It is often thought that idealism, which affirms that reality is mind-dependent in some relevant sense, leads to antirealism in science. This chapter argues that this common perception gets the cart before the horse. It is rather the case that realism in science, especially in regard to relativistic quantum physics and consciousness, leads to idealism – theistic quantum-informational idealism, to be precise – as the best account of the nature of reality. The chapter outlines the scientific basis for these claims and sketches the arguments for them, starting with an evaluation of the metaphysical significance of relativistic quantum physics for material identity and the character of physical law. It define three basic kinds of realism – metaphysical realism, critical epistemic realism, and critical scientific realism – and evaluate their relationship to theistic quantum-informational idealism as the metaphysical framework unifying the insights into reality that follow from quantum physics and consciousness studies.
It is often thought that idealism, which affirms that reality is mind-dependent in some relevant sense, leads to antirealism in science. This chapter argues that this common perception gets the cart before the horse. It is rather the case that realism in science, especially in regard to relativistic quantum physics and consciousness, leads to idealism – theistic quantum-informational idealism, to be precise – as the best account of the nature of reality. The chapter outlines the scientific basis for these claims and sketches the arguments for them, starting with an evaluation of the metaphysical significance of relativistic quantum physics for material identity and the character of physical law. It define three basic kinds of realism – metaphysical realism, critical epistemic realism, and critical scientific realism – and evaluate their relationship to theistic quantum-informational idealism as the metaphysical framework unifying the insights into reality that follow from quantum physics and consciousness studies.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
This paper investigates the nature of reality by looking at the philosophical debate between realism and idealism and at scientific investigations in quantum physics and at recent studies of animal senses, neurology and cognitive psychology. The concept of perceptual relativity is examined and this involves looking at sense perception in other animals and various examples of perceptual relativity in science. It will be concluded that the universe is observer dependent and that there is no reality independent of the observer, which is knowable to the observer. The paper concludes by an investigation of what an observer dependent universe would be like and that recognition of an observer dependent world would lead to a more open minded and tolerant world.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.
The article deals with the issue of whether quantum mechanics provides evidence for the view that ordinary matter is the product of the processes that essentially involve conscious- ness (in collapses, or reductions, of quantum-mechanical waves). It is pointed out that if this were the case, this would have tremendous consequences that anyone who takes science seri- ously can hardly welcome — it would make nonsense of the whole natural pre-animal his- tory, and would also make it extremely difficult to make sense of animal evolution and hu- man history. It is argued, however, that there is no good scientific evidence for the idealistic (consciousness-involving) construal of quantum-mechanical processes; moreover, unequiv- ocal experimental refutations were produced but not made widely known. In the second part, the recent attempt to draw quantum mechanics in support of idealism by Bernardo Kastrup is discussed and found wanting, because in so far as his defense of idealism is suc- cessful, the resulting kind of idealism (cosmopsychism) stands to the results of quantum mechanical experiments in the same relations as common physical realism.