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DIMACS series in discrete mathematics and theoretical computer science

Secret bit transmission using a random deal of cards

Michael J. Fischer, Michael S. Paterson, Charles Rackoff

Published Apr 3, 1991• 25 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract : Protocols are developed and analyzed for transmitting a secret bit between a sender and a receiver process using only the information contained in a random deal of hands of specified sizes from a deck of n distinct cards. The sender's and receiver's algorithms are known i advance, and all conversation between sender and receiver is public and is heard by all. A correct protocol always succeeds in transmitting the secret bit, and the other player(s), who receive the remaining cards and are assumed to have unlimited computing power, gain no information whatsoever about the value of the secret bit. In other words, their probability of correctly guessing the secret is bit exactly the same after listening to a run of the protocol as it was before. Both randomized and deterministic protocols are considered. A randomized protocol is described which works whenever the sender's and receiver's hands comprise a constant fraction of the deck, for all sufficiently large decks. A deterministic protocol is also described, but it requires the sender and receiver to each have approximately 44% of the cards. A general condition is presented that provides a lower bound on sizes of the sender's and receiver's hands in order for a protocol to exist. There is still a considerable gap between the upper and lower bounds, and improving the bounds remains an open problem. (kr)

DOI
10.1090/dimacs/002/11

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The multiparty secret key exchange problem is to find a k-player protocol for generating an n-bit random key. At the end of the protocol, the key should be known to each player but remain completely secret from a computationally unlimited eavesdropper, Eve, who overhears all communication among the players. The players are initially dealt hands of cards of prespecified sizes from a deck of distinct cards; any remaining cards are given to Eve. Considered here is the case in which each player receives the same fraction fi of the cards in the deck, for fi in the interval (0; 1=k]. The efficiency of a secret key exchange protocol is measured by the smallest deck size d 0 for which the protocol is guaranteed of success. A secret key exchange protocol is presented with d 0 = O(n(1=fi) 2:71 ). The best previous bound, by Fischer, Paterson, and Rackoff (1991), was super-polynomial in 1=fi and only handled the special case of k = 2 and n = 1. 1 Introduction The problem of multiparty secret ...

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Achieving perfect secrecy using correlated random variables

Michael J. Fischer, Rebecca N. Wright

We present a general model for communication among a of players, $P\sb{1}$ through $P\sb{k}$, overheard by a passive eavesdropper, Eve, in which all players including Eve are given private inputs that may be correlated. We define and explore secret key exchange in this model. A protocol specifies how the team players behave. A source specifies a distribution on the team players' inputs. Together, a protocol and a source are a system. An adequate notion of secrecy must depend not only on the protocol, but on any relevant Eve may have about the source. We provide precise mathematical definitions of the multiparty secret key exchange problem that take Eve's into account, and allow us to determine whether a given system achieves secret key exchange with respect to any particular type of knowledge for Eve. Our secrecy requirements are information-theoretic and hold even if Eve is computationally unlimited. We explore the properties of secret key exchange systems and show formally the intuitive result that the team players' inputs must be correlated in order for secret key exchange to be achieved. We show that any source has a finite capacity for secret key exchange even if the team players are allowed unlimited independent randomization. Specifically, the capacity of a source is the largest number of output values of any secret key exchange system using that source. We present an upper bound on the capacity of arbitrary sources. In the second half of the dissertation, we focus our attention on sources yielding inputs consisting of hands of prespecified sizes from a randomly shuffled deck of cards. We exhibit several secret key exchange protocols designed to work even if Eve is allowed to see the remaining cards in the deck. Let each team player $P\sb{i}$ hold $s\sb{i}$ cards, let Eve hold $s\sb{e}$ cards, and let k be the number of team players. We present a family of key set protocols, a simple family of protocols that achieve one-bit secret key exchange provided that max $s\sb{i}$ + min $s\sb{i} \ge k$ + $s\sb{e}$. We use a game-theoretic argument to exhibit an optimal key set protocol. Of particular interest is the symmetric case in which each player receives the same fraction $\beta$ of the cards in the deck. The efficiency of a secret key exchange protocol is measured by the smallest deck size $d\sb{0}$ for which the protocol is guaranteed of success. The best previous bound (Fischer, Paterson, and Rackoff, 1991) was super-polynomial in 1/$\beta$ and only handled the special case of k = 2 and n = 1. We present the transformation protocol, which achieves n-bit secret key exchange in the symmetric case for any deck size $d > d\sb{0}$ = O(n(1/$\beta)\sp{2.71}$). Using the transformation protocol, we show that if $d \ge$ (42.8) $\cdot$ (1/$\beta)\sp{2.71}$(n + 0.07), then the capacity of a source in which each team player receives $\beta d$ cards is at least 2$\sp{n}$. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

