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The Scope and Generality of Bell's Theorem

James Owen Weatherall

Published Jan 1, 2012• 4 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

I present a local, deterministic model of the EPR-Bohm experiment, inspired by recent work by Joy Christian, that appears at first blush to be in tension with Bell-type theorems. I argue that the model ultimately fails to do what a hidden variable theory needs to do, but that it is interesting nonetheless because the way it fails helps clarify the scope and generality of Bell-type theorems. I formulate and prove a minor proposition that makes explicit how Bell-type theorems rule out models of the sort I describe here.

Related papers

Whither All the Scope and Generality of Bell's Theorem?

Joy Christian

In a recent preprint James Owen Weatherall has attempted a simple local-deterministic model for the EPR-Bohm correlation and speculated about why his model fails when my counterexample to Bell's theorem succeeds. Here I bring out the physical, mathematical, and conceptual reasons why his model fails. In particular, I demonstrate why no model based on a tensor representation of the rotation group SU(2) can reproduce the EPR-Bohm correlation. I demonstrate this by calculating the correlation explicitly between measurement results A = +1 or -1 and B = +1 or -1 in a local and deterministic model respecting the spinor representation of SU(2). I conclude by showing how Weatherall's reading of my model is misguided at best and bring out a number of misconceptions and unwarranted assumptions in his imitation of my model, as it relates to Bell-CHSH inequalities.

arXiv:1301.1653•Jan 4, 2013•3 citations

Bell theorem

Franck Laloë

The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 30, 2012•0 citations

Non-Viability of a Counter-Argument to Bell's Theorem

M. Holman

It is demonstrated that a recently suggested model for the EPR-Bohm spin experiment, based on Clifford algebra valued local variables and observables, runs into very serious difficulties and can therefore not be taken as constituting a viable counter-example to Bell's theorem.

arXiv:0704.2038•Apr 16, 2007•2 citations

The EPR Experiment: A Prelude to Bohr's Reply to EPR

Michael Dickson

Recent work on Bohr's reply to EPR has helped improve our understanding of Bohr's reply, but further work is needed. In this paper I do two things towards that end. First, I make some elementary points about EPR's argument, which help to clear the air of some minor criticisms of Bohr's reply. Second, I argue that Bohr's thought experiment is a reasonable realization of EPR's argument, and I briefly suggest how to understand that experiment. I finish with a brief remark about Bohm's version of the experiment, and its relation to Bohr's.

arXiv:quant-ph/0102053•Feb 9, 2001•2 citations

A simplified local-realistic derivation of the EPR-Bohm correlation

Joy Christian

We illustrate an explicit counterexample to Bell's theorem by constructing a pair of spin variables within S^3 that exactly reproduces the EPR-Bohm correlation in a manifestly local-realistic manner.

•Oct 3, 2015•0 citations

Comments on "Disproof of Bell's theorem"

Florin Moldoveanu

In a series of very interesting papers [1-7], Joy Christian constructed a counterexample to Bell's theorem. This counterexample does not have the same assumptions as the original Bell's theorem, and therefore it does not represent a genuine disproof in a strict mathematical sense. However, assuming the physical relevance of the new assumptions, the counterexample is shown to be a contextual hidden variable theory. If Bell's theorem's importance is to rule out contextual hidden variable theories obeying relativistic locality, then Joy Christian's counterexample achieves its aim. If however contextual hidden variables theories are not considered genuine physically theories and Bell's theorem's importance stems from its ability to be experimentally confirmed, then Joy Christian's counterexample does not diminish the importance of Bell's theorem. The implications of Joy Christian's counterexample are discussed in the context of information theory. Version 2 note: Subsequent analysis disproved the mathematical consistency of Joy Christian's model. This paper was based on the assumption of the mathematical validity of the model. Except for the addition of this note, the content of this paper was not modified in any other way.

arXiv:1107.1007•Jul 6, 2011•2 citations
I present a local, deterministic model of the EPR-Bohm experiment, inspired by recent work by Joy Christian, that appears at first blush to be in tension with Bell-type theorems. I argue that the model ultimately fails to do what a hidden variable theory needs to do, but that it is interesting nonetheless because the way it fails helps clarify the scope and generality of Bell-type theorems. I formulate and prove a minor proposition that makes explicit how Bell-type theorems rule out models of the sort I describe here.
In a recent preprint James Owen Weatherall has attempted a simple local-deterministic model for the EPR-Bohm correlation and speculated about why his model fails when my counterexample to Bell's theorem succeeds. Here I bring out the physical, mathematical, and conceptual reasons why his model fails. In particular, I demonstrate why no model based on a tensor representation of the rotation group SU(2) can reproduce the EPR-Bohm correlation. I demonstrate this by calculating the correlation explicitly between measurement results A = +1 or -1 and B = +1 or -1 in a local and deterministic model respecting the spinor representation of SU(2). I conclude by showing how Weatherall's reading of my model is misguided at best and bring out a number of misconceptions and unwarranted assumptions in his imitation of my model, as it relates to Bell-CHSH inequalities.
The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.
Recent work on Bohr's reply to EPR has helped improve our understanding of Bohr's reply, but further work is needed. In this paper I do two things towards that end. First, I make some elementary points about EPR's argument, which help to clear the air of some minor criticisms of Bohr's reply. Second, I argue that Bohr's thought experiment is a reasonable realization of EPR's argument, and I briefly suggest how to understand that experiment. I finish with a brief remark about Bohm's version of the experiment, and its relation to Bohr's.
In a series of very interesting papers [1-7], Joy Christian constructed a counterexample to Bell's theorem. This counterexample does not have the same assumptions as the original Bell's theorem, and therefore it does not represent a genuine disproof in a strict mathematical sense. However, assuming the physical relevance of the new assumptions, the counterexample is shown to be a contextual hidden variable theory. If Bell's theorem's importance is to rule out contextual hidden variable theories obeying relativistic locality, then Joy Christian's counterexample achieves its aim. If however contextual hidden variables theories are not considered genuine physically theories and Bell's theorem's importance stems from its ability to be experimentally confirmed, then Joy Christian's counterexample does not diminish the importance of Bell's theorem. The implications of Joy Christian's counterexample are discussed in the context of information theory. Version 2 note: Subsequent analysis disproved the mathematical consistency of Joy Christian's model. This paper was based on the assumption of the mathematical validity of the model. Except for the addition of this note, the content of this paper was not modified in any other way.