Abstract. Garbled circuits is a cryptographic technique, which has been used among other things for the con-struction of two and three-party secure computation, private function evaluation and secure outsourcing. Garbling schemes is a primitive which formalizes the syntax and security properties of garbled circuits. We dene a gener-alization of garbling schemes called reactive garbling schemes. We consider functions and garbled functions taking multiple inputs and giving multiple outputs. Two garbled functions can be linked together: an encoded output of one garbled function can be transformed into an encoded input of the other garbled function without commu-nication between the parties. Reactive garbling schemes also allow partial evaluation of garbled functions even when only some of the encoded inputs are provided. It is possible to further evaluate the linked garbled functions when more garbled inputs become available. It is also possible to later garble more functions and link them to the ongoing garbled evaluation. We provide rigorous denitions for reactive garbling schemes. We dene a new notion of security for reactive garbling schemes called condentiality. We provide both simulation based and in-distinguishability based notions of security. We also show that the simulation based notion of security implies the indistinguishability based notion of security. We present an instantiation of reactive garbling schemes. We present an application of reactive garbling schemes to reactive two-party computation secure against a malicious adversary. We demonstrate how garbling schemes can be used to give abstract black-box descriptions and proof of several advanced applications of garbled circuits in the literature, including Minilego and Lindell’s forge-and-loose technique. 1
Abstract. Garbled circuits is a cryptographic technique, which has been used among other things for the con-struction of two and three-party secure computation, private function evaluation and secure outsourcing. Garbling schemes is a primitive which formalizes the syntax and security properties of garbled circuits. We dene a gener-alization of garbling schemes called reactive garbling schemes. We consider functions and garbled functions taking multiple inputs and giving multiple outputs. Two garbled functions can be linked together: an encoded output of one garbled function can be transformed into an encoded input of the other garbled function without commu-nication between the parties. Reactive garbling schemes also allow partial evaluation of garbled functions even when only some of the encoded inputs are provided. It is possible to further evaluate the linked garbled functions when more garbled inputs become available. It is also possible to later garble more functions and link them to the ongoing garbled evaluation. We provide rigorous denitions for reactive garbling schemes. We dene a new notion of security for reactive garbling schemes called condentiality. We provide both simulation based and in-distinguishability based notions of security. We also show that the simulation based notion of security implies the indistinguishability based notion of security. We present an instantiation of reactive garbling schemes. We present an application of reactive garbling schemes to reactive two-party computation secure against a malicious adversary. We demonstrate how garbling schemes can be used to give abstract black-box descriptions and proof of several advanced applications of garbled circuits in the literature, including Minilego and Lindell’s forge-and-loose technique. 1
Garbled circuits is a cryptographic technique, which has been used among other things for the construction of two and threeparty secure computation, private function evaluation and secure outsourcing. Garbling schemes is a primitive which formalizes the syntax and security properties of garbled circuits. We define a generalization of garbling schemes called reactive garbling schemes. We consider functions and garbled functions taking multiple inputs and giving multiple outputs. Two garbled functions can be linked together: an encoded output of one garbled function can be transformed into an encoded input of the other garbled function without communication between the parties. Reactive garbling schemes also allow partial evaluation of garbled functions even when only some of the encoded inputs are provided. It is possible to further evaluate the linked garbled functions when more garbled inputs become available. It is also possible to later garble more functions and link them to the ongoing garbled evaluation. We provide rigorous definitions for reactive garbling schemes. We define a new notion of security for reactive garbling schemes called confidentiality. We provide both simulation based and indistinguishability based notions of security. We also show that the simulation based notion of security implies the indistinguishability based notion of security. We present an instantiation of reactive garbling schemes. We present an application of reactive garbling schemes to reactive two-party computation secure against a malicious, static adversary. We demonstrate how garbling schemes can be used to give abstract black-box descriptions and proof of several advanced applications of garbled circuits in the literature, including Minilego and Lindell’s forge-and-lose technique.
