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Werner Heisenberg and Thomas Aquinas on Natural Indeterminism

Ignacio Silva

Published Nov 1, 2013• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract When Werner Heisenberg presented his views of the fundamental indeterminism to which his uncertainty principle pointed in the basic levels of reality described by quantum mechanics, he used the Aristotelian technical terms of act and potency, affirming that the quantum system is in potency before the measurement and that the potency was actualised when the measurement took place, speaking thus of a ‘new ontology’ of quantum mechanics. I argue that Thomas Aquinas’ Aristotelian account of indeterminism in nature, through his analysis of the notions of matter as potency and form as act, can provide a suitable framework to understand Heisenberg's philosophical intuition about the nature of quantum systems.

DOI
10.1111/nbfr.12036

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Abstract When Werner Heisenberg presented his views of the fundamental indeterminism to which his uncertainty principle pointed in the basic levels of reality described by quantum mechanics, he used the Aristotelian technical terms of act and potency, affirming that the quantum system is in potency before the measurement and that the potency was actualised when the measurement took place, speaking thus of a ‘new ontology’ of quantum mechanics. I argue that Thomas Aquinas’ Aristotelian account of indeterminism in nature, through his analysis of the notions of matter as potency and form as act, can provide a suitable framework to understand Heisenberg's philosophical intuition about the nature of quantum systems.
Some considerations are presented on the so called “ontological interpretations” of quantum physics, starting from a remark by Werner Heisenberg on the relation between the probabilistic character of quantum states and the Aristotelian notion of “potency”. We show how an interesting revival of the original idea by Heisenberg can be found in the recent scientific and epistemological literature, in order to solve some paradoxical aspects emerging within some of the usual interpretations of quantum physics. Moreover a way seems to be open in order to rediscover the role of Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of “analogy” of “causal agents” operating even in the physical world. The “Potency-Act” interpretation of quantum physics appears aside the role of the Aristotelian notion of “Form” when it is compared with the recent notion of “information” in the context of the physics of “complex systems” and the biology of “living systems”.
The discovery of quantum physics opened a broad debate on the epistemological status of the principle of causality. In this article, I analyze the problem of causality in Heisenberg by distinguishing two levels of philosophical explanation in his thought. As a philosopher of science, his understanding of causality is closely linked to Moritz Schlick, although he will later adopt a neo-Kantian view of the a priori. As a philosopher of nature, Heisenberg recovers the notion of potency to understand the wave function. My thesis is that this notion of potency could have allowed him to elaborate a realistic and nondeterministic theory of causality, but the identification of causality and determinism (in Schlick’s line) did not lead him to such a conclusion.
Does the success of quantum mechanics require that we abandon the notion of complete scientific explanation? Or does it represent a breakthrough in the explanatory scope of physical theories? Ever since Werner Heisenberg formulated the theory of matrix mechanics in 1925, this issue has been the topic of a continuing philosophical debate. In this essay I propose to explain Heisenberg's rejection of the mechanistic philosophy associated with classical physics and the significance of his return to Aristotle's concept of matter as potency.
The innovations to physics introduced by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr via quantum mechanics presented them with epistemological and metaphysical challenges with which they were perpetually engaged. Among Heisenberg’s innovations are the complex-valued quantum state-transition probability amplitudes, and among Bohr’s the non- trivial role of the measuring environment in the procurement of data. In his article, Arkady Plotnitsky examines the responses of these two natural philosophers to these challenges through the lens of Pythagoreanism in terms of the rational and the irrational. He argues that Bohr’s philosophical stance is of the Reality-without-Realism sort in that Bohr holds quantum reality to be unrepresentable, and that Heisenberg’s is of the Pythagorean-realist sort in that Heisenberg comes to hold reality to be representable, but only by mathematics. Here, I argue that Heisenberg’s later representation of reality can be characterized as neo- Aristotelian because, among other relevant things, he intentionally develops quantum potentiality, which is essential to his late interpretation of the quantum formalism, as a quantification of Aristotle’s potentia.
One of the main philosophical problems of quantum mechanics is understanding in what manner Schödinger's wave function can said to be real.In this paper I explore the ways in which the Aristotelian notion of potentiality could be used to understand the reality of the wave function, as suggested by Heisenberg in some of his writings.For this reason I sketch some of the potential complications in the interpretation of wave function while trying to develop Aristotle's philosophy of potentiality in relation to quantum mechanics.I will also attempt to demonstrate the connections of Popper's account of propensities with the notion of potentiality.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle constitutes one of the foundational pillars of quantum mechanics and represents a definitive rupture with the deterministic ideal of classical physics. This work develops a comprehensive analysis of the uncertainty principle from a mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspective, demonstrating that it should not be interpreted as an instrumental or epistemological limitation, but rather as an ontological property inherent to the formalstructure of quantum theory.Within the framework of Hilbert spaces, self-adjoint operators, and non-commutative algebras, it is shown that uncertainty emerges necessarily as a consequence of the structural incompatibility between conjugate observables. The study articulates the uncertainty principle with classical chaos theory and the sciences of complexity, establishing a fundamental distinction between epistemological unpredictability and ontological indeterminacy. While classical chaos preserves well-defined trajectories that are practically inaccessible, quantum mechanics eliminates the very notion of trajectory as a fundamental entity.This rupture manifests itself in the granularity of phase space, the impossibility of defining exact initial conditions, and the consequent reformulation of determinism. Contemporary experimental developments designed to exclude instrumental disturbances are analyzed, reinforcing the ontological interpretation of the uncertainty principle.Finally, the implications for simulation, predictability, and quantumOverall, this work argues that the uncertainty principle does not undermine scientific rationality, but rather redefines itsscope and deepens our understanding of physical reality. Keywords: uncertainty principle; quantum mechanics; mathematical structure; non-commutative operators; chaos theory; complexity; determinism; physical ontology.