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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The Common Cause Principle

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

Published May 16, 2013• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Reichenbach's notion of common cause In what follows ( X, S, p ) denotes a classical Kolmogorovian probability space with Boolean algebra S of subsets of a set X (with respect to the set theoretic operations ∩, ∪ and A ⊥ = X\A as Boolean algebra operations) and with the probability measure p on S . (See the Appendix for a concise review of the basic concepts of measure theoretic probability theory.) Elements of S are called random events (elements of X are sometimes called (random) elementary events). It is common to assume in probability theory that p is a countably additive (also called σ-additive) and not just a finitely additive measure but the assumption of countable additivity is somewhat controversial in the philosophical literature. The distinction between countable and finite additivity will not play any role in Chapters 3–5, 7 and 9: the results presented are valid under the assumption of either finite or countable additivity. Countable additivity will play a role in Chapters 6 and 8, however, where the problem of correlations in nonclassical (quantum) probability spaces will be investigated, and where the quantum counterpart of p will be assumed to be countably additive (“normal” in the terminology of the theory von Neumann algebras). If S has a finite number of elements, then it is the power set P(X) of a set X having n < ∞ elements denoted by a i ( i = 1, 2 … n ); in this case we write S n .

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139094344.003

Related papers

Where do we stand?

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

The history of philosophy teaches us that metaphysical claims of sweeping generality are neither verifiable nor conclusively falsifiable. One can only aim at assessing their plausibility on the basis of the best available evidence provided by the sciences – both formal and empirical sciences. This is what has been done in this book in connection with the Principle of the Common Cause. In Chapter 2, Reichenbach's notion of common cause and the related Common Cause Principle was formulated explicitly in terms of classical, Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces. The Definition 2.4 of common cause followed Reichenbach's original definition closely, and insisting on the quite obvious methodological principle that probabilistic concepts and statements (in particular claims about random events being correlated or probabilistically independent) are only meaningful within the context of a fixed probability measure space in terms of which some segment of reality is modeled, we specified the notions of common cause incomplete and common cause complete probability theories: a theory was defined to be common cause complete if it contains a proper common cause of every correlation it predicts, common cause incomplete otherwise. (There is a strong version of common cause completeness as well: a probability space was defined to be strongly common cause closed if it contains common causes of all admissible types – Definition 4.4.) These explicitly defined notions form the basis on which one can start assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle in the spirit of empirical philosophy. Suppose we have an empirically confirmed scientific theory T describing some segment of reality using (possibly among other mathematical structures) a probability measure space ( X, S, p ).

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 16, 2013•0 citations

On Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle and Reichenbach's Notion of Common Cause

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.

arXiv:quant-ph/9805066•The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1999•105 citations

Completion of the Causal Completability Problem

Michał Marczyk, Leszek Wroński

We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 Conclusion Appendix A

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Mar 23, 2014•17 citations

2 Screening Off and Explanation: Formal Properties

Leszek Wroński

Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.

•Aug 19, 2014•0 citations

Reichenbach’s causal completeness of quantum probability spaces

Dominika Burešová, Kamila Houšková, Mirko Navara +3 more

Abstract Reichenbach’s common cause principle (RCCP) is a metaphysical claim about the causal structure of the world. It entails that all correlations can be explained causally either by pointing at the causal connection between the correlated entities or by displaying a common cause of the correlation. We contribute to its mathematical side. Firstly, after adopting the RCCP axioms, we indicate the importance of positive covariance of events in connection with RCCP. In fact, RCCP is meaningful only for positively correlated events. Secondly, we find explicit requirements for a state to have a common cause in a quantum logic. Afterwards, we compare RCCP in the standard (Boolean) case and in the quantum setup that admits new properties of correlation, impossible in the classical case. We show that the notion of maximal correlation differs considerably in these two cases. We answer an open question by providing a counterexample based on a quantum logic given by a free orthomodular lattice. Subsequently, we find a relation between the Darboux property and RCCP. We invent a new technique for obtaining the central result that atomless σ-complete quantum logics are common cause complete. A variety of new examples is presented. Finally, we contribute to a fundamental question whether a common cause incomplete quantum logic can be embedded into one that is common cause complete. We contribute by an advanced construction that allows for a positive answer to this question for quantum logics with finitely many atoms and even for some quantum logics with countably many atoms.

Mathematica Slovaca•Aug 1, 2025•2 citations

Causally closed probability theories

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

Causal closedness and common cause closedness Assuming that Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is valid, one is led to the question of whether our probabilistic theories predicting probabilistic correlations can be causally rich enough to also contain the causes of all the correlations they predict. The aim of this chapter is to formulate precisely and investigate this question. According to the Common Cause Principle, causal richness of a theory T would manifest in T 's being causally closed (complete) in the sense of being capable of explaining the correlations by containing a common cause of every correlation between causally independent events A, B . This feature of a theory is formulated in the next two definitions of causal closedness. In both definitions ( X, S, p )is a probability space and R ind is a two-place causal independence relation that is assumed to have been defined between elements of S . We treat the relation R ind as a variable in the problem of causal closedness; hence, at this point we leave open what properties R ind should have to be acceptable as a causal independence relation – later we will return to the issue of how to specify it. Definition 4.1 The probability space ( X, S, p ) is called causally closed with respect to R ind , if for every correlation Corr p ( A, B ) > 0 with A ϵ S and B ϵ S such that R ind ( A, B ) holds, there exists a common cause C of some type in S .

