In another essay, I’ve argued by means of a formal analogy between (i) the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica-style systems of mathematical logic (logico-mathematical incompleteness) and (ii) the incompleteness of the Standard Models in contemporary physics (physico-mechanical incompleteness), that (iii) just as the fact of logico-mathematical incompleteness entails the existence of mathematical creativity, so too the fact of physico-mechanical incompleteness entails the existence of natural creativity. Building on that line of thought, in this essay I present a new and empirically-testable strategy for completing quantum mechanics. More precisely, I argue that if we assume that the Standard Models in contemporary physics are incomplete, and if we also assume that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, then, by means of an appeal to Bohmian mechanics, together with the thesis that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, we can complete quantum mechanics.
In another essay, I’ve argued by means of a formal analogy between (i) the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica-style systems of mathematical logic (logico-mathematical incompleteness) and (ii) the incompleteness of the Standard Models in contemporary physics (physico-mechanical incompleteness), that (iii) just as the fact of logico-mathematical incompleteness entails the existence of mathematical creativity, so too the fact of physico-mechanical incompleteness entails the existence of natural creativity. Building on that line of thought, in this essay I present a new and empirically-testable strategy for completing quantum mechanics. More precisely, I argue that if we assume that the Standard Models in contemporary physics are incomplete, and if we also assume that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, then, by means of an appeal to Bohmian mechanics, together with the thesis that all rational human animals are primitive sources of natural creativity via their free agency, we can complete quantum mechanics.
After the development of a self-consistent quantum formalism nearly a century ago there began a quest for how to interpret the theoretical constructs of the formalism. In fact, the pursuit of new interpretations of quantum mechanics persists to this day. Most of these endeavors assume the validity of standard quantum formalism and proceed to ponder the ontic nature of wave functions, operators, and the Schödinger equation. The present essay takes a different approach, more epistemological than ontological. I endeavor to give a heuristic account of how empirical principles lead us to a quantum mechanical description of the world. An outcome of this approach is the suggestion that the notion of discrete quanta leads to the wave nature and statistical behavior of matter rather than the other way around. Finally, the hope is to offer some solace to those older of us who still worry about such things and also to provide the neophyte student of quantum mechanics with physical insight into the mathematically abstract and often baffling aspects of the theory.
AbstractStandard quantum mechanics is formulated using complex Hilbert spaces, real-valued probabilities, continuous one-parameter dynamics, and—where particles and fields have continuous degrees of freedom —function spaces constructed over continua such as R3 . In that precise mathematical sense, the real and complex continua are deeply embedded in the standard theory. It does not follow, however, that experiments have demonstrated the physical existence of an uncountable set of exact real numbers, still less that individual quantum systems physically “store” infinitely many digits. Every preparation, control operation, and measurement has finite precision, and many quantum predictions can be approximated arbitrarily closely using countable or finite descriptions.This distinction matters because the continuum is sometimes blamed for quantum theory's conceptual strangeness. That diagnosis is mostly unsupported. Superposition, interference, uncertainty, noncommutativity, entanglement, contextuality, Bell-inequality violations, and no-cloning already occur in finite-dimensional quantum systems and do not depend in any straightforward way on continuous position space or arbitrary irrational numbers. Restricting a Hilbert space to rational, algebraic, computable, or finitely specified states therefore does not automatically produce classical physics. Indeed, dense restricted subsets can approximate ordinary quantum predictions to arbitrary finite accuracy, although turning such a subset into a complete physical theory requires much more: closed dynamics, a composition rule, a measurement theory, robustness, and new empirical predictions.A particularly developed contemporary alternative is Tim Palmer's Invariant Set Theory and its recent formulation as Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM). RaQM is not accurately described as simply “quantum mechanics with irrational numbers banned.” It restricts the bases in which states are physically defined through number-theoretic rationality conditions, represents admissible states using finite bit strings, invokes a fractal invariant state space equipped with a non-Euclidean, p-adic-like metric, and violates Bell measurement independence at the level of exact counterfactual settings. Palmer's 2026 proposal further predicts a finite qubit-information capacity and an eventual saturation of quantum computational advantage. These are genuine, potentially falsifiable proposals, but they remain speculative and have not displaced standard quantum theory.The strongest conclusion is consequently asymmetric. There is a serious foundational question about whether the continuum is an ontological feature of nature or an extraordinarily efficient mathematical completion. Finite precision prevents existing experiments from proving a literal continuum. But there is presently little evidence that continuum mathematics causes quantum phenomena. Any discrete replacement must still account quantitatively for interference, contextuality, Bell correlations, entanglement, spectroscopy, atomic structure, and quantum computation. Discreteness can change quantum physics only when it is accompanied by additional physical postulates—and those postulates, rather than discreteness alone, must ultimately face experiment.
It is generally accepted that quantum mechanics entails a revision of the classical propositional calculus as a consequence of its physical content. However, the universal claim according to which a new quantum logic is indispensable in order to model the propositions of every quantum theory is challenged. In the present essay, we critically discuss this claim by showing that classical logic can be rehabilitated in a quantum context by taking into account Bohmian mechanics. It will be argued, indeed, that such a theoretical framework provides the necessary conceptual tools to reintroduce a classical logic of experimental propositions by virtue of its clear metaphysical picture and its theory of measurement. More precisely, it will be shown that the rehabilitation of a classical propositional calculus is a consequence of the primitive ontology of the theory, a fact that is not yet sufficiently recognized in the literature concerning Bohmian mechanics. This work aims to fill this gap.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
Abstract We use the Wigner’s friend story to characterize the quantum measurement problem. On the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whether a physical system is measured determines which of the theory's two dynamical laws obtains. For this reason, the logical consistency of the theory depends on one specifying strictly disjoint conditions for when when each law obtains, which means that one needs to say precisely what constitutes a measurement. But since the term measurement occurs in the standard theory as an undefined primitive term, the theory is at best incomplete. We see precisely how this conceptual incompleteness threatens the logical inconsistency of the theory and why, on even the most charitable reading, it entails that the theory is empirical incomplete. We end by considering why its empirically incompleteness is extremely difficult to test.