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American Journal of Physics

Quantum Fact and Fiction III

Alfred Landé

Published May 1, 1969• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Part III of this series [A. Landé, Amer. J. Phys. 33, 123 (1965), and 34, 160 (1966), quoted as Parts I and II] continues the critique of the customary interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is directed against the idea that electrons, in opposition to the Born statistical particle interpretation of the wave function, are “wavicles.” Serious conceptual and elementary mathematical defects in Bohr's famous “Discussion with Einstein” are pointed out. The doctrine that position q and momentum p of a particle are blurred over an uncertainty range because both allegedly cannot be measured simultaneously, that q and p do not exist simultaneously, is due to a confusion of analogy with identity of qualities. In its second part, the paper offers a nonquantal derivation of the probability interference law as a necessity under the postulate that the general interdependence between probabilities is to become the ordinary probability addition law in the average. The wave picture of matter violates the postulate of relativity.

DOI
10.1119/1.1975669

Related papers

Quantum Fact and Fiction. II

Alfred Landé

Electron diffraction was shown in Part I to be due to the quantum-mechanical activity of the diffractor rather than to a fictional wave-picture manifestation of the diffracted particles. Part II aims at eliminating further fictional elements, most of them based on inconsistency of interpretation. The controversy between the extremist views of Schrödinger and Born, either frequency resonance or quantum jumps, is removed by showing that consistency compels one to admit both to occur simultaneously. Attempts at saving duality and other fictions are criticized, such as the contention that (1) “duality is a fact” seen in the contrast of obvious particle effects and not so obvious particle effects, (2) that particles are material and waves are expectations by observing subjects, (3) that statistical law means the end of the sharp separation between subject and object, (4) that Heisenberg's empirical rule for the uncertainty of prediction means indeterminacy of existence. It is pointed out that quantum mechanics can be derived as a necessary consequence of general nonquantal postulates, known from deterministic mechanics, but applied now to the construction of a probabilistic schema of connection between events.

American Journal of Physics•Dec 1, 1966•11 citations

Quantum fact and fiction. IV

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Niels Bohr has often pointed out that already the simplest quantum rule, ΔE = hν, is irrational insofar as ΔE stands for a timeless energy jump, whereas a frequency ν is defined only over a long time span. However, when this irrational relation is accepted as a mainstay of the quantum theory, one cannot reject a corresponding irrationality for momentum jumps Δp connected with periodicities in space, the less so as it yields a unitary mechanical explanation of all wavelike-looking phenomena of matter, in particular those of the diffraction of electrons, without resorting to any wave interference in space. (This has nothing to do with the complex–imaginary wave function ψ, which has a purely statistical significance.) We therefore propose to regard matter particles as real physical entities as always, in contrast to the matter waves with λ = h/p as a suggestive yet expendable fiction, permitting a return from dualism to unity, a simplification of the customary interpretation of standard quantum effects, also suggesting a long overdue reform in the teaching of the elements of quantum mechanics. Editor’s note: This is the fourth and last in a series of articles begun ten years ago in this Journal. Earlier parts in the series may be found in American Journal of Physics 33, 123 (1965); 34, 1160 (1966); and 37, 541 (1969).

American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 1975•11 citations

Unitary Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Alfred Landé

This Anti-Copenhagen interpretation [compare with N. R. Hanson, Am. J. Phys. 27, 1 (1959)] submits that the doctrine of an inherent double nature of matter (and of light) is a most uneconomical hypothesis which would never have been proposed (except for heuristic purposes) had it not been for an oversight of the mechanical particle theory of diffraction by Duane (1923), later incorporated into the quantum mechanics of 1926 in Born's unitary statistical interpretation of wavelike phenomena. Bohr's indeterminacy view comes from a verbal translation of a legitimate wave feature; it is contrasted to the uncertainty of prediction of exact results. The latter is supported by the experiment, the former is not, so that various “epistemological lessons” drawn from Bohr's view stand on brittle ground, which can hardly be reinforced by pointing to the transformation from the first to the second quantization, i.e., from one to another form of a complete and unitary theory. The simple quantum rules of the particle theory (first quantization) can be reduced to general postulates of symmetry and invariance.

American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 1961•4 citations

A Burning Question: Einstein's Paradox of Correlations

O. Costa de Beauregard

In 1927 at the fifth Solvay Council, that reunited all the aristocracy of theoretical physics, Einstein, regarding with solicitude the new-born “quantum mechanics” of Louis de Broglie, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Dirac, discerned with his usual sagacity an indelible mark that was destined to become, with time, a subject of passionate discussion among those whose vocation is to adulate this enigmatic and capricious personality. In 1926 Born had given the prophetic stroke to the portrait. Turning to probability as to the official factotum of the reconciliation of the continuous and the discontinuous-here, the associated wave and particle-he transmuted the waves of de Broglie and Schr6dinger into an undulatory calculus o f probabilities, deducing, from a surprising principle, consequences that were even more surprising but always verified through experiment. Parting from the idea that the intensity of the wave is the probability of the detection of the particle at a given point and time, Born replaced the classic principle of addition of partial probabilities with his “principle of the addition of partial amplitudes” that are, as in classical optics, represented by “complex” dimensions, with one real part and one imaginary part. In general, the square of the module of the sum of amplitudes will be the probability. This expression contains, of course, the terms “square” and “rectangular.” The first, if they were alone, would give the former law; as for the second, they express the existence of phenomena of interference that are at the origin of the thousand and one well verified paradoxes of the “new mechanics “-the one thousand and first being the one under consideration here.