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 16, 2013•0 citations
Reichenbach's notion of common cause In what follows ( X, S, p ) denotes a classical Kolmogorovian probability space with Boolean algebra S of subsets of a set X (with respect to the set theoretic operations ∩, ∪ and A ⊥ = X\A as Boolean algebra operations) and with the probability measure p on S . (See the Appendix for a concise review of the basic concepts of measure theoretic probability theory.) Elements of S are called random events (elements of X are sometimes called (random) elementary events). It is common to assume in probability theory that p is a countably additive (also called σ-additive) and not just a finitely additive measure but the assumption of countable additivity is somewhat controversial in the philosophical literature. The distinction between countable and finite additivity will not play any role in Chapters 3–5, 7 and 9: the results presented are valid under the assumption of either finite or countable additivity. Countable additivity will play a role in Chapters 6 and 8, however, where the problem of correlations in nonclassical (quantum) probability spaces will be investigated, and where the quantum counterpart of p will be assumed to be countably additive (“normal” in the terminology of the theory von Neumann algebras). If S has a finite number of elements, then it is the power set P(X) of a set X having n < ∞ elements denoted by a i ( i = 1, 2 … n ); in this case we write S n .
The history of philosophy teaches us that metaphysical claims of sweeping generality are neither verifiable nor conclusively falsifiable. One can only aim at assessing their plausibility on the basis of the best available evidence provided by the sciences – both formal and empirical sciences. This is what has been done in this book in connection with the Principle of the Common Cause. In Chapter 2, Reichenbach's notion of common cause and the related Common Cause Principle was formulated explicitly in terms of classical, Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces. The Definition 2.4 of common cause followed Reichenbach's original definition closely, and insisting on the quite obvious methodological principle that probabilistic concepts and statements (in particular claims about random events being correlated or probabilistically independent) are only meaningful within the context of a fixed probability measure space in terms of which some segment of reality is modeled, we specified the notions of common cause incomplete and common cause complete probability theories: a theory was defined to be common cause complete if it contains a proper common cause of every correlation it predicts, common cause incomplete otherwise. (There is a strong version of common cause completeness as well: a probability space was defined to be strongly common cause closed if it contains common causes of all admissible types – Definition 4.4.) These explicitly defined notions form the basis on which one can start assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle in the spirit of empirical philosophy. Suppose we have an empirically confirmed scientific theory T describing some segment of reality using (possibly among other mathematical structures) a probability measure space ( X, S, p ).
It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 Conclusion Appendix A
Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.
Abstract Reichenbach’s common cause principle (RCCP) is a metaphysical claim about the causal structure of the world. It entails that all correlations can be explained causally either by pointing at the causal connection between the correlated entities or by displaying a common cause of the correlation. We contribute to its mathematical side. Firstly, after adopting the RCCP axioms, we indicate the importance of positive covariance of events in connection with RCCP. In fact, RCCP is meaningful only for positively correlated events. Secondly, we find explicit requirements for a state to have a common cause in a quantum logic. Afterwards, we compare RCCP in the standard (Boolean) case and in the quantum setup that admits new properties of correlation, impossible in the classical case. We show that the notion of maximal correlation differs considerably in these two cases. We answer an open question by providing a counterexample based on a quantum logic given by a free orthomodular lattice. Subsequently, we find a relation between the Darboux property and RCCP. We invent a new technique for obtaining the central result that atomless σ-complete quantum logics are common cause complete. A variety of new examples is presented. Finally, we contribute to a fundamental question whether a common cause incomplete quantum logic can be embedded into one that is common cause complete. We contribute by an advanced construction that allows for a positive answer to this question for quantum logics with finitely many atoms and even for some quantum logics with countably many atoms.
Causal closedness and common cause closedness Assuming that Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is valid, one is led to the question of whether our probabilistic theories predicting probabilistic correlations can be causally rich enough to also contain the causes of all the correlations they predict. The aim of this chapter is to formulate precisely and investigate this question. According to the Common Cause Principle, causal richness of a theory T would manifest in T 's being causally closed (complete) in the sense of being capable of explaining the correlations by containing a common cause of every correlation between causally independent events A, B . This feature of a theory is formulated in the next two definitions of causal closedness. In both definitions ( X, S, p )is a probability space and R ind is a two-place causal independence relation that is assumed to have been defined between elements of S . We treat the relation R ind as a variable in the problem of causal closedness; hence, at this point we leave open what properties R ind should have to be acceptable as a causal independence relation – later we will return to the issue of how to specify it. Definition 4.1 The probability space ( X, S, p ) is called causally closed with respect to R ind , if for every correlation Corr p ( A, B ) > 0 with A ϵ S and B ϵ S such that R ind ( A, B ) holds, there exists a common cause C of some type in S .