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American Journal of Physics

Quantum fact and fiction. IV

Alfred Landé

Published Aug 1, 1975• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Niels Bohr has often pointed out that already the simplest quantum rule, ΔE = hν, is irrational insofar as ΔE stands for a timeless energy jump, whereas a frequency ν is defined only over a long time span. However, when this irrational relation is accepted as a mainstay of the quantum theory, one cannot reject a corresponding irrationality for momentum jumps Δp connected with periodicities in space, the less so as it yields a unitary mechanical explanation of all wavelike-looking phenomena of matter, in particular those of the diffraction of electrons, without resorting to any wave interference in space. (This has nothing to do with the complex–imaginary wave function ψ, which has a purely statistical significance.) We therefore propose to regard matter particles as real physical entities as always, in contrast to the matter waves with λ = h/p as a suggestive yet expendable fiction, permitting a return from dualism to unity, a simplification of the customary interpretation of standard quantum effects, also suggesting a long overdue reform in the teaching of the elements of quantum mechanics. Editor’s note: This is the fourth and last in a series of articles begun ten years ago in this Journal. Earlier parts in the series may be found in American Journal of Physics 33, 123 (1965); 34, 1160 (1966); and 37, 541 (1969).

DOI
10.1119/1.9717

Related papers

Quantum Fact and Fiction. II

Alfred Landé

Electron diffraction was shown in Part I to be due to the quantum-mechanical activity of the diffractor rather than to a fictional wave-picture manifestation of the diffracted particles. Part II aims at eliminating further fictional elements, most of them based on inconsistency of interpretation. The controversy between the extremist views of Schrödinger and Born, either frequency resonance or quantum jumps, is removed by showing that consistency compels one to admit both to occur simultaneously. Attempts at saving duality and other fictions are criticized, such as the contention that (1) “duality is a fact” seen in the contrast of obvious particle effects and not so obvious particle effects, (2) that particles are material and waves are expectations by observing subjects, (3) that statistical law means the end of the sharp separation between subject and object, (4) that Heisenberg's empirical rule for the uncertainty of prediction means indeterminacy of existence. It is pointed out that quantum mechanics can be derived as a necessary consequence of general nonquantal postulates, known from deterministic mechanics, but applied now to the construction of a probabilistic schema of connection between events.

American Journal of Physics•Dec 1, 1966•11 citations

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Part III of this series [A. Landé, Amer. J. Phys. 33, 123 (1965), and 34, 160 (1966), quoted as Parts I and II] continues the critique of the customary interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is directed against the idea that electrons, in opposition to the Born statistical particle interpretation of the wave function, are “wavicles.” Serious conceptual and elementary mathematical defects in Bohr's famous “Discussion with Einstein” are pointed out. The doctrine that position q and momentum p of a particle are blurred over an uncertainty range because both allegedly cannot be measured simultaneously, that q and p do not exist simultaneously, is due to a confusion of analogy with identity of qualities. In its second part, the paper offers a nonquantal derivation of the probability interference law as a necessity under the postulate that the general interdependence between probabilities is to become the ordinary probability addition law in the average. The wave picture of matter violates the postulate of relativity.

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Quantum Fact and Fiction

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he study of the behavior of subatomic particles in this century is supposed to have established at least three exceedingly curious facts about the physical world. First, pure chance governs the innermost workings of nature. Second, although material objects always occupy space, situations exist in which they occupy no particular region of space. Third and perhaps most surprising, the fundamental laws that govern the behaviors of OordinaryO physical objects somehow radically fail to apply to objects that happen to be functioning as Omeasuring instrumentsO or Oobservers.O That at any rate is what the founders of quantum mechanics decided; that is what has since become the more or less oUcial dogma of theoretical physics; and that is what it says, to this day, in all the standard textbooks on that subject. But it is now emerging that those conclusions were settled on somewhat too quickly. As a matter of fact, a radically diÝerent, fully worked-out theory exists that accounts for all known behaviors of subatomic particles. In this theory, chance plays no role at all, and every material object invariably does occupy some particular region of space. Moreover, this theory takes the form of a single set of basic physical laws that apply in exactly the same way to every physical object that exists. That theory is principally the work of the late David J. Bohm of Birkbeck College, London. Although his formulation has existed in the scientiÞc literature for more than 40 years, it has until quite recently been mostly ignored. Throughout that period, the thinking about such matters has been dominated by the standard dogma, usually referred to as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics because it can more or less be traced back to the Danish physicist Niels Bohr and his circle. I will begin this article with an outline of the main arguments for the standard dogma. I will then indicate briesy how BohmOs theory manages to get around some of those arguments. Finally, I will say a little about how and where BohmOs theory Þts into contemporary speculation about the foundations of quantum mechanics.

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A Midrash upon Quantum Mechanics

