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Limits on the Power of Cryptographic Cheap Talk.

Pavel Hubáček, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Alon Rosen

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete" (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial " (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate " utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. 1

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Limits on the Power of Cryptographic Cheap Talk

Pavel Hubáček, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Alon Rosen

We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete” (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial” (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate” utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of replacing the trusted mediator with an unconditionally secure sampling protocol that jointly generates the players' actions. We characterize the joint distributions that can be securely sampled by malicious players via protocols using error-free communication. This class of distributions depends on whether players may speak simultaneously (“cheap talk”) or must speak in turn (“polite talk”). In applying sampling protocols toward attaining correlated equilibria with rational players, we observe that security against malicious protocols may be much stronger than necessary. We propose the concept of secure sampling by rational players, and show that many more distributions are feasible given certain utility functions. However, the payoffs attainable via secure sampling by malicious players are a dominant subset of the rationally attainable payoffs.

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Abstract. A common problem in many markets is that competing firms cannot plan joint business strategies which are socially beneficial, as each firm has its own preferable business strategy which would yield higher profits for it and lower profits for the others. The solution to this problem becomes complex because each firm need not stick to its commitment to follow the pre-designated strategy. Game theory suggests to us a way to enforce this commitment, as when every player chooses his actions according to his observation of the value of a common public signal and, assuming that the others do not deviate, no player is willing to deviate from his recommended strategy. The players do not deviate from their recommended strategy as playing them would yield them a much higher expected pay-off than playing individually. The common public channel can be a trusted external mediator which may send each player his recommended strategy. This mediator can be simulated by a cryptographic protocol, which all the players agree to implement. This problem of suggesting the protocol is known as the Correlated Element Selection Problem. The first two-player protocol was proposed by Dodis et. al[1] in Crypto 2000. The extension of the two-player protocol to an n-player protocol is highly prone to collusions, as two firms can collude and cheat the rest of the firms. The main contribution of the paper is the first n-player collusion free protocol for the correlated element selection problem that does not use hardware primitives. We assume that players are honest but curious. 1

•Jan 1, 2010•1 citation
We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete" (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial " (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate " utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. 1
We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete” (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial” (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate” utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of replacing the trusted mediator with an unconditionally secure sampling protocol that jointly generates the players' actions. We characterize the joint distributions that can be securely sampled by malicious players via protocols using error-free communication. This class of distributions depends on whether players may speak simultaneously (“cheap talk”) or must speak in turn (“polite talk”). In applying sampling protocols toward attaining correlated equilibria with rational players, we observe that security against malicious protocols may be much stronger than necessary. We propose the concept of secure sampling by rational players, and show that many more distributions are feasible given certain utility functions. However, the payoffs attainable via secure sampling by malicious players are a dominant subset of the rationally attainable payoffs.
The field of rational cryptography considers the design of cryptographic protocols in the presence of rational agents seeking to maximize local utility functions. This departs from the standard secure multiparty computation setting, where players are assumed to be either honest or malicious. We detail the construction of both a two-party and a multiparty game theoretic framework for constructing rational cryptographic protocols. Our framework specifies the utility function assumptions necessary to realize the privacy, correctness, and fairness guarantees for protocols. We demonstrate that our framework correctly models cryptographic protocols, such as rational secret sharing, where existing work considers equilibrium concepts that yield unreasonable equilibria. Similarly, we demonstrate that cryptography may be applied to the game theoretic domain, constructing an auction market not realizable in the original formulation. Additionally, we demonstrate that modeling players as rational agents allows us to design a protocol that destabilizes coalitions. Thus, we establish a mutual benefit from combining the two fields, while demonstrating the applicability of our framework to real-world market environments. We also give an application of game theory to adversarial interactions where cryptography is not necessary. Specifically, we consider adversarial machine learning, where the adversary is rational and reacts to the presence of a data miner. We give a general extension to classification algorithms that returns greater expected utility for the data miner than existing classification methods.
Abstract. Understanding the minimal assumptions required for carrying out cryptographic tasks is one of the fundamental goals of theoretical cryptography. A rich body of work has been dedicated to understanding the complexity of cryptographic tasks in the context of (semi-honest) secure two-party computation. Much of this work has focused on the characterization of trivial and complete functionalities (resp., functionalities that can be securely implemented unconditionally, and functionalities that can be used to securely compute all functionalities). All previous works define reductions via an ideal implementation of the functionality; i.e., f reduces to g if one can implement f using an ideal box (or oracle) that computes the function g and returns the output to both parties. Such a reduction models the computation of f as an atomic operation. However, in the real-world, protocols proceed in rounds, and the output is not learned by the parties simultaneously. In this paper we show that this distinction is significant. Specifically, we show that there exist symmetric functionalities (where both parties receive the same outcome), that are neither trivial nor complete under “ideal-box reductions”, and yet the existence of a constant-round protocol for securely computing such a functionality implies infinitely-often oblivious transfer (meaning that it is secure for infinitely-many n’s). In light of the above, we propose an alternative definitional infrastructure for studying the triviality and completeness of functionalities. 1
Which computational complexity assumptions are inherent to cryptography? We present a broad framework to pose and investigate this question. We first aim to understand the “cryptographic complexity ” of various tasks, independent of any computational assumptions. In our framework the cryptographic tasks are modeled as multi-party computation functionalities. We consider a universally composable secure protocol for one task given access to another task as the most natural complexity reduction between the two tasks. Some of these cryptographic complexity reductions are unconditional, others are unconditionally non-existent, but the vast majority appear to depend on computational assumptions; it is this relationship with computational assumptions that we study. In our detailed investigation of large classes of 2-party functionalities, we find that every reduction we are able to classify turns out to be unconditionally true or false, or else equivalent to the existence of one-way functions (OWF) or of semi-honest (equivalently, standalone-secure) oblivious transfer protocols (sh-OT). This leads us to conjecture that there are only a small finite number of distinct (i.e., black-box separable) computational assump-tions that are inherent among the infinite number of different cryptographic reductions in our framework. On moving to 3-party functionalities, there does exist a natural computational assumption, distinct from the OWF and sh-OT assumptions (namely, the existence of a key agreement protocol) that manifests itself as a cryptographic
Abstract. A common problem in many markets is that competing firms cannot plan joint business strategies which are socially beneficial, as each firm has its own preferable business strategy which would yield higher profits for it and lower profits for the others. The solution to this problem becomes complex because each firm need not stick to its commitment to follow the pre-designated strategy. Game theory suggests to us a way to enforce this commitment, as when every player chooses his actions according to his observation of the value of a common public signal and, assuming that the others do not deviate, no player is willing to deviate from his recommended strategy. The players do not deviate from their recommended strategy as playing them would yield them a much higher expected pay-off than playing individually. The common public channel can be a trusted external mediator which may send each player his recommended strategy. This mediator can be simulated by a cryptographic protocol, which all the players agree to implement. This problem of suggesting the protocol is known as the Correlated Element Selection Problem. The first two-player protocol was proposed by Dodis et. al[1] in Crypto 2000. The extension of the two-player protocol to an n-player protocol is highly prone to collusions, as two firms can collude and cheat the rest of the firms. The main contribution of the paper is the first n-player collusion free protocol for the correlated element selection problem that does not use hardware primitives. We assume that players are honest but curious. 1