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Foundations of Science

No-Thing and Causality in Realistic Non-Standard Interpretations of the Quantum Mechanical Wave Function: Ex Nihilo Aliquid?

Gino Tarozzi, Giovanni Macchia

Published Jul 10, 2021• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract It has been shown that quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpretation violates four different formulations of causality principle endowed with empirical meaning. The present work aims to highlight how even a realistic non-standard interpretation of the theory conflicts with causality in its Cartesian formulation of the principle of the non-inferiority of causes over effects. Such an interpretation, which attributes some form of weak physical reality to the wave function (called empty wave, regarded as a zero-energy wave-like phenomenon), is a sort of precursor of the more recent so-called wavefunction realism. We also discuss a more radical realistic interpretation according to which physical properties can also be assigned to non-metaphysical relative nothing, seen as the simple absence of a particle such as a photon, but not of its corresponding state (no-photon), which is considered real. By interpreting the wave function collapse as a consequence of an interaction with empty waves or of a detection of the no-photon, we will highlight how more real physical effects can derive from lower causes, including relative nothing. Finally, we will show how these interpretations, while violating Cartesian causality in its two variants, do not seem to affect the validity of the principle of a rational explanation that nothing can derive from (absolute) nothing, which does not seem satisfied by the orthodox interpretation.

DOI
10.1007/s10699-021-09807-z

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Abstract It has been shown that quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpretation violates four different formulations of causality principle endowed with empirical meaning. The present work aims to highlight how even a realistic non-standard interpretation of the theory conflicts with causality in its Cartesian formulation of the principle of the non-inferiority of causes over effects. Such an interpretation, which attributes some form of weak physical reality to the wave function (called empty wave, regarded as a zero-energy wave-like phenomenon), is a sort of precursor of the more recent so-called wavefunction realism. We also discuss a more radical realistic interpretation according to which physical properties can also be assigned to non-metaphysical relative nothing, seen as the simple absence of a particle such as a photon, but not of its corresponding state (no-photon), which is considered real. By interpreting the wave function collapse as a consequence of an interaction with empty waves or of a detection of the no-photon, we will highlight how more real physical effects can derive from lower causes, including relative nothing. Finally, we will show how these interpretations, while violating Cartesian causality in its two variants, do not seem to affect the validity of the principle of a rational explanation that nothing can derive from (absolute) nothing, which does not seem satisfied by the orthodox interpretation.
Abstract By the relational realist interpretation of wave function collapse, the quantum mechanical actualization of potentia is defined as a decoherence-driven process by which each actualization (in "orthodox" terms, each measurement outcome) is conditioned both by physical ana logical relations with the actualities conventionally demarked as "environmental" or external to that particular outcome. But by the relational realist interpretation, the actualization-in-process is understood as internally related to these "enironmental" data per the formalism of quantum decoherence. The concept of "actualization via wave function collapse" is accounted for solely by virtue of these presupposed logical relations—the same logical relations otherwise presupposed by the scientific method itself—and thus requires no "external" physical-dynamical trigger: e.g., the Gaussian hits of GRW, acts of conscious observation, etc. By the relational realist interpretation, it is the physical and logical relations among quantum actualities (quantum "final real things") that drives the process of decoherence and, via the latter, the logically conditioned actualization of potentia. In this regard, the relational realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is a praxiological interpretation; that is, these physical and logical relations are ontobgically active relations, contributing not just to the epistemic coordination of quantum actualizations, but to the process of actualization itself.
Several experiments have suggested that the complete indistinguishability of quantum systems is to be considered a real phenomenon. Experiments such as the HOM effect, the existence of BECs, the path identity cases, and many others are physical realities of today. Physicists `explain’ these phenomena using different models, such as Bohmian mechanics, relational quantum mechanics or the QBism approach. Most of these models are constructed within a standard mathematical framework, meaning standard mathematics, where all things can, even if only in principle, be distinguished from one another, so complete indistinguishability can only be mimicked. These approaches may work for physical purposes but are debatable regarding logical and metaphysical questions. If we accept that such questions are at least part of the philosophical aspect of quantum physics, then we are authorised to analyse them and try to offer an alternative. Looking for an alternative, we consider Alain Aspect’s and Anton Zeilinger’s views about quantum realism, opting for Aspect’s acceptance of some kind of reality behind the wave-function, while Zeilinger suggests that everything comes from information. In our opinion, the case is the opposite: it is information that comes from the existence of things. The aim of this paper is to justify why we think that the underlying reality (in Aspect’s sense) can be seen as a quantum ontology of non-individuals.
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The causal closure of the physical is often formulated as the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. That formulation leaves two parameters tacit: the domain over which closure is asserted, and the completeness relation—causal, dynamical, or explanatory—that closure asserts of it. Both become unstable when the term physical is indexed to competing quantum ontologies. Wave-function realism treats the quantum state as a field on a high-dimensional space, whereas primitive-ontology, spacetime-state, multi-field, and nomological approaches characterize the fundamental ontology differently. I distinguish spatiotemporal-domain closure from fundamental-physical closure and separate causal closure from dynamical and explanatory completeness. Conditional on wave-function realism, spacetime-restricted closure fails if ordinary spacetime is derivative, but theory-relative closure may remain true once the wave function is counted as physical. The apparent conflict therefore does not establish a trans-domain causal breach. It reveals a formulation dilemma for causal arguments for physicalism: a spacetime-restricted closure principle is too narrow to accommodate serious quantum ontologies, while a theory-relative principle requires an independent, non-question-begging criterion of physicality—and an explicit bridge from dynamical to causal completeness—before it can exclude nonphysical mental causes. Quantum ontology thus converts the familiar problem of characterizing the physical from a deferrable objection into a structural requirement on causal arguments for physicalism, without supporting interactionist dualism. It also explains why appeals to Hilbert space, the PBR theorem, the Born rule, or Bohmian guidance cannot by themselves yield the stronger conclusion.
Quantum mechanics, even in its early and simple phases, has often been regarded as a non-causal discipline. The argument supporting this view cites the uncertainty principle as prohibiting the ascertainment of complete knowledge concerning physical states upon which causal prediction could be based. Recent developments in atomic physics have added new and puzzling features to the problem of causality insofar as they operate, not only with intrinsically unmeasurable states, but also with time reversals which have been interpreted to mean that the effect can be prior to the cause. Feynman's theory of quantum electrodynamics is particularly rich in unorthodox suggestions which tantalise philosophers. The purpose of the present paper is to exhibit them, appraise their methodological function and see in what manner they violate the rules of causal description. This purpose, it seems, is best achieved by a sequential discussion of three questions: What does causality mean in physics? What is the new method of quantum electrodynamics? Is this new method compatible with the causal doctrine in some satisfactory form?
Presenting a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and, in particular, a realistic view of quantum waves, this book defends, with one exception, Schrodinger's views on quantum mechanics. Johansson goes on to defend the view that the collapse of a wave function during a measurement is a real physical collapse of a wave and argues that the collapse is a consequence of quantisation of interaction. Lastly Johansson argues for a revised principle of individuation in the quantum domain and that this principle enables a sort of explanation of non-local phenomena.