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Springer eBooks

Science and Metaphysics: The Case of Quantum Physics

Michaël Esfeld

Published Jan 1, 2014• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-04199-5_20

Related papers

Floating free from physics: the metaphysics of quantum mechanics

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.

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Routledge eBooks•Feb 17, 2015•0 citations

A Note on Quantum Theory and Metaphysics

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Idealism and science

Bruce L. Gordon

It is often thought that idealism, which affirms that reality is mind-dependent in some relevant sense, leads to antirealism in science. This chapter argues that this common perception gets the cart before the horse. It is rather the case that realism in science, especially in regard to relativistic quantum physics and consciousness, leads to idealism – theistic quantum-informational idealism, to be precise – as the best account of the nature of reality. The chapter outlines the scientific basis for these claims and sketches the arguments for them, starting with an evaluation of the metaphysical significance of relativistic quantum physics for material identity and the character of physical law. It define three basic kinds of realism – metaphysical realism, critical epistemic realism, and critical scientific realism – and evaluate their relationship to theistic quantum-informational idealism as the metaphysical framework unifying the insights into reality that follow from quantum physics and consciousness studies.

Routledge eBooks•Jul 20, 2021•1 citation

Challenges in Constructing Scientific Metaphysics: A Case Study of the Everettian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Vladislav Terekhovich

The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental con­cepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by exam­ples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scien­tific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of main­stream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the on­tologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.

Voprosy filosofii•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations

Quantum physics and philosophical problems

V. Fock

Foundations of Physics•Jan 1, 1971•8 citations
We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.
It is often thought that idealism, which affirms that reality is mind-dependent in some relevant sense, leads to antirealism in science. This chapter argues that this common perception gets the cart before the horse. It is rather the case that realism in science, especially in regard to relativistic quantum physics and consciousness, leads to idealism – theistic quantum-informational idealism, to be precise – as the best account of the nature of reality. The chapter outlines the scientific basis for these claims and sketches the arguments for them, starting with an evaluation of the metaphysical significance of relativistic quantum physics for material identity and the character of physical law. It define three basic kinds of realism – metaphysical realism, critical epistemic realism, and critical scientific realism – and evaluate their relationship to theistic quantum-informational idealism as the metaphysical framework unifying the insights into reality that follow from quantum physics and consciousness studies.
The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental con­cepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by exam­ples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scien­tific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of main­stream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the on­tologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.