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Lecture notes in computer science

Decryption Failure Attacks on IND-CCA Secure Lattice-Based Schemes

Jan-Pieter D’Anvers, Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson, Alexander Nilsson, Fréderik Vercauteren, Ingrid M.R. Verbauwhede

Published Jan 1, 2019• 73 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-17259-6_19

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Security is the primary consideration for cryptographic algorithms. For key encapsulation mechanisms, it is generally required to satisfy indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks(IND-CCA) in the quantum random oracle model(QROM). The approach of constructing IND-CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanisms from public-key encryption schemes that satisfy disjoint simulatability (DS) is tight. However, existing work on DS either does not consider decryption error rates or requires stronger security properties from the underlying schemes. In this work, we presents a DS-based reduction method that accounts for decryption errors without relying on IND-CPA and this method is applicable to most scenarios of lattice-based encryption schemes including LWE-baced and NTRU-based deterministic public key encryption(DPKE). This work can enhance confidence in the security of lattice-based encryption algorithms in the post-quantum era.
In 2013, Boneh and Zhandry introduced the notion of indistinguishability (IND) in chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks by a quantum adversary which is given superposition access to an oracle for encryption and decryption queries but is restricted to classical queries in the challenge phase. In this paper we define IND-CPA and IND-CCA notions for symmetric encryption schemes where the adversary has full quantum superposition access to the oracle, and give constructions that achieve these security notions. Our results are formulated in the concrete security framework.