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Oxford University Press eBooks

In Defense of the Metaphysics of Entanglement

David Glick, George Darby

Published Apr 30, 2020• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum entanglement has long been thought to have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humeansupervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. This chapter discusses two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—which appear quite different but, as the authors see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, the chapter claims, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What the chapter advocates instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198831501.003.0010

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There has recently been debate in the literature over whether the metaphysical doctrine popularly known as Humean supervenience can be reconciled—in whole or in part—with certain empirical facts about quantum entanglement. In this paper, I undertake a critical analysis of Humean efforts to effect such a reconciliation. I begin with a discussion of the relationship between Humeanism and quantum mechanics; I suggest that there are some difficulties even when considering single-particle quantum mechanics, but agree that the real problems come when considering many-particle quantum mechanics. I then review the available strategies for overcoming this problem, and find them wanting.

•Jan 31, 2016•1 citation
Quantum entanglement has long been thought to have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humeansupervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. This chapter discusses two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—which appear quite different but, as the authors see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, the chapter claims, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What the chapter advocates instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.
Abstract In quantum mechanics, entangled states are not exotic or rare. Rather, entanglement is the norm and so the metaphysical consequences of entanglement are a central issue for anyone wishing to provide an ontological interpretation of the various formulations of quantum mechanics. This chapter presents the argument for wave function realism from quantum entanglement, which says that wave function realism is necessary if one wants an ontological interpretation that does not conflate distinct quantum states. It explains quantum entanglement and how postulating a wave function in higher dimensions can help to metaphysically ground the phenomenon. The chapter ultimately concludes that the argument from quantum entanglement fails as there are several rival positions that can also explain quantum entanglement and recover the distinctions between different entangled states. These include the primitive ontology approach, various other holisms, ontic structural realism, spacetime state realism, and the multi-field approach.
David Lewis is a natural target for those who believe that findings in quantum physics threaten the tenability of traditional metaphysical reductionism. Such philosophers point to allegedly holistic entities they take both to be the subjects of some claims of quantum mechanics and to be incompatible with Lewisian metaphysics. According to one popular argument, the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement, any realist interpretation of quantum theory is straightforwardly inconsistent with the reductive conviction that the complete physical state of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of and spatio-temporal relations between its point-sized constituents. Here I defend Lewis's metaphysical doctrine, and traditional reductionism more generally, against this alleged threat from quantum holism. After presenting the non-separability argument from entanglement, I show that Bohmian mechanics, an interpretation of quantum mechanics explicitly recognized as a realist one by proponents of the non-separability argument, plausibly rejects a key premise of that argument. Another holistic worry for Humeanism persists, however, the trouble being the apparently holistic character of the Bohmian pilot wave. I present a Humean strategy for addressing the holistic threat from the pilot wave by drawing on resources from the Humean best system account of laws.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Concept of quantum entanglement, its role in physics, philosophy, and in updating general worldview are studied in this article. It is pointed out that Schrodinger introduced this concept and some derivatives from it into description of physical reality in the 1935 article in the context of discussion around the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment, but in the related 1936 publication he did not use them. Taking into account the concepts of a mixture and statistical operator, which were introduced by von Neumann and borrowed by Schrödinger, it is shown that the concept of entanglement is not necessary in quantum mechanics unconditionally. At a certain moment of development of the complex quantum systems theory, this concept and its derivatives served as not very successful substitutes for the concepts of a mixture, situation of a mixture. Comparative analysis of some Schrödinger’s, von Neumann’s, and Landau’s theoretical works concludes that imagination of a complex quantum system as a quasi-mechanical aggregate was gradually being overcome; its objective wholeness was being substantiated instead. Therefore, wholeness is inherent not only to quantum phenomena, but also to quantum systems by itself, objectively. By the essence, just the attempt to think this circumstance had brought into life the concept of quantum entanglement. The concept of a mixture and its substitutes – the concepts of entangled state, entanglement, etc. – have not only the scientific but some metaphysical meaning as well: they prove the possibility of rational thinking of wholeness, the reasonableness and effectiveness of rational holism. Therefore, the metaphysics of quantum entanglement in its correct understanding is a manifestation of the rational holism metaphysics. Complete explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment requires consideration of both these appearances of the quantum wholeness. One can say the essential result of long-term discussion of the EPR experiment is the exhaustive recognition of the quantum reality wholeness. A row of generalizations achieved by A. Alexandrov, I. Tsekhmistro, and D.Bohm are considered. Together with the completed study of the concept of quantum entanglement or Bohr's substantiation of the concept of undivided quantum phenomenon, they support irreducibility of physical reality, the Universe in general to any set of Democritian atoms and their countless combinations, aggregates. All this enriches and improves the understanding of the Universe as a real wholeness. Perhaps, this understanding will be newest substitution for the hitherto popular worldview in the spirit of Democritus.
There has recently been debate in the literature over whether the metaphysical doctrine popularly known as Humean supervenience can be reconciled—in whole or in part—with certain empirical facts about quantum entanglement. In this paper, I undertake a critical analysis of Humean efforts to effect such a reconciliation. I begin with a discussion of the relationship between Humeanism and quantum mechanics; I suggest that there are some difficulties even when considering single-particle quantum mechanics, but agree that the real problems come when considering many-particle quantum mechanics. I then review the available strategies for overcoming this problem, and find them wanting.