•Jan 1, 1994•4 citations
Abstract : Protocols are developed and analyzed for transmitting a secret bit between a sender and a receiver process using only the information contained in a random deal of hands of specified sizes from a deck of n distinct cards. The sender's and receiver's algorithms are known i advance, and all conversation between sender and receiver is public and is heard by all. A correct protocol always succeeds in transmitting the secret bit, and the other player(s), who receive the remaining cards and are assumed to have unlimited computing power, gain no information whatsoever about the value of the secret bit. In other words, their probability of correctly guessing the secret is bit exactly the same after listening to a run of the protocol as it was before. Both randomized and deterministic protocols are considered. A randomized protocol is described which works whenever the sender's and receiver's hands comprise a constant fraction of the deck, for all sufficiently large decks. A deterministic protocol is also described, but it requires the sender and receiver to each have approximately 44% of the cards. A general condition is presented that provides a lower bound on sizes of the sender's and receiver's hands in order for a protocol to exist. There is still a considerable gap between the upper and lower bounds, and improving the bounds remains an open problem. (kr)
The multiparty secret key exchange problem is to find a k-player protocol for generating an n-bit random key. At the end of the protocol, the key should be known to each player but remain completely secret from a computationally unlimited eavesdropper, Eve, who overhears all communication among the players. The players are initially dealt hands of cards of prespecified sizes from a deck of distinct cards; any remaining cards are given to Eve. Considered here is the case in which each player receives the same fraction fi of the cards in the deck, for fi in the interval (0; 1=k]. The efficiency of a secret key exchange protocol is measured by the smallest deck size d 0 for which the protocol is guaranteed of success. A secret key exchange protocol is presented with d 0 = O(n(1=fi) 2:71 ). The best previous bound, by Fischer, Paterson, and Rackoff (1991), was super-polynomial in 1=fi and only handled the special case of k = 2 and n = 1. 1 Introduction The problem of multiparty secret ...
In unconditionally secure protocols, a sender and receiver are able to communicate their secrets to each other without the eavesdropper(s) being able to learn the secret, even when the eavesdropper intercepts the entire communication. We investigate such protocols for the special case of deals of cards over players, where two players aim to communicate to each other their hand of cards without the remaining player(s) learning a single card from either hand. In this contribution we show that a particular protocol of length strictly larger than two (i.e., consisting of more than just one announcement by one player, and one other announcement by the other player) is after all not acceptable, and therefore does not constitute a new solution. The demonstration requires a detailed case-based analysis. The result may bring a general approach to arbitrary finite-length protocols closer.
In the research area of card-based secure computation, one of the long-standing open problems is a problem proposed by Crépeau and Kilian at CRYPTO 1993. This is to develop an efficient protocol using a deck of physical cards that generates uniformly at random a permutation with no fixed points (called a derangement), where the resulting permutation must be secret against the parties in the protocol. All the existing protocols for the problem have a common issue of lacking a guarantee to halt within a finite number of steps. In this paper, we investigate feasibility and infeasibility for the problem where both a uniformly random output and a finite runtime is required. First, we propose a way of reducing the original problem, which is to sample a uniform distribution over an inefficiently large set of the derangements, to another problem of sampling a non-uniform distribution but with a significantly smaller underlying set. This result will be a base of a new approach to the problem. On the other hand, we also give (assuming the abc conjecture), under a certain formal model, an asymptotic lower bound of the number of cards for protocols solving the problem using uniform shuffles only. This result would give a supporting evidence for the necessity of dealing with non-uniform distributions such as in the aforementioned first part of our result.