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arXiv:2012.02040 · Quantum Reports

Classical Logic in the Quantum Context

Andréa Oldofredi

Published Dec 5, 2020• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is generally accepted that quantum mechanics entails a revision of the classical propositional calculus as a consequence of its physical content. However, the universal claim according to which a new quantum logic is indispensable in order to model the propositions of every quantum theory is challenged. In the present essay, we critically discuss this claim by showing that classical logic can be rehabilitated in a quantum context by taking into account Bohmian mechanics. It will be argued, indeed, that such a theoretical framework provides the necessary conceptual tools to reintroduce a classical logic of experimental propositions by virtue of its clear metaphysical picture and its theory of measurement. More precisely, it will be shown that the rehabilitation of a classical propositional calculus is a consequence of the primitive ontology of the theory, a fact that is not yet sufficiently recognized in the literature concerning Bohmian mechanics. This work aims to fill this gap.

DOI
10.3390/quantum2040042

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It is generally accepted that quantum mechanics entails a revision of the classical propositional calculus as a consequence of its physical content. However, the universal claim according to which a new quantum logic is indispensable in order to model the propositions of every quantum theory is challenged. In the present essay, we critically discuss this claim by showing that classical logic can be rehabilitated in a quantum context by taking into account Bohmian mechanics. It will be argued, indeed, that such a theoretical framework provides the necessary conceptual tools to reintroduce a classical logic of experimental propositions by virtue of its clear metaphysical picture and its theory of measurement. More precisely, it will be shown that the rehabilitation of a classical propositional calculus is a consequence of the primitive ontology of the theory, a fact that is not yet sufficiently recognized in the literature concerning Bohmian mechanics. This work aims to fill this gap.
This paper reviews the structure of standard quantum mechanics, introducing the basics of the von Neumann-Dirac axiomatic formulation as well as the well-known Copenhagen interpretation. We review also the major conceptual difficulties arising from this theory, first and foremost, the well-known measurement problem. The main aim of this essay is to show the possibility to solve the conundrums affecting quantum mechanics via the methodology provided by the primitive ontology approach. Using Bohmian mechanics as an example, the paper argues for a realist attitude towards quantum theory. In the second place, it discusses the Quinean criterion for ontology and its limits when it comes to quantum physics, arguing that the primitive ontology programme should be considered as an improvement on Quine's method in determining the ontological commitments of a theory.
Bohmian mechanics is endowed with an ontological package that supposedly allows to solve the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. We are concerned in this work by the emergence of classicality from the quantum mechanical substrate. We will argue that although being superficially attractive, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation does not shed new light on the quantum-to-classical transition. This is due to nature of the dynamical law of Bohmian mechanics by which the particles follow the streamlines of the probability flow. As a consequence, Bohmian trajectories can be highly non-classical even when the wavefunction propagates along classical trajectories, as happens in semiclassical systems. In order to account for classical dynamics, Bohmian mechanics needs non-spreading and non-interfering wave packets: this is achieved for practical purposes by having recourse to decoherence and dense measurements. However one then faces the usual fundamental problems associated with the meaning of reduced density matrices. Moreover the specific assets of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation – in particular the existence of point-like particles pursuing well-defined trajectories – would play no role in accounting for the emergence of classical dynamics.
Since its inception Bohmian mechanics has been generally regarded as a hidden-variable theory aimed at providing an objective description of quantum phenomena. To date, this rather narrow conception of Bohm’s proposal has caused it more rejection than acceptance. Now, after 65 years of Bohmian mechanics, should still be such an interpretational aspect the prevailing appraisal? Why not favoring a more pragmatic view, as a legitimate picture of quantum mechanics, on equal footing in all respects with any other more conventional quantum picture? These questions are used here to introduce a discussion on an alternative way to deal with Bohmian mechanics at present, enhancing its aspect as an efficient and useful picture or formulation to tackle, explore, describe and explain quantum phenomena where phase and correlation ( entanglement ) are key elements. This discussion is presented through two complementary blocks. The first block is aimed at briefly revisiting the historical context that gave rise to the appearance of Bohmian mechanics, and how this approach or analogous ones have been used in different physical contexts. This discussion is used to emphasize a more pragmatic view to the detriment of the more conventional hidden-variable (ontological) approach that has been a leitmotif within the quantum foundations. The second block focuses on some particular formal aspects of Bohmian mechanics supporting the view presented here, with special emphasis on the physical meaning of the local phase field and the associated velocity field encoded within the wave function. As an illustration, a simple model of Young’s two-slit experiment is considered. The simplicity of this model allows to understand in an easy manner how the information conveyed by the Bohmian formulation relates to other more conventional concepts in quantum mechanics. This sort of pedagogical application is also aimed at showing the potential interest to introduce Bohmian mechanics in undergraduate quantum mechanics courses as a working tool rather than merely an alternative interpretation.
In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.
The non-classical nature of quantum theory has led to a number of efforts to formalize the logic of statements whose universe of discourse is the subatomic (see, for example, [3], [6], [8], and [10]).It might be hoped that ideally the fruit of such efforts would be a formalism not totally divorced from the classical logic, but incorporating or incorporated in it in such a manner as to unify the logic of the micro-and the macro-worlds.Indeed, this has been the general direction taken by these efforts, including that which we principally examine and expand upon here.*Josef Jauch, [6], pp.67-89, developed a "propositional calculus of quantum mechanics".He objected to calling a system like his a "logic of quantum mechanics"; however, our use of 'logic' here is not, I think, the use to which Jauch objected.A logic, for our present purposes, is a mathematical formalism having a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction; its actual application as normative of argumentation in reality is a matter of empirical judgment.This seems close to the way Jauch wished to use "propositional calculus" but more general, allowing for extension to a quantification theory of quantum mechanics, for example.Although Jauch's presentation of a propositional calculus of quantum mechanics is mathematically interesting and suggestive, there are a number of problems connected with it.It is our purpose to engage some of these problems and to present a rigorously defined formalism intended to come close to doing the job intended by Jauch for his logic.The success or lack of success of this effort as related to actual application of this formalism in the foundations of quantum theory is, I think, a matter for the physicists to decide; the empirical judgment involved in this application is not in the scope of this paper.If a formalism is to have a reasonable interpretation as a theory of deduction, it seems clear that it must include a relation which, when it holds between two elements of the formalism, may be reasonably interpreted as expressing that one of the elements 'follows from' the other, in •The author wishes to thank Robert Piziak for advice and comments in the course of research for this paper.
Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.