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Synthese

Bohmian dispositions

Mauricio Suárez

Published Apr 22, 2015• 37 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11229-015-0741-1

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The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian dispositions’, and Simpson’s theory of ‘Cosmic Hylomorphism’, in which the particle configuration comprises a hylomorphic substance which has an intrinsic power. I argue that Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only a small number of particles, but that this problem is avoided by Cosmic Hylomorphism, in which the cosmic power manifests a teleological process.

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Bohmian Mechanics (as presented in Dürr et al. 1992) is being regarded more and more as an attractive quantum theory because it provides a clear ontology, consisting of particles and one universal wave-function (Dürr et al 1992, Dürr et al. 1995). However, this is true only prima facie because the status of the wave-function remains controversial for several reasons (Belot 2012, Esfeld et al. 2014). In my talk I will show how the debate on the wave-function is leading to a completely new way of understanding not only the ontology of Bohmian Mechanics, but also the fundamental building blocks of any physical theory (the so called ‘primitive ontology’). In particular, I will discuss the dispositional approach, which regards the wave-function as a nomological entity grounded in one dispositional property instantiated by some ‘primitive stuff’ (Esfeld et al. 2014, Esfeld et al. 2015). In my conclusion I will point out the challenges and the problems that this approach has to face, and I will suggest that it cannot be regarded as a definitive and final solution to the question of the status of the wave-function.

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Abstract. After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions of particles play the role of the categorical basis, a role that in other interpretations cannot be filled by anything else. In Bohr’s and Everett-type interpretations, dispositionalism is instrumentalism in disguise.

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The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian dispositions’, and Simpson’s theory of ‘Cosmic Hylomorphism’, in which the particle configuration comprises a hylomorphic substance which has an intrinsic power. I argue that Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only a small number of particles, but that this problem is avoided by Cosmic Hylomorphism, in which the cosmic power manifests a teleological process.
Bohmian Mechanics (as presented in Dürr et al. 1992) is being regarded more and more as an attractive quantum theory because it provides a clear ontology, consisting of particles and one universal wave-function (Dürr et al 1992, Dürr et al. 1995). However, this is true only prima facie because the status of the wave-function remains controversial for several reasons (Belot 2012, Esfeld et al. 2014). In my talk I will show how the debate on the wave-function is leading to a completely new way of understanding not only the ontology of Bohmian Mechanics, but also the fundamental building blocks of any physical theory (the so called ‘primitive ontology’). In particular, I will discuss the dispositional approach, which regards the wave-function as a nomological entity grounded in one dispositional property instantiated by some ‘primitive stuff’ (Esfeld et al. 2014, Esfeld et al. 2015). In my conclusion I will point out the challenges and the problems that this approach has to face, and I will suggest that it cannot be regarded as a definitive and final solution to the question of the status of the wave-function.
Abstract. After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions of particles play the role of the categorical basis, a role that in other interpretations cannot be filled by anything else. In Bohr’s and Everett-type interpretations, dispositionalism is instrumentalism in disguise.