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Lecture notes in computer science

Multitarget Decryption Failure Attacks and Their Application to Saber and Kyber

Jan-Pieter D’Anvers, Senne Batsleer

Published Jan 1, 2022• 14 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-97121-2_1

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Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) based key reconciliation mechanisms (KRM) can be viewed as quantizing an M-LWE sample according to a lattice codebook. This paper describes a generic M-LWE-based KRM framework, valid for any dimensional lattices and any modulusqqqwithout a dither. Our main result is an explicit upper bound on the decryption failure rate (DFR) of M-LWE-based KRM. This bound allows us to construct optimal lattice quantizers to reduce the DFR and communication cost simultaneously. Moreover, we present a KRM scheme using the same security parameters(q,k,η1,η2)(q, k, \eta_{1}, \eta_{2})(q,k,η1​,η2​)as in Kyber. Compared with Kyber, the communication cost is reduced by up to 36.47% and the DFR is reduced by a factor of up to 299. The security arguments remain the same as Kyber.