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arXiv:quant-ph/0604185 · Quantum Information and Computation

New approach to quantum key distribution via quantum encryption

A. Fahmi

Published Sep 1, 2009• 0 citations
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Abstract

Recently, Zhang, Li and Guo (ZLG) suggested a new approach to quantum key distribution by using a shared Bell state which acts as quantum key in order to encode and decode classical information. Subsequently, others extended ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and to quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states. However, Gao et al. have shown that if Eve employs a special strategy to attack, these protocols become insecure. Afterwards, they repair ZLG protocol so that their eavesdropping strategy becomes inefficient. In this paper, we investigate the security of ZLG quantum key distribution protocol and show that it is not secure against Eve's attacks and with probability of one half she gets all of the keys without being detected by the two parties. In this eavesdropping strategy, Eve transforms the previously shared Bell state between Alice and Bob to two Bell states among herself and the parties. Moreover, we briefly show that ZLG's repairing by Gao et al's is not efficient against of our attack and Eve can choose an appropriate rotation angle and measurement bases which help her to do eavesdropping. Afterwards, we discuss generalization of ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and show that with probability 1/d, Eve gets all of keys. We show that quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states is also not secure and with probability one half, Eve gets all of keys. We repair them by going to higher dimensional shared EPR or GHZ states. Finally, we compare ZLG protocol with ours and show that the ZLG protocol and its extensions are less robust against the channel noise with respect to ours.

DOI
10.26421/qic9.9-10-9

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Recently, Zhang, Li and Guo (ZLG) suggested a new approach to quantum key distribution by using a shared Bell state which acts as quantum key in order to encode and decode classical information. Subsequently, others extended ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and to quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states. However, Gao et al. have shown that if Eve employs a special strategy to attack, these protocols become insecure. Afterwards, they repair ZLG protocol so that their eavesdropping strategy becomes inefficient. In this paper, we investigate the security of ZLG quantum key distribution protocol and show that it is not secure against Eve's attacks and with probability of one half she gets all of the keys without being detected by the two parties. In this eavesdropping strategy, Eve transforms the previously shared Bell state between Alice and Bob to two Bell states among herself and the parties. Moreover, we briefly show that ZLG's repairing by Gao et al's is not efficient against of our attack and Eve can choose an appropriate rotation angle and measurement bases which help her to do eavesdropping. Afterwards, we discuss generalization of ZLG protocol to d-dimensional systems and show that with probability 1/d, Eve gets all of keys. We show that quantum secret sharing based on reusable GHZ states is also not secure and with probability one half, Eve gets all of keys. We repair them by going to higher dimensional shared EPR or GHZ states. Finally, we compare ZLG protocol with ours and show that the ZLG protocol and its extensions are less robust against the channel noise with respect to ours.
Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners are key distribution protocols in which Alice encodes her key into $N\ensuremath{-}1$ qubits, in such a way that all the other partners must cooperate in order to retrieve the key. On these protocols, several eavesdropping scenarios are possible: some partners may want to reconstruct the key without the help of the other ones, and consequently collaborate with an Eve that eavesdrops on the other partners' channels. For each of these scenarios, we give the optimal individual attack that Eve can perform. A link with Bell's inequality is demonstrated analytically for half of the scenarios, and is conjectured on the basis of numerical estimates for the other scenarios: the authorized partners have a higher information on the key than the unauthorized ones if and only if they can violate a Bell's inequality.
It seems that quantum key distribution (QKD) may be completely insecure when the message sender Alice always encodes her key bits in a fixed basis. In this paper, we present a QKD protocol with classical Alice, i.e. Alice always encodes her key bit in the {|0〉,|1〉} basis (we call it classical {0,1} basis) and the eavesdropper Eve knows this fact. We prove that our protocol is completely robust against any eavesdropping attack and present the amount of tolerable noise against Eve's individual attack. Next, we present a QKD protocol to demonstrate that secure key bits can be distributed even if neither Alice nor Bob has quantum capacities, and extend this idea to a QKD network protocol with numerous parties who have only classical capacities. Finally, we discuss that quantum is necessary in QKD for security reasons, but both Alice and Bob may be classical.
A quantum key distribution protocol, based on the quantum dense encoding in entangled states, is presented. In this protocol, we introduce an encoding process to encode,two classical bits information into one of the four one-qubit unitary operations implemented by Alice and the Bell states measurement implemented by Bob in stead of direct measuring the previously shared Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs by both of the distant parties, Alice and Bob Considering the practical application we can get the conclusion that our protocol has some advantages. It not only simplifies the measurement which may induce potential errors, but also improves the effectively transmitted rate of the generated qubits by the raw key. Here we also discuss eavesdropping attacks against the scheme and the channel loss.
In this paper, we propose an efficient multi-party quantum secret sharing scheme based on GHZ entangled state. The participants in this scheme are divided into two groups, and share secrets as a group. There is no need to exchange any measurement information between the two groups, reducing the security problems caused by the communication process. Each participant holds one particle from each GHZ state; it can be found that the particles of each GHZ state are related after measuring them, and the eavesdropping detection can detect external attacks based on this characteristic. Furthermore, since the participants within the two groups encode the measured particles, they can recover the same secrets. Security analysis shows that the protocol can resist the intercept-and-resend attack and entanglement measurement attack, and the simulation results show that the probability of an external attacker being detected is proportional to the amount of information he can obtain. Compared with the existing protocols, this proposed protocol is more secure, has less quantum resources and is more practical.