Adaptively Secure Garbled Circuits from One-Way Functions.
Brett Hemenway, Zahra Jafargholi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Alessandra Scafuro, Daniel Wichs
Abstract
A garbling scheme is used to garble a circuit C and an input x in a way that reveals the output C(x) but hides everything else. In many settings, the circuit can be garbled off-line without strict efficiency constraints, but the input must be garbled very efficiently on-line, with much lower complexity than evaluating the circuit. Yao’s scheme has essentially optimal on-line complexity, but only achieves selective security, where the adversary must choose the input x prior to seeing the garbled circuit. It has remained an open problem to achieve adaptive security, where the adversary can choose x after seeing the garbled circuit, while preserving on-line efficiency. In this work, we modify Yao’s scheme in a way that allows us to prove adaptive security under one-way functions. As our main instantiation, we get a scheme where the on-line complexity is only proportional to the width w of the circuit, which corresponds to the space complexity of the computation, but is independent of the circuit’s depth d. Alternately, we can also get an instantiation where the on-line complexity is only proportional to the input/output size and the depth d of the circuit but independent of its width w, albeit in this case we incur a 2 security loss in our reduction. More broadly, we relate the on-line complexity of adaptively secure garbling schemes in our framework to a certain type of pebble complexity of the circuit. As our main tool, of independent interest, we develop a new notion of somewhere equivocal encryption, which allows us to efficiently equivocate on a small subset of the message bits. ∗This work was done in part while some of the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant CNS1523467. †University of Pennsylvania. Department of Computer Science. fbrett@cis.upenn.edu ‡Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. zahra@ccs.neu.edu §University of California, Los Angeles. Department of Computer Science and Mathematics. rafail@cs.ucla.edu Research supported in part by NSF grants 09165174, 1065276, 1118126 and 1136174, US-Israel BSF grant 2008411, OKAWA Foundation Research Award, IBM Faculty Research Award, Xerox Faculty Research Award, B. John Garrick Foundation Award, Teradata Research Award, and Lockheed-Martin Corporation Research Award. This material is based upon work supported in part by DARPA Safeware program. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. ¶Boston University and Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. scafuro@bu.edu Research supported by NSF grants 1012798. ‖Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. wichs@ccs.neu.edu. Research supported by NSF grants CNS-1347350, CNS-1314722, CNS-1413964.