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China Communications

CLORKE-SFS: Certificateless one-round key exchange protocol with strong forward security in limited communication scenarios

Xiaowei Li, Dengqi Yang, Benhui Chen, Yuqing Zhang

Published Jul 1, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Certificateless one-round key exchange (CL-ORKE) protocols enable each participant to share a common key with only one round of communication which greatly saves communication cost. CL-ORKE protocols can be applied to scenarios with limited communication, such as space communication. Although CL-ORKE protocols have been researched for years, lots of them only consider what secrets can be compromised but ignore the time when the secrets have been corrupted. In CL-ORKE protocols, the reveal of the long-term key attacks can be divided into two different attacks according to the time of the long-term key revealed: the attack to weak Forward Security (wFS) and the attack to strong Forward Security (sFS). Many CLKE protocols did not take into account the sFS property or considered sFS as wFS. In this paper, we first propose a new security model for CL-ORKE protocols which considers the sFS property as well as the Ephemeral Key Reveal attack. Then, we give a CL-ORKE protocol which is called CLORKE-SFS. CLORKE-SFS is provably secure under the proposed model provided the Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH) and the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (BCDH) assumption hold. The security model and the protocol may give inspiration for constructing one-round key exchange protocols with perfect forward security in certificateless scenarios.

DOI
10.23919/jcc.2021.07.017

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Certificateless one-round key exchange (CL-ORKE) protocols enable each participant to share a common key with only one round of communication which greatly saves communication cost. CL-ORKE protocols can be applied to scenarios with limited communication, such as space communication. Although CL-ORKE protocols have been researched for years, lots of them only consider what secrets can be compromised but ignore the time when the secrets have been corrupted. In CL-ORKE protocols, the reveal of the long-term key attacks can be divided into two different attacks according to the time of the long-term key revealed: the attack to weak Forward Security (wFS) and the attack to strong Forward Security (sFS). Many CLKE protocols did not take into account the sFS property or considered sFS as wFS. In this paper, we first propose a new security model for CL-ORKE protocols which considers the sFS property as well as the Ephemeral Key Reveal attack. Then, we give a CL-ORKE protocol which is called CLORKE-SFS. CLORKE-SFS is provably secure under the proposed model provided the Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH) and the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (BCDH) assumption hold. The security model and the protocol may give inspiration for constructing one-round key exchange protocols with perfect forward security in certificateless scenarios.
Security models for key exchange protocols have been researched for years, however, lots of them only focus on what secret can be compromised but they do not differentiate the timing of secrets compromise, such as the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we propose a new security model for key exchange protocols which can not only consider what keys can be compromised as well as when they are compromised. The proposed security model is important to the security proof of the key exchange protocols with forward secrecy (either weak forward secrecy (wFS) or strong forward secrecy (sFS)). In addition, a new kind of key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks which is called strong key compromise impersonation (sKCI) attack is proposed. Finally, we provide a new one-round key exchange protocol called mOT+ based on mOT protocol. The security of the mOT+ is given in the new model. It can provide the properties of sKCI-resilience and sFS and it is secure even if the ephemeral key reveal query is considered.
One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bandwidth efficiency. As a special case of GAKE – the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.
Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) avoids the inherent escrow of identity-based cryptography and does not require certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. Based on CL-PKC, we present an efficient constant-round group key exchange protocol, which is provably secure under the intractability of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Our protocol is a contributory key exchange with perfect forward secrecy and has only two communication rounds. So it is more efficient than other protocols. Moreover, our protocol provides a method to design efficient constant-round group key exchange protocols and most secret sharing schemes could be adopted to construct our protocol.
Abstract:Based on Zhang’s security model, an improved pairing-free certificateless key agreement,CL-AKA random oracle model, was proposed. An ephemeral-secret query and three types of fresh oracles were further defined in the improved CL-AKA random oracle model to achieve the simulation of key-compromise impersonation, disclosure of ephemeral secrets and perfect forward secrecy. A CL-AKA protocol with strong security was proposed, costing only 9 scalar multiplications on the elliptic curve. The secure of the new protocol was proved in the improved model. The comparative analysis pointed out that the new protocol with strong security and low computing costs can be used to build secure mobile communication environment.
Traditionally, secure one-round key exchange protocols in the PKI setting have either achieved perfect forward secrecy, or forms of deniability, but not both. On the one hand, achieving perfect forward secrecy against active attackers seems to require some form of authentication of the messages, as in signed Diffie-Hellman style protocols, that subsequently sacrifice deniability. On the other hand, using implicit authentication along the lines of MQV and descendants sacrifices perfect forward secrecy in one round and achieves only weak perfect forward secrecy instead. We show that by reintroducing signatures, it is possible to satisfy both a strong key-exchange security notion as well as a strong form of deniability, in one-round key exchange protocols. Our security notion for key exchange is stronger than, e. g., the extended CK model, and captures perfect forward secrecy. Our notion of deniability, which we call peer-and-time deniability, is stronger than that offered by, e. g., the SIGMA protocol. We propose a concrete protocol and prove that it satisfies our definition of key-exchange security in the random oracle model as well as peer-and-time deniability. The protocol combines a signed-Diffie-Hellman message exchange with an MQV-style key computation, and offers a remarkable combination of advanced security properties and efficiency