allows the parties to keep all inputs and intermediate values secret and to pool the shares of the output values to learn exactly these values. More recently an approach based on joint homomorphic encryption was introduced, allowing for an efficient realization of general multiparty computation secure against an eavesdropper. A joint encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where all parties can encrypt, but where it takes the participation of all parties to open an encryption. The computation then starts by all parties broadcasting encryptions of their inputs and progresses through computing encryptions of the intermediary values using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. The encryptions of the outputs can then be jointly decrypted. In this dissertation we extend this approach by using threshold homomorphic encryption to provide full-fledged security against an active attacker which might control some of the parties and which might take over parties during the course of the protocol execution. As opposed to a joint encryption scheme a threshold encryption scheme only requires that a given number of the parties are operating correctly for decryption to be possible. In this dissertation we show that threshold homomorphic encryption allows to solve the secure general multiparty computation problem more efficiently than previous approaches to the problem. Starting from an open point-to-point network there is a long way to general secure multiparty computation. The dissertation contains contributions at several points along the way. In particular we investigate how to realize secure channels. We also show how threshold signature schemes can be used to efficiently realize a broadcast channel and how threshold cryptography can be used to provide the parties of the network with a source of shared randomness. All three tools are well-known to be extremely powerful resources in a network, and our principle contribution is to provide efficient realizations. The dissertation also contains contributions to the definitional part of the field of multiparty computation. Most significantly we augment the recent model of universally composable security with a formal notion of what it means for a protocol to only realize a given problem under a given restricted input-output behavior of the environment. This e.g. allows us to give the first specification of a universally composable zero-knowledge proof of membership which does not at the same time require the proof system to be a proof of knowledge.
Encrypted control systems allow to evaluate feedback laws on external servers without revealing private information about state and input data, the control law, or the plant. While there are a number of encrypted control schemes available for linear feedback laws, only few results exist for the evaluation of more general control laws. Recently, an approach to encrypted polynomial control was presented, relying on two-party secret sharing and an inter-server communication protocol using homomorphic encryption. As homomorphic encryptions are much more computationally demanding than secret sharing, they make up for a tremendous amount of the overall computational demand of this scheme. For this reason, in this paper, we demonstrate that multi-party computation enables secure polynomial control based solely on secret sharing. We introduce a novel secure three-party control scheme based on three-party computation. Further, we propose a novel n-party control scheme to securely evaluate polynomial feedback laws of arbitrary degree without inter-server communication. The latter property makes it easier to realize the necessary requirement regarding non-collusion of the servers, with which perfect security can be guaranteed. Simulations suggest that the presented control schemes are many times less computationally demanding than the two-party scheme mentioned above.
Secure multi-party computation has been playing a fundamental role in terms of classical cryptography. Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) could compute the encrypted data without decryption. At present, most protocols use a semi-honest third party (TP) to protect participants’ secrets. We use a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme instead of TP to protect the privacy of parties. Based on quantum homomorphic encryption, a secure multi-party quantum summation scheme is proposed in which N participants can delegate a server with strong quantum computing power to assist computation. By delegating the computation and key update processes to a server and a semi-honest key center, participants encrypt their private information data using Pauli operators to get the sum. Besides, the server can design and optimize the summation lines itself, and the correct results can be obtained even if the secret information is negative. The correctness analysis showed that the participants could correctly obtain the results of the calculation. The security analysis proves the scheme is resistant to both outside attack and participant’s attack, and is secure against collusive attack by up to N-2 participants. From the theoretical point of view, our protocol can extend to other secure multi-party computing problems.