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Journal of Modern Physics

A “Potency-Act” Interpretation of Quantum Physics

Alberto Strumia

Published Jan 1, 2021• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Some considerations are presented on the so called “ontological interpretations” of quantum physics, starting from a remark by Werner Heisenberg on the relation between the probabilistic character of quantum states and the Aristotelian notion of “potency”. We show how an interesting revival of the original idea by Heisenberg can be found in the recent scientific and epistemological literature, in order to solve some paradoxical aspects emerging within some of the usual interpretations of quantum physics. Moreover a way seems to be open in order to rediscover the role of Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of “analogy” of “causal agents” operating even in the physical world. The “Potency-Act” interpretation of quantum physics appears aside the role of the Aristotelian notion of “Form” when it is compared with the recent notion of “information” in the context of the physics of “complex systems” and the biology of “living systems”.

DOI
10.4236/jmp.2021.127058

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•Sep 13, 2026•0 citations
Some considerations are presented on the so called “ontological interpretations” of quantum physics, starting from a remark by Werner Heisenberg on the relation between the probabilistic character of quantum states and the Aristotelian notion of “potency”. We show how an interesting revival of the original idea by Heisenberg can be found in the recent scientific and epistemological literature, in order to solve some paradoxical aspects emerging within some of the usual interpretations of quantum physics. Moreover a way seems to be open in order to rediscover the role of Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of “analogy” of “causal agents” operating even in the physical world. The “Potency-Act” interpretation of quantum physics appears aside the role of the Aristotelian notion of “Form” when it is compared with the recent notion of “information” in the context of the physics of “complex systems” and the biology of “living systems”.
Abstract When Werner Heisenberg presented his views of the fundamental indeterminism to which his uncertainty principle pointed in the basic levels of reality described by quantum mechanics, he used the Aristotelian technical terms of act and potency, affirming that the quantum system is in potency before the measurement and that the potency was actualised when the measurement took place, speaking thus of a ‘new ontology’ of quantum mechanics. I argue that Thomas Aquinas’ Aristotelian account of indeterminism in nature, through his analysis of the notions of matter as potency and form as act, can provide a suitable framework to understand Heisenberg's philosophical intuition about the nature of quantum systems.
The discovery of quantum physics opened a broad debate on the epistemological status of the principle of causality. In this article, I analyze the problem of causality in Heisenberg by distinguishing two levels of philosophical explanation in his thought. As a philosopher of science, his understanding of causality is closely linked to Moritz Schlick, although he will later adopt a neo-Kantian view of the a priori. As a philosopher of nature, Heisenberg recovers the notion of potency to understand the wave function. My thesis is that this notion of potency could have allowed him to elaborate a realistic and nondeterministic theory of causality, but the identification of causality and determinism (in Schlick’s line) did not lead him to such a conclusion.
Does the success of quantum mechanics require that we abandon the notion of complete scientific explanation? Or does it represent a breakthrough in the explanatory scope of physical theories? Ever since Werner Heisenberg formulated the theory of matrix mechanics in 1925, this issue has been the topic of a continuing philosophical debate. In this essay I propose to explain Heisenberg's rejection of the mechanistic philosophy associated with classical physics and the significance of his return to Aristotle's concept of matter as potency.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
In this paper, epistemology and ontology of quantum states are discussed based on a completely new way of founding quantum theory. The fundamental notions are conceptual variables in the mind of an observer or in the joint minds of a group of observers. These conceptual variables are very often accessible, that is, it is possible to find values of the variables by doing experiments or by making measurements. An important notion is that of maximal accessibility. It is shown here that this new machinery may facilitate the discussion of when a specific quantum state can be given an ontological interpretation, and also the more speculative question whether all states can be given such an interpretation. The discussion here is general, and has implications for the basic problem of how one should look upon information from experiments and measurement, in particularly the question concerning when this information may reflect properties of the real world.
This article develops a contextual Boolean formalization of the Bell-Bohm-Modal-Thomistic (BBMT) model under the provisional name Contextual Ontological Actualization Framework (COAF). Its central thesis is deliberately limited: Boolean algebra does not prove the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics of potency and actuality, but it can represent, within compatible quantum contexts, a disciplined sequence of determination, modality, actualization, and renewed determination. That is, it aims to show a path to accessing analogical ontology from BBMT. In this case, the idea is to maximize the algebraic route and postpone conceptual interpretation until the last moment. As I will show in subsequent articles, other options exist, but for now we will follow this path. Under this proposal, the global network of quantum propositions is distinguished from Boolean subalgebras associated with compatible observables, while a privileged beable algebra linked to position is examined as the domain in which a defined valuation can be assigned without postulating a prohibited global valuation1. On the other hand, the transition from physical-mathematical structure to ontology is governed neither by univocal identity nor by equivocal separation, but by a composite analogy. At this point, it is necessary to keep in mind two elements of the realist ontological framework that inspire BBMT-COAF: 1) Reality is divided into actual and potential; that is, potency is part of reality, because otherwise it would be impossible for a being to become actual. 2) The entity, as a transcendental concept, is analogous, and this analogy is twofold: it possesses a horizontal dimension expressed in proportionality and a vertical dimension expressed in its attributive predicability. This last element is the position subscribed to by the author in the discussion of specialists, which should be taken beforehand as a hermeneutical prejudice. Horizontally, a proper proportionality analogy compares the relation between physical possibility and physical actuality with that between potentiality and act. Vertically, an analogy of intrinsic attribution orders physical actuality and potentiality to their ontological analogs. Building on Ángel González Álvarez's synthesis of the Thomistic analogy and Santiago Ramírez's proposed correction to the Cayetano-Suárez opposition, this work also clarifies the conception of being that should govern the interpretation: a being is not an abstract logical unity, but rather the inseparable unity of essence and existence, intrinsically realized in diverse ways. Consequently, COAF is presented as a research program and a formal correspondence, not as a deduction of ontology from quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we must not forget that we are attempting to demonstrate that the analogical realist interpretation is not contradictory; that is, we begin with analogy and then demonstrate that this interpretive option of scientific realism does not lead to contradiction. This technique does not imply circularity and is used in various sciences when direct demonstration, whether experimental or deductive, is not possible. It thus proves that a proposition considered true will maintain this condition as long as no derived contradiction is found. Moreover, we must also remember that the BBMT model and its COAF form part of a hermeneutic and, consequently, interpretive thesis.