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Springer eBooks

Statistical Interpretation

Andrey Anatoljevich Grib, Waldyr A. Rodrigues

Published Jan 1, 1999• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4615-4687-0_12

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Kagaku tetsugaku•Jan 1, 2005•0 citations
In his 1939 Lectures, the prominent Soviet physicist L. I. Mandelstam proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that was understood in different ways. To assess Mandelstam's interpretation, we classify contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics and compare his interpretation with others developed in the 1930s (the Copenhagen interpretation and the statistical interpretations proposed by K. R. Popper, H. Margenau, and E. C. Kemble). We conclude that Mandelstam's interpretation belongs to the family of minimal statistical interpretations and has much in common with interpretations developed by American physicists. Mandelstam's characteristic message was his theory of indirect measurement, which influenced his discussion of the “reduction of the wave packet” and the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen argument. This article also reconstructs what lay behind Mandelstam's interpretation of quantum mechanics. This was his operationalism, by virtue of which his interpretation resembled Kemble's, in which the statistical and Copenhagen views had been combined. Like Popper and Margenau, Mandelstam followed R. von Mises's empirical conception of probability. Mandelstam, like the other proponents of the statistical approach to quantum mechanics, was affected by the culture of macroscopic experimentation with its emphasis on statistical (collective) measurement.
In a recent paper (arXiv:1111.3328), Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph claim to prove that statistical interpretations of quantum mechanics do not work. In fact, their proof assumes that all statistical interpretations must be based on hidden variable realism. Effectively, the authors demand from the start that reality must be decided by mathematics, and not by measurements. If this unjustified assumption is dropped, the quantum formalism has a natural statistical interpretation that fully explains the paradox presented by the authors. It is therefore possible to conclude that the paradox actually supports the statistical interpretation, demonstrating once more that quantum mechanics should not be explained by measurement independent realities that are never observed and therefore lie beyond the reach of empirical tests.
The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on Einstein's idea that a state function does not represent an individual system but describes an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. It has been believed that the statistical interpretation is inconsistent with the NO-GO theorems. However, as shown in the present paper, the statistical interpretation is consistent with the theorems, when we change the concept of momentum, energy, and spin. We discuss whether it is possible or impossible to regard momentum, energy, and spin as characteristics of statistical ensembles of similarly prepared systems.