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a secure computation protocol realized by using physical cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography: public and private models. We adopt private one that allows players to handle cards privately. While much of the existing works for card-based cryptography use two-colored cards, it is also a vital task to construct an efficient protocol with playing cards. In the public model, 2n cards are necessary for any n-bit input protocol since at least two cards are required to express a Boolean value. It holds true for both two-colored and playing-card settings. On the other hand, the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards. However, all existing protocols that achieve such properties are only in the two-colored setting. This paper shows that the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards using the playing cards. We first show two-bit input protocols with fewer than four cards for logical operations, AND, OR, and XOR. Furthermore, we show a three-input majority voting protocol using only three cards, which is constructed by combining our AND and OR protocols. Notably, our proposed protocols require no randomness. All operations are deterministic and depend only on players’ private inputs.
We present a general model for communication among a of players, $P\sb{1}$ through $P\sb{k}$, overheard by a passive eavesdropper, Eve, in which all players including Eve are given private inputs that may be correlated. We define and explore secret key exchange in this model. A protocol specifies how the team players behave. A source specifies a distribution on the team players' inputs. Together, a protocol and a source are a system. An adequate notion of secrecy must depend not only on the protocol, but on any relevant Eve may have about the source. We provide precise mathematical definitions of the multiparty secret key exchange problem that take Eve's into account, and allow us to determine whether a given system achieves secret key exchange with respect to any particular type of knowledge for Eve. Our secrecy requirements are information-theoretic and hold even if Eve is computationally unlimited. We explore the properties of secret key exchange systems and show formally the intuitive result that the team players' inputs must be correlated in order for secret key exchange to be achieved. We show that any source has a finite capacity for secret key exchange even if the team players are allowed unlimited independent randomization. Specifically, the capacity of a source is the largest number of output values of any secret key exchange system using that source. We present an upper bound on the capacity of arbitrary sources. In the second half of the dissertation, we focus our attention on sources yielding inputs consisting of hands of prespecified sizes from a randomly shuffled deck of cards. We exhibit several secret key exchange protocols designed to work even if Eve is allowed to see the remaining cards in the deck. Let each team player $P\sb{i}$ hold $s\sb{i}$ cards, let Eve hold $s\sb{e}$ cards, and let k be the number of team players. We present a family of key set protocols, a simple family of protocols that achieve one-bit secret key exchange provided that max $s\sb{i}$ + min $s\sb{i} \ge k$ + $s\sb{e}$. We use a game-theoretic argument to exhibit an optimal key set protocol. Of particular interest is the symmetric case in which each player receives the same fraction β\betaβ of the cards in the deck. The efficiency of a secret key exchange protocol is measured by the smallest deck size $d\sb{0}$ for which the protocol is guaranteed of success. The best previous bound (Fischer, Paterson, and Rackoff, 1991) was super-polynomial in 1/β\betaβ and only handled the special case of k = 2 and n = 1. We present the transformation protocol, which achieves n-bit secret key exchange in the symmetric case for any deck size $d > d\sb{0}$ = O(n(1/$\beta)\sp{2.71}$). Using the transformation protocol, we show that if d≥d \ged≥ (42.8) ⋅\cdot⋅ (1/$\beta)\sp{2.71}$(n + 0.07), then the capacity of a source in which each team player receives βd\beta dβd cards is at least 2$\sp{n}$. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)