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BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks

Introduction

Sergey P. Suprun, Anatoly P. Suprun

Published Apr 26, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

So far, there have been many attempts to interpret experimental facts from the field of quantum mechanics but all these attempts were made because the models intended to logically resolve the contradictions at the level of the already established notions without interfering with the geneses of these notions. Here the grounds for the possible solution of quantum mechanics problems are given using the psychosemantic approach.

DOI
10.2174/978160805349011201010003

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So far, there have been many attempts to interpret experimental facts from the field of quantum mechanics but all these attempts were made because the models intended to logically resolve the contradictions at the level of the already established notions without interfering with the geneses of these notions. Here the grounds for the possible solution of quantum mechanics problems are given using the psychosemantic approach.
Bohr is said to have remarked that anybody who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it. No physicist, however, challenges its practical usefulness in predicting experimental results and providing an explanatory framework for an enormous range of study. Nevertheless, more thoughtful physicists have been astonished and disturbed by what is implied when attempts are made to interpret its meaning. As a result a variety of ingenious, and sometimes bizarre, schemes have been devised since its inception in order to make these implications more acceptable to the scientific mind. Some of these schemes have resulted in proposals which appear stranger than the problems they have been designed to resolve. After some sixty years there is no consensus of opinion upon the solution of the epistemological problems posed. Indeed the debate keeps on resurfacing in the scientific literature and continues to generate library shelves of books. Some progress, however, has been made and the late John Bell himself and the experimental work of Alain Aspect have demonstrated that some epistemological positions cannot be sustained.
Entertaining the possibility of time travel will invariably challenge dearly-held concepts in fundamental physics. It becomes relatively easy to construct multiple logical contradictions using differing starting points from various well-established fields of physics. Sometimes, the interpretation is that only a full theory of quantum gravity will be able to settle these logical contradictions. Even then, it remains unclear if the multitude of problems could be overcome. Yet as definitive as this seems to the notion of time travel in physics, such recourse to quantum gravity comes with its own, long-standing challenge to most of these counter-arguments to time travel: These arguments rely on time, while quantum gravity is (in)famously stuck with the problem of time. One attempt to answer this problem within the canonical framework resulted in the Page–Wootters formalism, and its recent gauge-theoretic reinterpretation as an emergent notion of time. Herein, we will begin a program to study toy models implementing the Hamiltonian constraint in quantum theory, with an aim toward understanding what an emergent notion of time can tell us about the (im)possibility of time travel.
The paper attempts to convince that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics does not contradict philosophical realism by throwing light onto certain properties of quantum systems that seem to have escaped attention as yet. The exposition starts with the philosophical notions of realism. Then, the quantum mechanics as it is usually taught is demoted to a mere part of the theory called phenomenology of observations, and the common impression about its contradiction to realism is explained. The main idea of the paper, the physical notion of intrinsic properties, is introduced and many examples thereof are given. It replaces the irritating dichotomy of quantum and classical worlds by a much softer difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, which concern equally microscopic and macroscopic systems. Finally, the classicality and the quantum measurement are analyzed and found to present some still unsolved problems. A possible way of dealing with the Schrödinger cat is suggested that is based on the intrinsic properties. A simple quantum model of one classical property illustrates how our philosophy may work.
Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.