The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.
The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.
2014.06.03 – the 25th anniversary of my phone-call re Mermin (1988) – 1989.06.03 Abstract: Generalizing Bell 1964:(15) to realizable experiments, CHSH (1969) coined the term “Bell’s theorem”. Since the results of such experiments (eg, see Aspect 2002) contradict Bell’s theorem: at least one step in his supposedly com-monsense analysis must be false. Using undergraduate maths and logic, we find a mathematical error, a false equality, in Bell (1964). Uncorrected, and therefore continuing, this error undermines all of Bell’s EPR-based analysis and many later variants, rendering them false. We can therefore predict with certainty that all loophole-free EPRB-style experiments will also give the lie to Bell’s theorem. “It is a matter of indifference... whether λ denotes a single variable or a set, or even a set of functions, and whether the variables are discrete or continuous. However, [Bell writes] as if λ were a single continuous parameter, ” Bell (1964:195). λ may denote “any number of hypothetical additional complementary variables needed to complete quantum mechanics in the way envisaged by EPR, ” Bell (2004:242); from his final essay. #1. Re Bell (1964) (which, like other key essays here, is available online; see References): Let the unnumbered equations between Bell’s (14)-(15) be (14a)-(14c). Let a,b, c replace his ~a,~b,~c. Given Bell’s (2004:242) λ specification above (from his final essay), let A(a, λi) and B(b, λ′i) denote the respective outcomes (±1) when Alice and Bob test the i-th particle-pair. #2. NB: Primes (′) distinguish λs in Bob’s domain from those in others. With i = 1, 2,.., N (and j similarly), there is no requirement here that any two particle-pairs should be the same. #3. Let expectation 〈A(a)B(b) 〉 replace Bell’s equivalent term P (~a,~b); etc. Let P (. | Z) denote a probability conditioned on Z: where Z is shorthand for EPRB, the experiment based
EPR (1935) famously argue that additional variables will bring locality and causality to QM's completion; we show that they are right. More famously, Bell (1964) cried 'impossible' against such variables; we give the shortest possible refutation of his theorem. With EPR-based variables -- and no QM -- a thought-experiment delivers common-sense locally-causal accounts of EPRB and GHZ in 3-space. We then find the flaw in Bell's theorem: Bell's 1964:(14a) does not equal Bell's 1964:(14b). Thus, at odds with EPR (and us), Bell's unrealistic theorem and its many variants (eg, Mermin, Peres) miss their mark. In short, mixing common-sense with undergrad math and physics in the classical way so favored by Einstein, we interpret QM locally and realistically. Long may EPR rule OK we say.
John Stewart Bell’s famous theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important developments in the foundations of physics. Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and implications remain controversial. Many workers assert that Bell’s theorem refutes the possibility suggested by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) of supplementing ordinary quantum theory with “hidden” variables that might restore determinism and/or some notion of an observer-independent reality. But Bell himself interpreted the theorem very differently—as establishing an “essential conflict” between the well-tested empirical predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. Our goal is to make Bell’s own views more widely known and to explain Bell’s little-known formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which his theorem rests. We also show precisely how Bell’s formulation of local causality can be used to derive an empirically testable Bell-type inequality and to recapitulate the EPR argument.
Bell's theorem contains the proposition that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) theory (hypothesis) of the existence of elements of reality together with Einstein locality permits a mathematical description of EPR experiments by functions that are all defined on one common probability space. This proposition leads in turn to restrictions for possible experimental outcomes that Bell expressed in terms of his well known inequalities and that Vorob'ev and others had investigated before Bell. Summarizing several previous publications and adding new material, the above proposition is refuted by Einstein-local counterexamples from classical physics and shown to involve additional assumptions that can not be justified for mutually exclusive (incompatible) measurements and experiments. Moreover, criticism of our work by Mermin who invoked "standard sampling arguments" is shown to be false.
This open letter challenges Annals of Physics' Editors and Bell's supporters on this front: in the context of Bell's theorem -- after AoP (2016:67) -- ‘it's a proven scientific fact that a violation of local realism has been demonstrated theoretically and experimentally.' We show that such claims under the Bellian canon are curtailed by its foundation on a naive realism that is known to be false; ie, under Bohr's old insight (in our terms), a test may disturb the tested system. Further: (i) We define a general all-embracing local realism -- CLR, commonsense local realism -- the union of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively). (ii) Under CLR, with EPR-based variables (and without QM), a thought-experiment delivers a local-realistic account of EPRB and GHZ in 3-space. (iii) Under EPR, mixing common-sense with undergrad math/physics in the classical way so favored by Einstein, we interpret QM locally and realistically. (iv) We find the flaw in Bell's theorem: Bell's 1964:(14a) ≠ Bell's 1964:(14b) under EPRB. (v) EPR (1935) famously argue that additional variables will bring locality and causality to QM's completion; we show that they are right. (vi) Even more famously, Bell (1964) cried ‘impossible' against such variables; we give the shortest possible refutation of his claim. (vii) Using Bell's (1988:88) moot gloss on a fragment of von Neumann's work, we conclude: ‘There's nothing to Bell's theorem -- nor Bellian variants like CHSH (1969), Mermin (1990), Peres (1995); nor Bellian endorsements like those by Bricmont, du Sautoy, Goldstein et al., Maudlin, Norsen, Shimony -- it's not just flawed, it's silly; its assumptions nonsense; it's not merely false but foolish' and misleading. (viii) Our results accord with common-sense, QM, Einstein's principles, EPR's belief and Bell's hopes and expectations.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.