In the generalized Russian cards problem, we have a card deck
X of
n cards and three participants, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, dealt
a,
b, and
c cards, respectively. Once the cards are dealt, Alice and Bob wish to privately communicate their hands to each other via public announcements, without the advantage of a shared secret or public key infrastructure. Cathy, for her part, should remain ignorant of all but her own cards after Alice and Bob have made their announcements. Notions for Cathy's ignorance in the literature range from Cathy not learning the fate of any individual card with certainty (weak
1-security) to not gaining any probabilistic advantage in guessing the fate of some set of
δ cards (perfect
δ-security). As we demonstrate in this work, the generalized Russian cards problem has close ties to the field of combinatorial designs, on which we rely heavily, particularly for perfect security notions. Our main result establishes an equivalence between perfectly
δ-secure strategies and
(c+δ)-designs on
n points with block size
a, when announcements are chosen uniformly at random from the set of possible announcements. We also provide construction methods and example solutions, including a construction that yields perfect
1-security against Cathy when
c=2. Drawing on our equivalence results, we are able to use a known combinatorial design to construct a strategy with
a=8,
b=13, and
c=3 that is perfectly
2-secure. Finally, we consider a variant of the problem that yields solutions that are easy to construct and optimal with respect to both the number of announcements and level of security achieved. Moreover, this is the first method obtaining weak
δ-security that allows Alice to hold an arbitrary number of cards and Cathy to hold a set of
c=⌊2a−δ⌋ cards. Alternatively, the construction yields solutions for arbitrary
δ,
c and any
a≥δ+2c.
In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide weak security, where Alice and Bob’s exchanges do not allow Cath to know with certainty who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic information about who holds any given card. We propose an intermediate notion, which we call
ε -strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor of
ε . We then show that strategies based on affine or projective geometries yield
ε -strong safety for arbitrarily small
ε and appropriately chosen values of a, b, c.
Consider three players Alice, Bob and Cath who hold a, b and c cards, respectively, from a deck of d=a+b+c cards. The cards are all different and players only know their own cards. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning whether Alice or Bob holds a specific card. Considering the cards as consecutive natural numbers 0,1,..., we investigate general conditions for when Alice or Bob can safely announce the sum of the cards they hold modulo an appropriately chosen integer. We demonstrate that this holds whenever a,b>2 and c=1. Because Cath holds a single card, this also implies that Alice and Bob will learn the card deal from the other player's announcement.
The multiparty secret key exchange problem is to find a k-player protocol for generating an n-bit random key. At the end of the protocol, the key should be known to each player but remain completely secret from a computationally unlimited eavesdropper, Eve, who overhears all communication among the players. The players are initially dealt hands of cards of prespecified sizes from a deck of distinct cards; any remaining cards are given to Eve. Considered here is the case in which each player receives the same fraction fi of the cards in the deck, for fi in the interval (0; 1=k]. The efficiency of a secret key exchange protocol is measured by the smallest deck size d 0 for which the protocol is guaranteed of success. A secret key exchange protocol is presented with d 0 = O(n(1=fi) 2:71 ). The best previous bound, by Fischer, Paterson, and Rackoff (1991), was super-polynomial in 1=fi and only handled the special case of k = 2 and n = 1. 1 Introduction The problem of multiparty secret ...
We consider the generic problem of Secure Aggregation of Distributed Information (SADI), where several agents acting as a team have information distributed among them, modeled by means of a publicly known deck of cards distributed among the agents, so that each of them knows only her cards. The agents have to exchange and aggregate the information about how the cards are distributed among them by means of public announcements over insecure communication channels, intercepted by an adversary eavesdropper, in such a way that the adversary does not learn who holds any of the cards. We present a combinatorial construction of protocols that provides a direct solution of a class of SADI problems and develop a technique of iterated reduction of SADI problems to smaller ones which are eventually solvable directly. We show that our methods provide a solution to a large class of SADI problems, including all SADI problems with sufficiently large size and sufficiently balanced card distributions.
Abstract : Protocols are developed and analyzed for transmitting a secret bit between a sender and a receiver process using only the information contained in a random deal of hands of specified sizes from a deck of n distinct cards. The sender's and receiver's algorithms are known i advance, and all conversation between sender and receiver is public and is heard by all. A correct protocol always succeeds in transmitting the secret bit, and the other player(s), who receive the remaining cards and are assumed to have unlimited computing power, gain no information whatsoever about the value of the secret bit. In other words, their probability of correctly guessing the secret is bit exactly the same after listening to a run of the protocol as it was before. Both randomized and deterministic protocols are considered. A randomized protocol is described which works whenever the sender's and receiver's hands comprise a constant fraction of the deck, for all sufficiently large decks. A deterministic protocol is also described, but it requires the sender and receiver to each have approximately 44% of the cards. A general condition is presented that provides a lower bound on sizes of the sender's and receiver's hands in order for a protocol to exist. There is still a considerable gap between the upper and lower bounds, and improving the bounds remains an open problem. (kr)