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Collusion Free Protocol for Correlated Element Selection Problem.

Amjed Shareef, Akshay Agrawal, Chandrasekharan Pandu Rangan

Published Jan 1, 2010• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. A common problem in many markets is that competing firms cannot plan joint business strategies which are socially beneficial, as each firm has its own preferable business strategy which would yield higher profits for it and lower profits for the others. The solution to this problem becomes complex because each firm need not stick to its commitment to follow the pre-designated strategy. Game theory suggests to us a way to enforce this commitment, as when every player chooses his actions according to his observation of the value of a common public signal and, assuming that the others do not deviate, no player is willing to deviate from his recommended strategy. The players do not deviate from their recommended strategy as playing them would yield them a much higher expected pay-off than playing individually. The common public channel can be a trusted external mediator which may send each player his recommended strategy. This mediator can be simulated by a cryptographic protocol, which all the players agree to implement. This problem of suggesting the protocol is known as the Correlated Element Selection Problem. The first two-player protocol was proposed by Dodis et. al[1] in Crypto 2000. The extension of the two-player protocol to an n-player protocol is highly prone to collusions, as two firms can collude and cheat the rest of the firms. The main contribution of the paper is the first n-player collusion free protocol for the correlated element selection problem that does not use hardware primitives. We assume that players are honest but curious. 1

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Abstract. A common problem in many markets is that competing firms cannot plan joint business strategies which are socially beneficial, as each firm has its own preferable business strategy which would yield higher profits for it and lower profits for the others. The solution to this problem becomes complex because each firm need not stick to its commitment to follow the pre-designated strategy. Game theory suggests to us a way to enforce this commitment, as when every player chooses his actions according to his observation of the value of a common public signal and, assuming that the others do not deviate, no player is willing to deviate from his recommended strategy. The players do not deviate from their recommended strategy as playing them would yield them a much higher expected pay-off than playing individually. The common public channel can be a trusted external mediator which may send each player his recommended strategy. This mediator can be simulated by a cryptographic protocol, which all the players agree to implement. This problem of suggesting the protocol is known as the Correlated Element Selection Problem. The first two-player protocol was proposed by Dodis et. al[1] in Crypto 2000. The extension of the two-player protocol to an n-player protocol is highly prone to collusions, as two firms can collude and cheat the rest of the firms. The main contribution of the paper is the first n-player collusion free protocol for the correlated element selection problem that does not use hardware primitives. We assume that players are honest but curious. 1
We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete" (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial " (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate " utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. 1
We revisit the question of whether cryptographic protocols can replace correlated equilibria mediators in two-player strategic games. This problem was first addressed by Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (CRYPTO 2000), who suggested replacing the mediator with a secure protocol and proved that their solution is stable in the Nash equilibrium (NE) sense, provided that the players are computationally bounded. We show that there exist two-player games for which no cryptographic protocol can implement the mediator in a sequentially rational way; that is, without introducing empty threats. This explains why all solutions so far were either sequentially unstable, or were restricted to a limited class of correlated equilibria (specifically, those that do not dominate any NE, and hence playing them does not offer a clear advantage over playing any NE). In the context of computational NE, we classify necessary and sufficient cryptographic assumptions for implementing a mediator that allows to achieve a given utility profile of a correlated equilibrium. The picture that emerges is somewhat different than the one arising in semi-honest secure two-party computation. Specifically, while in the latter case every functionality is either “complete” (i.e., implies Oblivious Transfer) or “trivial” (i.e., can be securely computed unconditionally), in the former there exist some “intermediate” utility profiles whose implementation is equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Secure protocols attempt to minimize the injuries to privacy and correctness inflicted by malicious participants who collude during run-time. They do not, however, prevent malicious parties from colluding and coordinating their actions in the first place!Eliminating such collusion of malicious parties during the execution of a protocol is an important and exciting direction for research in Cryptography. We contribute the first general result in this direction: (1) We provide a rigorous definition of what a collusion-free protocol is; and (2) We prove that, under standard physical and computational assumptions ---i.e., plain envelopes and trapdoor permutations---collusion-free protocols exist for all finite protocol tasks with publicly observable actions. (Note that such tasks are allowed to have secret global state, and thus include Poker, Bridge, and other such games.Our solution is tight in the sense that, for a collusion-free protocol to exist, each of (a) the finiteness of the game of interest, (b) the public observability of its actions, and (c) the use of some type of physically private channel is provably essential.
Steganography, the hiding of covert messages inside innocuous communication, is an active area of cryptographic research. Recent research has shown that provably undetectable steganography is possible in a wide variety of settings. We believe that the existence of such undetectable steganography will have far reaching implications. In this thesis, we investigate the impact of steganography on the design of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we show that all existing cryptographic protocols allow malicious players to collude and coordinate their actions by steganographicly hiding covert messages inside legitimate protocol traffic. Such collusion is devastating in many settings, and thus we argue that its elimination is an important direction for cryptographic research. Defeating such steganographic collusion requires not only new cryptographic protocols, but also a new notion of protocol security. Traditional notions of protocol security attempt to minimize the injuries to privacy and correctness inflicted by malicious participants who collude during run-tune. They do not, however, prevent malicious parties from colluding and coordinating their actions in the first place! We therefore put forward the notion of a collusion-free protocol which guarantees that no set of players can use the protocol to maliciously coordinate their actions. As should be expected, such a strong notion of security is very difficult to achieve. We show that achieving collusion-free security is impossible in a model with only broadcast communication and that even with physically private communication (e.g. physical envelopes) there are still many ideal functionalities that have no collusion-free protocols. Fortunately, under natural assumptions collusion-free protocols exist for an interesting class of ideal functionalities. Assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations, we construct collusion-free protocols, in a model with both broadcast messages and physical envelopes, for every finite ideal functionality in which all actions are public.
Abstract. We consider the problem of random selection, where p players follow a protocol to jointly select a random element of a universe of size n. However, some of the players may be adversarial and collude to force the output to lie in a small subset of the universe. We describe essentially the first protocols that solve this problem in the presence of a dishonest majority in the full-information model (where the adversary is computationally unbounded and all communication is via non-simultaneous broadcast). Our protocols are nearly optimal in several parameters, including the round complexity (as a function of n), the randomness complexity, the communication complexity, and the tradeoffs between the fraction of honest players, the probability that the output lies in a small subset of the universe, and the density of this subset. 1
We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a pro-tocol with ballots and a ballot box. That is, n mutually suspicious players, each player i possessing a secret input xi, can use ballots and ballot boxes to jointly evaluate f(x1,..., xn) = (y1,..., yn), so that (no matter how many players may collude and deviate from their pre-scribed instructions, and no matter how long they compute!) each player i learns exactly yi with the same privacy and correctness as if all players privately handed their secret inputs to a trusted party, who privately evaluates f and privately returns yi to each player i. Our protocol is (1) efficient, (2) enjoys perfect privacy, (3) guaran-tees perfect correctness, (4) is universally composable in the sense of [DoMi00] and [Can01], and (5) is always collusion-free in the sense of [LMS05], even for games with secret actions. 1 Main Theorem For any function f, mapping n private inputs to a single public output, there exists an n party protocol for a ballot-box network with public opening that securely evaluates f. We now procedure to define (1) a ballot-box network, (2) a ballot-box network with public opening and (3) the notion of securely evaluating a function. In a subsequent version of this work, we will provide a proof of our main theorem, generalize our results to functions with n inputs and n outputs and explore applications to economic mechanisms.