Dietrick E. Thomsen

The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

Science News•Jul 11, 1987•1 citation
Niels Bohr has often pointed out that already the simplest quantum rule, ΔE = hν, is irrational insofar as ΔE stands for a timeless energy jump, whereas a frequency ν is defined only over a long time span. However, when this irrational relation is accepted as a mainstay of the quantum theory, one cannot reject a corresponding irrationality for momentum jumps Δp connected with periodicities in space, the less so as it yields a unitary mechanical explanation of all wavelike-looking phenomena of matter, in particular those of the diffraction of electrons, without resorting to any wave interference in space. (This has nothing to do with the complex–imaginary wave function ψ, which has a purely statistical significance.) We therefore propose to regard matter particles as real physical entities as always, in contrast to the matter waves with λ = h/p as a suggestive yet expendable fiction, permitting a return from dualism to unity, a simplification of the customary interpretation of standard quantum effects, also suggesting a long overdue reform in the teaching of the elements of quantum mechanics. Editor’s note: This is the fourth and last in a series of articles begun ten years ago in this Journal. Earlier parts in the series may be found in American Journal of Physics 33, 123 (1965); 34, 1160 (1966); and 37, 541 (1969).
Electron diffraction was shown in Part I to be due to the quantum-mechanical activity of the diffractor rather than to a fictional wave-picture manifestation of the diffracted particles. Part II aims at eliminating further fictional elements, most of them based on inconsistency of interpretation. The controversy between the extremist views of Schrödinger and Born, either frequency resonance or quantum jumps, is removed by showing that consistency compels one to admit both to occur simultaneously. Attempts at saving duality and other fictions are criticized, such as the contention that (1) “duality is a fact” seen in the contrast of obvious particle effects and not so obvious particle effects, (2) that particles are material and waves are expectations by observing subjects, (3) that statistical law means the end of the sharp separation between subject and object, (4) that Heisenberg's empirical rule for the uncertainty of prediction means indeterminacy of existence. It is pointed out that quantum mechanics can be derived as a necessary consequence of general nonquantal postulates, known from deterministic mechanics, but applied now to the construction of a probabilistic schema of connection between events.
Part III of this series [A. Landé, Amer. J. Phys. 33, 123 (1965), and 34, 160 (1966), quoted as Parts I and II] continues the critique of the customary interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is directed against the idea that electrons, in opposition to the Born statistical particle interpretation of the wave function, are “wavicles.” Serious conceptual and elementary mathematical defects in Bohr's famous “Discussion with Einstein” are pointed out. The doctrine that position q and momentum p of a particle are blurred over an uncertainty range because both allegedly cannot be measured simultaneously, that q and p do not exist simultaneously, is due to a confusion of analogy with identity of qualities. In its second part, the paper offers a nonquantal derivation of the probability interference law as a necessity under the postulate that the general interdependence between probabilities is to become the ordinary probability addition law in the average. The wave picture of matter violates the postulate of relativity.
The fact is that, beside the two quantum rules for energy and angular momentum, there is a third analogous rule for the linear momentum, established by W. Duane in 1923. Though this rule is generally accepted, there is no trace of recognition in the literature that it yields a consistent unitary particle explanation of all those phenomena of diffraction and coherence, e.g., of the two-slit experiment, which allegedly can be accounted for only by the fiction of a dual nature of matter, with transmutation of particles into waves and back into particles again. The usual method of solving this dilemma has admittedly been that of “refining the language of physics,” beginning with replacing the physical idea of a forth and back transformation by the term “dual manifestation,” thereby shunning any “real” constitution of matter, which then requires a specially adjusted philosophy of knowledge. In contrast, the quantum rule for the linear momentum solves the apparent contradictions in a physical manner without alternating manifestations. It introduces a great simplification which should also influence the method of teaching the theory. The purpose of the present article is to give due credit to the American pioneer of quantum mechanics, W. Duane, whose contribution to solving the duality paradox is a shining example of the scientific method, in contrast to the purely semantic approach in vogue for more than a generation.
This Anti-Copenhagen interpretation [compare with N. R. Hanson, Am. J. Phys. 27, 1 (1959)] submits that the doctrine of an inherent double nature of matter (and of light) is a most uneconomical hypothesis which would never have been proposed (except for heuristic purposes) had it not been for an oversight of the mechanical particle theory of diffraction by Duane (1923), later incorporated into the quantum mechanics of 1926 in Born's unitary statistical interpretation of wavelike phenomena. Bohr's indeterminacy view comes from a verbal translation of a legitimate wave feature; it is contrasted to the uncertainty of prediction of exact results. The latter is supported by the experiment, the former is not, so that various “epistemological lessons” drawn from Bohr's view stand on brittle ground, which can hardly be reinforced by pointing to the transformation from the first to the second quantization, i.e., from one to another form of a complete and unitary theory. The simple quantum rules of the particle theory (first quantization) can be reduced to general postulates of symmetry and invariance.
he study of the behavior of subatomic particles in this century is supposed to have established at least three exceedingly curious facts about the physical world. First, pure chance governs the innermost workings of nature. Second, although material objects always occupy space, situations exist in which they occupy no particular region of space. Third and perhaps most surprising, the fundamental laws that govern the behaviors of OordinaryO physical objects somehow radically fail to apply to objects that happen to be functioning as Omeasuring instrumentsO or Oobservers.O That at any rate is what the founders of quantum mechanics decided; that is what has since become the more or less oUcial dogma of theoretical physics; and that is what it says, to this day, in all the standard textbooks on that subject. But it is now emerging that those conclusions were settled on somewhat too quickly. As a matter of fact, a radically diÝerent, fully worked-out theory exists that accounts for all known behaviors of subatomic particles. In this theory, chance plays no role at all, and every material object invariably does occupy some particular region of space. Moreover, this theory takes the form of a single set of basic physical laws that apply in exactly the same way to every physical object that exists. That theory is principally the work of the late David J. Bohm of Birkbeck College, London. Although his formulation has existed in the scientiÞc literature for more than 40 years, it has until quite recently been mostly ignored. Throughout that period, the thinking about such matters has been dominated by the standard dogma, usually referred to as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics because it can more or less be traced back to the Danish physicist Niels Bohr and his circle. I will begin this article with an outline of the main arguments for the standard dogma. I will then indicate briesy how BohmOs theory manages to get around some of those arguments. Finally, I will say a little about how and where BohmOs theory Þts into contemporary speculation about the foundations of quantum mechanics.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.