Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
Forward secrecy (FS) is a central security requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE). Especially, strong FS (sFS) is desirable because it can guarantee security against a very realistic attack scenario that an adversary is allowed to be active in the target session. However, most of AKE schemes cannot achieve sFS, and currently known schemes with sFS are only proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a generic construction of AKE protocol with sFS in the standard model against a constrained adversary. The constraint is that session-specific intermediate computation results (i.e., session state) cannot be revealed to the adversary for achieving sFS, that is shown to be inevitable by Boyd and González Nieto. However, our scheme maintains weak FS (wFS) if session state is available to the adversary. Thus, our scheme satisfies one of strongest security definitions, the CK+ model, which includes wFS and session state reveal. The main idea to achieve sFS is to use signcryption KEM while the previous CK+ secure construction uses ordinary KEM. We show a possible instantiation of our construction from Diffie-Hellman problems.
Abstract. An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the CK + model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is CK + secure in the standard model. The construction gives the first CK + secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie-Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without non-standard assumptions such as πPRF and KEA1. Furthermore, we extend the CK + model to identity-based (called the id-CK + model), and propose a generic construction of identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) based on identity-based KEM, which satisfies id-CK + security. The construction leads first strongly secure ID-AKE protocols under the hardness of integer factorization problem, or learning problems with errors.
Nowadays many crucial network applications rely on the existence of a confidential channel established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks.With the rapid development of cyber technology, novel attacks to cryptosystem emerge in an endless stream.This has also led to the development of AKE solutions to provide increasingly stronger security guarantees.In this thesis we focus on provision of practical constructions for AKE protocols which are provably secure in a strong sense without resorting to random oracles.We first we present three new efficient compilers to generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries.Our compilers are not only a useful tool for the design of new AKE systems with many additional security properties in a modular and less error-prone fashion, but they also help to relax the assumptions on existing, practical key exchange mechanisms which are not known to be provably secure AKE protocols.Security of our compilers is shown in a strong modified CK model where the adversary is allowed to reveal either long-term secret key or state information of the protocol participants.On the second, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure two party AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS trick.A generic construction satisfying those requirements is given based on well-known cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency.Then a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting (i.e.without knowing any cryptographic information about its communication peer).Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous works which are eCK secure in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and to implement codes of protocol which need to be resilience of state leakage.Finally, we generalize our one-round two party AKE construction to group case that yields an efficient tripartite AKE protocol based on bilinear maps and a candidate group AKE protocol (with more than three members) based on multilinear maps.Up to now they are the first solutions which can be proved secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles.Meanwhile we make first step to show how to simplify the security proof for one-round group AKE under g-eCK model.i
A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.
Traditionally, secure one-round key exchange protocols in the PKI setting have either achieved perfect forward secrecy, or forms of deniability, but not both. On the one hand, achieving perfect forward secrecy against active attackers seems to require some form of authentication of the messages, as in signed Diffie-Hellman style protocols, that subsequently sacrifice deniability. On the other hand, using implicit authentication along the lines of MQV and descendants sacrifices perfect forward secrecy in one round and achieves only weak perfect forward secrecy instead. We show that by reintroducing signatures, it is possible to satisfy both a strong key-exchange security notion as well as a strong form of deniability, in one-round key exchange protocols. Our security notion for key exchange is stronger than, e. g., the extended CK model, and captures perfect forward secrecy. Our notion of deniability, which we call peer-and-time deniability, is stronger than that offered by, e. g., the SIGMA protocol. We propose a concrete protocol and prove that it satisfies our definition of key-exchange security in the random oracle model as well as peer-and-time deniability. The protocol combines a signed-Diffie-Hellman message exchange with an MQV-style key computation, and offers a remarkable combination of advanced security properties and efficiency
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary version [18] we have proposed, without proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.