Abstract. We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two parties wish to securely evaluate the same circuit multiple times. We design efficient garbled-circuit-based two-party protocols secure against malicious adversaries. Recent works by Lindell (Crypto 2013) and Huang-Katz-Evans (Crypto 2013) have obtained op-timal complexity for cut-and-choose performed over garbled circuits in the single execution setting. We show that it is possible to obtain much lower amortized overhead for cut-and-choose in the multiple-execution setting. Our efficiency improvements result from a novel way to combine a recent technique of Lindell (Crypto 2013) with LEGO-based cut-and-choose techniques (TCC 2009, Eurocrypt 2013). In concrete terms, for 40-bit statistical security we obtain a 2 × improvement (per execution) in com-munication and computation for as few as 7 executions, and require only 8 garbled circuits (i.e., a 5 × improvement) per execution for as low as 3500 executions. Our results suggest the exciting possibility that secure two-party computation in the malicious setting can be less than an order of magnitude more expensive than in the semi-honest setting. 1
In this thesis we design and implement three approaches to provide efficient Secure Two- Party Computation (2PC) protocols that are secure in presence of malicious adversaries. The field of secure two-party computation enables two mutually distrusting parties, each with their own private input, to run a computation of an arbitrary program. At the end of the computation, nothing about their private input is leaked except for what can be learned from the output of the computation. The seminal work of Yao in 1986 provided the first proof that such a computation is feasible using the so called garbled circuits and given an Oblivious Transfer protocol. In this thesis, we follow Yao’s garbled circuit approach and focus on efficient protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries. We examine three different categories of optimization. In each category, we present a 2PC protocol, prove its security, and implement it as a proof of concept to demonstrate its running time in practice. Non-interactive Secure Computation: In this category, we offer the first implementation of a malicious 2PC protocol that reduces the required rounds of interaction between the two parties to only two rounds (i.e., each party sends only one message to the other party). Mixed Secure Two-Party Computation: In the second category we target big and complex programs and break them into subprograms. Then, we compute each subprogram using the most efficient 2PC protocol that is suitable for it. Finally, we securely connect these subprograms together. The goal is to reduce the overhead of the garbled circuits significantly, which results in a more efficient overall 2PC protocol for programs with specific properties. Secure Computation for Random Access Machine Programs: In the third category, we target programs that require random access to the memory (as opposed to a sequential access). We present the first efficient maliciously-secure protocol for computing such programs.
Secure two-party computation problem is about two parties that want to compute some function of their private inputs in a way that other party won't learn it.We describe a general way to perform secure two-party computation of a function specified as a boolean circuit, which was proposed by A.A. Yao in 1982.This method is named Yao garbled circuit evaluation and is secure against semi-honest adversaries.We present a new efficient protocol for secure two-party computation Circus, that is secure against malicious adversary in consistency model.Consistency model implies that either both parties will receive correct output and persist privacy of their inputs or a honest party will know, that is was cheated and that adversary potentially have learnt 1 bit of other party's input value.We specify all necessary sub-protocols and their security requirements and prove security of Circus in malicious environment.
Abstract. We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the case of malicious behavior. To illustrate the need for the new protocol, we first discuss security issues of three existing protocols for secure two-party computation using garbled circuits, in the case of malicious behavior. The first is a protocol by Pinkas (Eurocrypt 2003), and the other two are the committed-input scheme and the k-leaked model, both presented by Mohassel and Franklin (PKC 2006). We address security flaws in all schemes, which allow leaking of information on the private inputs. In the k-leaked model leaking of some information is permitted if a participant is cheating, but then the honest participant should be aware of it. We show that this is not the case. After discussing these security issues of the known schemes, we describe our new protocol. It is based on the protocol by Pinkas, and the correction of the flaw of the scheme by Pinkas makes our protocol not only more secure, but also more efficient. We provide a detailed informal security analysis of our new protocol. Keywords: Secure two-party computation, Yao’s garbled circuit, active adversary 1
A garbling scheme is used to garble a circuit C and an input x in a way that reveals the output C(x) but hides everything else. In many settings, the circuit can be garbled off-line without strict efficiency constraints, but the input must be garbled very efficiently on-line, with much lower complexity than evaluating the circuit. Yao’s scheme has essentially optimal on-line complexity, but only achieves selective security, where the adversary must choose the input x prior to seeing the garbled circuit. It has remained an open problem to achieve adaptive security, where the adversary can choose x after seeing the garbled circuit, while preserving on-line efficiency. In this work, we modify Yao’s scheme in a way that allows us to prove adaptive security under one-way functions. As our main instantiation, we get a scheme where the on-line complexity is only proportional to the width w of the circuit, which corresponds to the space complexity of the computation, but is independent of the circuit’s depth d. Alternately, we can also get an instantiation where the on-line complexity is only proportional to the input/output size and the depth d of the circuit but independent of its width w, albeit in this case we incur a 2 security loss in our reduction. More broadly, we relate the on-line complexity of adaptively secure garbling schemes in our framework to a certain type of pebble complexity of the circuit. As our main tool, of independent interest, we develop a new notion of somewhere equivocal encryption, which allows us to efficiently equivocate on a small subset of the message bits. ∗This work was done in part while some of the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant CNS1523467. †University of Pennsylvania. Department of Computer Science. fbrett@cis.upenn.edu ‡Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. zahra@ccs.neu.edu §University of California, Los Angeles. Department of Computer Science and Mathematics. rafail@cs.ucla.edu Research supported in part by NSF grants 09165174, 1065276, 1118126 and 1136174, US-Israel BSF grant 2008411, OKAWA Foundation Research Award, IBM Faculty Research Award, Xerox Faculty Research Award, B. John Garrick Foundation Award, Teradata Research Award, and Lockheed-Martin Corporation Research Award. This material is based upon work supported in part by DARPA Safeware program. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. ¶Boston University and Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. scafuro@bu.edu Research supported by NSF grants 1012798. ‖Northeastern University. Department of Computer Science. wichs@ccs.neu.edu. Research supported by NSF grants CNS-1347350, CNS-1314722, CNS-1413964.