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A Midrash upon Quantum Mechanics

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The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

Science News•Jul 11, 1987•1 citation

More on the quantum measurement problem

Gregory N. Derry

Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations
Part III of this series [A. Landé, Amer. J. Phys. 33, 123 (1965), and 34, 160 (1966), quoted as Parts I and II] continues the critique of the customary interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is directed against the idea that electrons, in opposition to the Born statistical particle interpretation of the wave function, are “wavicles.” Serious conceptual and elementary mathematical defects in Bohr's famous “Discussion with Einstein” are pointed out. The doctrine that position q and momentum p of a particle are blurred over an uncertainty range because both allegedly cannot be measured simultaneously, that q and p do not exist simultaneously, is due to a confusion of analogy with identity of qualities. In its second part, the paper offers a nonquantal derivation of the probability interference law as a necessity under the postulate that the general interdependence between probabilities is to become the ordinary probability addition law in the average. The wave picture of matter violates the postulate of relativity.
Electron diffraction was shown in Part I to be due to the quantum-mechanical activity of the diffractor rather than to a fictional wave-picture manifestation of the diffracted particles. Part II aims at eliminating further fictional elements, most of them based on inconsistency of interpretation. The controversy between the extremist views of Schrödinger and Born, either frequency resonance or quantum jumps, is removed by showing that consistency compels one to admit both to occur simultaneously. Attempts at saving duality and other fictions are criticized, such as the contention that (1) “duality is a fact” seen in the contrast of obvious particle effects and not so obvious particle effects, (2) that particles are material and waves are expectations by observing subjects, (3) that statistical law means the end of the sharp separation between subject and object, (4) that Heisenberg's empirical rule for the uncertainty of prediction means indeterminacy of existence. It is pointed out that quantum mechanics can be derived as a necessary consequence of general nonquantal postulates, known from deterministic mechanics, but applied now to the construction of a probabilistic schema of connection between events.
Niels Bohr has often pointed out that already the simplest quantum rule, ΔE = hν, is irrational insofar as ΔE stands for a timeless energy jump, whereas a frequency ν is defined only over a long time span. However, when this irrational relation is accepted as a mainstay of the quantum theory, one cannot reject a corresponding irrationality for momentum jumps Δp connected with periodicities in space, the less so as it yields a unitary mechanical explanation of all wavelike-looking phenomena of matter, in particular those of the diffraction of electrons, without resorting to any wave interference in space. (This has nothing to do with the complex–imaginary wave function ψ, which has a purely statistical significance.) We therefore propose to regard matter particles as real physical entities as always, in contrast to the matter waves with λ = h/p as a suggestive yet expendable fiction, permitting a return from dualism to unity, a simplification of the customary interpretation of standard quantum effects, also suggesting a long overdue reform in the teaching of the elements of quantum mechanics. Editor’s note: This is the fourth and last in a series of articles begun ten years ago in this Journal. Earlier parts in the series may be found in American Journal of Physics 33, 123 (1965); 34, 1160 (1966); and 37, 541 (1969).
This Anti-Copenhagen interpretation [compare with N. R. Hanson, Am. J. Phys. 27, 1 (1959)] submits that the doctrine of an inherent double nature of matter (and of light) is a most uneconomical hypothesis which would never have been proposed (except for heuristic purposes) had it not been for an oversight of the mechanical particle theory of diffraction by Duane (1923), later incorporated into the quantum mechanics of 1926 in Born's unitary statistical interpretation of wavelike phenomena. Bohr's indeterminacy view comes from a verbal translation of a legitimate wave feature; it is contrasted to the uncertainty of prediction of exact results. The latter is supported by the experiment, the former is not, so that various “epistemological lessons” drawn from Bohr's view stand on brittle ground, which can hardly be reinforced by pointing to the transformation from the first to the second quantization, i.e., from one to another form of a complete and unitary theory. The simple quantum rules of the particle theory (first quantization) can be reduced to general postulates of symmetry and invariance.
In 1927 at the fifth Solvay Council, that reunited all the aristocracy of theoretical physics, Einstein, regarding with solicitude the new-born “quantum mechanics” of Louis de Broglie, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Dirac, discerned with his usual sagacity an indelible mark that was destined to become, with time, a subject of passionate discussion among those whose vocation is to adulate this enigmatic and capricious personality. In 1926 Born had given the prophetic stroke to the portrait. Turning to probability as to the official factotum of the reconciliation of the continuous and the discontinuous-here, the associated wave and particle-he transmuted the waves of de Broglie and Schr6dinger into an undulatory calculus o f probabilities, deducing, from a surprising principle, consequences that were even more surprising but always verified through experiment. Parting from the idea that the intensity of the wave is the probability of the detection of the particle at a given point and time, Born replaced the classic principle of addition of partial probabilities with his “principle of the addition of partial amplitudes” that are, as in classical optics, represented by “complex” dimensions, with one real part and one imaginary part. In general, the square of the module of the sum of amplitudes will be the probability. This expression contains, of course, the terms “square” and “rectangular.” The first, if they were alone, would give the former law; as for the second, they express the existence of phenomena of interference that are at the origin of the thousand and one well verified paradoxes of the “new mechanics “-the one thousand and first being the one under consideration here.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.