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Restoring physical realism

Dirk John Pons, Arion Douglas Pons, Aiden Jasper Pons

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.

Related papers

A Physical Basis for Entanglement in a Non-Local Hidden Variable Theory

Dirk John Pons, Arion Douglas Pons, Aiden Jasper Pons

Problem: Superposition and entanglement are coherent effects, which can be quantified by quantum mechanics (QM), but lack descriptive explanations. They are typically analysed with inequality methods, and the results favour QM and reject physical realism and hidden-variable solutions. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (2011) showed that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. Purpose: The purpose here is to critically evaluate from a conceptual and philosophical perspective the ontological underpinnings of the inequality approach. The current work is speculative in nature as it is based on a conjectured non-local hidden-variable (NLHV) design for particles, and does not yet have a mathematical formalism. Nonetheless this is worth attempting for the philosophical questions it poses about the nature of reality, and the pointers it gives to possible future directions in fundamental physics. Findings: The premises of the C & R proof (that particles are points, that locality exists, that quantum theory is correct) are inconsistent, hence invalidate its conclusion. We also show that superposition and entanglement may be qualitatively explained if particles were to have the internal structure proposed by the Cordus NLHV theory. Originality: The ability to explain superposition and entanglement conceptually in terms of physical realism is relevant because it rebuts the claim that it is impossible that such a hidden-variable theory could exist. This is significant because previously it has been believed that these phenomena are explainable by QM only.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2017•9 citations

Scientific Realism and the Quantum

Steven French, Juha T. Saatsi

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•67 citations

Quantum mechanics: completely unhidden?A critical review of the work of Colbeck and Renner

Gijs Leegwater

In this thesis a recent claim by Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner is reviewed. This claim concerns the completeness of quantum mechanics. Colbeck and Renner state that no theory can be constructed that is compatible with quantum mechanics, and gives more detailed predictions through supplemental variables added to the description of the state of a system. Their only assumption is that measurement settings can be choosen freely. We will argue that their result is for the most part valid and interesting, but the freedom assumption is not so innocent as it is presented, and parts of the result need to be clarified. Therefore, we will present a reformulation of the result. In our formulation the result is a no-go theorem for hidden variable theories satisfying Parameter Independence. This is a generalization of Bell’s theorem.

•Sep 9, 2013•1 citation

Completely real? A critical note on the claims by Colbeck and Renner

Ronnie Hermens

In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner claim to have shown that the quantum state provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier work of Leifer, Landsman and Leegwater, I present and prove two results that only partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.

•Jul 4, 2019•5 citations

Completely real? A critical note on the claims by Colbeck and Renner

Ronnie Hermens

In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner (2011, 2015a, 2015b) claim to have shown that the quantum state provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier work of Leifer (2014), Landsman (2015) and Leegwater (2016), I present and prove two results that only partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.

arXiv:2008.01444•Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics•Nov 1, 2020•4 citations

Problems of Quantum Mechanics (UET7B)

H. J. Spencer

This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}

•May 1, 2017•0 citations
Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.
Problem: Superposition and entanglement are coherent effects, which can be quantified by quantum mechanics (QM), but lack descriptive explanations. They are typically analysed with inequality methods, and the results favour QM and reject physical realism and hidden-variable solutions. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (2011) showed that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. Purpose: The purpose here is to critically evaluate from a conceptual and philosophical perspective the ontological underpinnings of the inequality approach. The current work is speculative in nature as it is based on a conjectured non-local hidden-variable (NLHV) design for particles, and does not yet have a mathematical formalism. Nonetheless this is worth attempting for the philosophical questions it poses about the nature of reality, and the pointers it gives to possible future directions in fundamental physics. Findings: The premises of the C & R proof (that particles are points, that locality exists, that quantum theory is correct) are inconsistent, hence invalidate its conclusion. We also show that superposition and entanglement may be qualitatively explained if particles were to have the internal structure proposed by the Cordus NLHV theory. Originality: The ability to explain superposition and entanglement conceptually in terms of physical realism is relevant because it rebuts the claim that it is impossible that such a hidden-variable theory could exist. This is significant because previously it has been believed that these phenomena are explainable by QM only.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
In this thesis a recent claim by Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner is reviewed. This claim concerns the completeness of quantum mechanics. Colbeck and Renner state that no theory can be constructed that is compatible with quantum mechanics, and gives more detailed predictions through supplemental variables added to the description of the state of a system. Their only assumption is that measurement settings can be choosen freely. We will argue that their result is for the most part valid and interesting, but the freedom assumption is not so innocent as it is presented, and parts of the result need to be clarified. Therefore, we will present a reformulation of the result. In our formulation the result is a no-go theorem for hidden variable theories satisfying Parameter Independence. This is a generalization of Bell’s theorem.
In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner claim to have shown that the quantum state provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier work of Leifer, Landsman and Leegwater, I present and prove two results that only partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.
In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner (2011, 2015a, 2015b) claim to have shown that the quantum state provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier work of Leifer (2014), Landsman (2015) and Leegwater (2016), I present and prove two results that only partially support this claim. I then discuss the arguments by Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater concerning how these results are to generalize to the full claim. This argument turns out to hinge on the implicit use of an assumption concerning the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I argue that this assumption is unsatisfactory and that possible attempts to validate it based on measurement theory also do not succeed.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}