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2 Screening Off and Explanation: Formal Properties

Leszek Wroński

Published Aug 19, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.

DOI
10.2478/9783110372717.2

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Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.
Reichenbach's notion of common cause In what follows ( X, S, p ) denotes a classical Kolmogorovian probability space with Boolean algebra S of subsets of a set X (with respect to the set theoretic operations ∩, ∪ and A ⊥ = X\A as Boolean algebra operations) and with the probability measure p on S . (See the Appendix for a concise review of the basic concepts of measure theoretic probability theory.) Elements of S are called random events (elements of X are sometimes called (random) elementary events). It is common to assume in probability theory that p is a countably additive (also called σ-additive) and not just a finitely additive measure but the assumption of countable additivity is somewhat controversial in the philosophical literature. The distinction between countable and finite additivity will not play any role in Chapters 3–5, 7 and 9: the results presented are valid under the assumption of either finite or countable additivity. Countable additivity will play a role in Chapters 6 and 8, however, where the problem of correlations in nonclassical (quantum) probability spaces will be investigated, and where the quantum counterpart of p will be assumed to be countably additive (“normal” in the terminology of the theory von Neumann algebras). If S has a finite number of elements, then it is the power set P(X) of a set X having n < ∞ elements denoted by a i ( i = 1, 2 … n ); in this case we write S n .
A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events, probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. [1999]; Gyenis and Rédei [2004]). We prove that (i) any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 Conclusion Appendix A
In recent years part of the literature on probabilistic causality concerned notions stemming from Reichenbach’s idea of explaining correlations between not directly causally related events by referring to their common causes. A few related notions have been introduced, e.g. that of a “common cause system” (Hofer-Szabó and Rédei in Int J Theor Phys 43(7/8):1819–1826, 2004 ) and “causal (N-)closedness” of probability spaces (Gyenis and Rédei in Found Phys 34(9):1284–1303, 2004 ; Hofer-Szabó and Rédei in Found Phys 36(5):745–756, 2006 ). In this paper we introduce a new and natural notion similar to causal closedness and prove a number of theorems which can be seen as extensions of earlier results from the literature. Most notably we prove that a finite probability space is causally closed in our sense iff its measure is uniform. We also present a generalisation of this result to a class of non-classical probability spaces.
The history of philosophy teaches us that metaphysical claims of sweeping generality are neither verifiable nor conclusively falsifiable. One can only aim at assessing their plausibility on the basis of the best available evidence provided by the sciences – both formal and empirical sciences. This is what has been done in this book in connection with the Principle of the Common Cause. In Chapter 2, Reichenbach's notion of common cause and the related Common Cause Principle was formulated explicitly in terms of classical, Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces. The Definition 2.4 of common cause followed Reichenbach's original definition closely, and insisting on the quite obvious methodological principle that probabilistic concepts and statements (in particular claims about random events being correlated or probabilistically independent) are only meaningful within the context of a fixed probability measure space in terms of which some segment of reality is modeled, we specified the notions of common cause incomplete and common cause complete probability theories: a theory was defined to be common cause complete if it contains a proper common cause of every correlation it predicts, common cause incomplete otherwise. (There is a strong version of common cause completeness as well: a probability space was defined to be strongly common cause closed if it contains common causes of all admissible types – Definition 4.4.) These explicitly defined notions form the basis on which one can start assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle in the spirit of empirical philosophy. Suppose we have an empirically confirmed scientific theory T describing some segment of reality using (possibly among other mathematical structures) a probability measure space ( X, S, p ).
Since its introduction by Hans Reichenbach, many philosophers have claimed to refute the idea – known as the common cause principle – that any surprising correlation between any two factors that do not directly influence one another is due to some common cause. For example, falsity of the principle is frequently inferred from falsifiability of Bell’s inequalities. The author demonstrates, however, that the situation is not so straightforward. There is more than one version of the principle formulated with the use of different variants of Reichenbach-inspired notions; their falsity still remains an open question. The book traces different formulations of the principle and provides proofs of a few pertinent theorems, settling the relevant questions in various probability spaces. In exploring mathematical and philosophical issues surrounding the principle, the book offers both philosophical insight and mathematical rigor.