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Oxford University Press eBooks

Quantum Secrets

Jeffrey Bub

Published Feb 11, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Classical physics cannot guarantee the security of a procedure for distributing a cryptographic key between two parties. In a quantum world, any attempt by Eve to eavesdrop on communications between Alice and Bob can be revealed. The chapter shows how Alice and Bob can share secrets with unconditional security in Bananaworld by exploiting the “monogamous” correlations of Popescu–Rohrlich bananas, and discusses a protocol by Ekert that exploits the monogamy of entanglement in our quantum world to allow Alice and Bob to share a secret key. Finally, the chapter shows how this can be extended to a device-independent scenario, where Alice and Bob can share a secret key even if they suspect that the devices they use to prepare and measure entangled quantum states are insecure and might have been supplied by an adversary.

DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718536.003.0007

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Classical physics cannot guarantee the security of a procedure for distributing a cryptographic key between two parties. In a quantum world, any attempt by Eve to eavesdrop on communications between Alice and Bob can be revealed. The chapter shows how Alice and Bob can share secrets with unconditional security in Bananaworld by exploiting the “monogamous” correlations of Popescu–Rohrlich bananas, and discusses a protocol by Ekert that exploits the monogamy of entanglement in our quantum world to allow Alice and Bob to share a secret key. Finally, the chapter shows how this can be extended to a device-independent scenario, where Alice and Bob can share a secret key even if they suspect that the devices they use to prepare and measure entangled quantum states are insecure and might have been supplied by an adversary.
Boyer, Kenigsberg, and Mor [Phys.Rev.Lett.99, 140501(2007)] proposed a novel idea of semi-quantum key distribution where a key can be securely distributed between Alice who can perform any quantum operation and Bob who is classical. Extending the idea of “semiquantum” to other tasks of quantum information processing is of interest and worth considering. In this article, we consider the issue of semi-quantum secret sharing where a quantum participant Alice can share a secret key with two classical participants Bobs. After analyzing the existing protocol, we propose a new protocol of semi-quantum secret sharing. Our protocol is more realistic, since it utilizes product states instead of entangled states. We prove that any attempt of an adversary to obtain information necessarily induces some errors that the legitimate users could notice. 1
Quantum key distribution allows two parties, traditionally known as Alice and Bob, to establish a secure random cryptographic key if, firstly, they have access to a quantum communication channel, and secondly, they can exchange classical public messages which can be monitored but not altered by an eavesdropper, Eve. Quantum key distribution provides perfect security because, unlike its classical counterpart, it relies on the laws of physics rather than on ensuring that successful eavesdropping would require excessive computational effort. However, security proofs of quantum key distribution are not trivial and are usually restricted in their applicability to specific protocols. In contrast, we present a general and conceptually simple proof which can be applied to a number of different protocols. It relies on the fact that a cryptographic procedure called privacy amplification is equally secure when an adversary's memory for data storage is quantum rather than classical.
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated. We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks. The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices. In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper. The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is intended to produce cryptographic secret keys between two remote parties, usually called Alice and Bob. Even though QKD has been proven to be unconditionally secure against the eavesdropper, commonly called Eve, practical implementations of QKD may contain vulnerabilities that may lead to the generated secret keys being compromised. In order to detect the presence of the eavesdropper in the channel, in our proposal Alice introduces an interleaved sequence of decoy states which produce a characteristic distribution at Bob's station. Thus, in analyzing such distribution in presence and absence of the eavesdropper Eve, her activity in the channel is detected. This protocol doesn’t require changes at the quantum physical level, but it can be incorporated at the high software level.
Recently, Zhang, Li and Guo (ZLG) suggested a new approach to quantum key distribution by using a shared Bell state which acts as quantum key in order to encode and decode classical information. Subsequently, others extended ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and to quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states. However, Gao et al. have shown that if Eve employs a special strategy to attack, these protocols become insecure. Afterwards, they repair ZLG protocol so that their eavesdropping strategy becomes inefficient. In this paper, we investigate the security of ZLG quantum key distribution protocol and show that it is not secure against Eve's attacks and with probability of one half she gets all of the keys without being detected by the two parties. In this eavesdropping strategy, Eve transforms the previously shared Bell state between Alice and Bob to two Bell states among herself and the parties. Moreover, we briefly show that ZLG's repairing by Gao et al's is not efficient against of our attack and Eve can choose an appropriate rotation angle and measurement bases which help her to do eavesdropping. Afterwards, we discuss generalization of ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and show that with probability 1/d, Eve gets all of keys. We show that quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states is also not secure and with probability one half, Eve gets all of keys. We repair them by going to higher dimensional shared EPR or GHZ states. Finally, we compare ZLG protocol with ours and show that the ZLG protocol and its extensions are less robust against the channel noise with respect to ours.